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The selective refusal of administrative agencies to conduct their internal
proceedings consistently with adverse rulings of the courts of appeals-a
practice commonly termed agency nonacquiescence-is not new in Ameri-
can law. Over the past sixty years, many agencies have insisted, in vary-
ing degrees, on the authority to pursue their policies, despite conflicting
court decisions, until the Supreme Court is prepared to issue a nationally
binding resolution.1 For example, the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) asserted this prerogative as early as the 1940's,2 and has invoked
it intermittently since then.3 Similarly, since the 1920's, the Internal Rev-
enue Service (IRS) has periodically engaged in nonacquiescence.' These
practices were sufficiently pervasive to warrant extended unfavorable
comment in the 1975 report of the Hruska Commission on Revision of the
Federal Court Appellate System. 5 Nonetheless, despite occasional judicial
criticism,6 nonacquiescence persisted without either legitimation or in-
terdiction by Congress or the Supreme Court. The overall response of the
legal system was one of tolerance mixed with disquiet.
In the late 1970's, however, the courts of appeals began to express the
view that the practice borders on lawlessness and should not be tolerated."
The criticism of the Social Security Administration's (SSA's) aggressive
nonacquiescence during the first half of the Reagan Administration was
particularly scathing.8 In an effort to reduce the number of recipients of
1. Agencies have accepted, of course, the authority of the lower federal courts to enter rulings that
are binding resolutions of the particular dispute between the parties before the court. What is at stake
in the nonacquiescence context is the effect such adverse decisions have on the agency's subsequent
internal proceedings in other cases.
2. See Acme Indus. Police, 58 N.L.R.B. 1342, 1344-45 (1944).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 147-52.
4. See, e.g., Carter, The Commissioner's Nonacquiescence: A Case for a National Court of Tax
Appeals, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 879, 881-83 (1986); Dwan, Administrative Review of Judicial Decisions:
Treasury Practice, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 581, 599 (1946). For a discussion of nonacquiescence by the
IRS, see infra text accompanying notes 175-85.
5. Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure and Internal Pro-
cedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 349-61, app. B. (1975) [hereinafter Hruska
Commission Report].
6. See, e.g., Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 529, 532 (7th Cir. 1953), enforcing
99 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1952), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 909 (1953).
7. See, e.g., Borton, Inc. v. OSHRC, 734 F.2d 508, 510 (10th Cir. 1984); Yellow Taxi of Minn.
v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366, 382-83 (D.C. Cir. 1983); ITT World Communications v. FCC, 635 F.2d
32, 43 (2d Cir. 1980); Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 227-29 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 975 (1980); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 969-70 (3d Cir. 1979); Goodman's
Furniture Co. v. United States Postal Serv., 561 F.2d 462, 465 (3d Cir. 1977) (Weis, J., concurring);
May Dep't Stores v. Williamson, 549 F.2d 1147, 1149-50 (8th Cir. 1977) (Lay, J., concurring).
8. The judicial reaction is summarized infra text accompanying notes 97-126. For critical com-
mentary, see Heaney, Why the High Rate of Reversals in Social Security Disability Cases?, 7 HAM-
LINE L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1984); Neuborne, The Binding Quality of Supreme Court Precedent, 61 TUL.
L. REV. 991, 1002 n.32 (1987); Williams, The Social Security Administration's Policy of Non-Acqui-
escence, 12 N. Ky. L. REV. 253 (1985); Note, Social Security Nonacquiescence in Crisis: Non-Acqui-
escence and Social Insecurity, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 89 (1986); Note, Federal Agency Nonacquies-
cence: Defining and Enforcing Constitutional Limitations on Bad Faith Agency Adjudication, 38
ME. L. REV. 185 (1986); Lewis, A Profound Contempt, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1984, at A17, col. 5.
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Social Security disability benefits in the face of circuit court rulings re-
quiring proof of a change in medical condition before benefits could be
terminated, SSA directed its personnel to follow agency policy and disre-
gard contrary directions of the court of appeals.' The result was a series
of agency-court conflicts that culminated in the Ninth Circuit's entry of a
circuit-wide injunction against continued nonacquiescence in the Lopez v.
Heckler"0 litigation and in Congress's serious consideration of legislation
to bar SSA's nonacquiescence practice."
The SSA practice achieved particular notoriety because each of SSA's
decisions is normally reviewed, on appeal, in a single identifiable court of
appeals-the circuit in which the claimant resides.' 2 From the perspective
of the reviewing court, SSA's nonacquiescence appears to embody a claim
that the agency is entirely free to disregard binding law in the circuit. In
contrast, agencies such as the NLRB administer statutes with considerably
broader venue provisions;' 3 thus, a particular order may be reviewed by a
number of courts of appeals. While nonacquiescence by these agencies has
been criticized, the indictment is necessarily tempered by the fact that the
venue provisions make it difficult for any particular court of appeals to
insist on exclusive superintendence over the particular agency order.
The status of agency nonacquiescence in our legal system remains un-
certain. Despite considerable writings on the subject, there has been no
systematic evaluation of the practice's costs and benefits.' 4 Neither has
The agency's nonacquiescence practice was defended, however, by Deputy Solicitor General Paul
Bator and Deputy Assistant Attorney Carolyn Kuhl, see Remarks by Deputy Solicitor General Bator,
American Law Institute Luncheon (May 18, 1984) (on file with authors); Kuhl, The Social Security
Administration's Nonacquiescence Policy, 4 DET. C.L. REv. 913 (1984), as well as by some commen-
tators, see Comment, Social Security Continuing Disability Reviews and the Practice of Nonacquies-
cence, 16 CUMB. L. REv. 111 (1985); Note, Nonacquiescence: Health and Human Services' Refusal
to Follow Federal Court Precedent, 63 WASH. U.L.Q. 737 (1985).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 97-113.
10. 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 127-37.
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982).
13. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f) (1982).
14. Much of the literature is specific to a particular agency. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 8
(SSA); infra notes 164 (NLRB) & 181 (IRS). The most extensive general treatment of the effects of
nonacquiescence is Maranville, Nonacquiescence: Outlaw Agencies, Imperial Courts, and the Perils
of Pluralism, 39 VAND. L. REV. 471, 490-99 (1986). Professor Maranville concludes:
The question whether nonacquiescence is legitimate or desirable can be resolved at a theoreti-
cal level only by reference to a prior choice between conflicting values. The decisionmaker
must choose between the perspective of the agency and that of the courts, between rule of law
values and bureaucratic values. That value conflict pervades administrative law. Because the
conflict has not been resolved in other contexts, it is unlikely to be resolved generally or perma-
nently in the context of nonacquiescence.
39 VAND. L. REV. at 528-29. Rather than an open-ended choice between conflicting values, the
proper treatment of nonacquiescence flows, we believe, from an understanding of the respective func-
tions of agencies and courts in our administrative lawmaking system. For useful student commentary,
see Note, "Respectful Disagreement": Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies in
United States Court of Appeals Precedents, 18 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 463 (1985); Note, Ad-
ministrative Agency Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 582, 602-04 (1985); Note,
Collateral Estoppel and Nonacquiescence: Precluding Government Relitigation in Pursuit of Liti-
gant Equality, 99 HARV. L. REv. 847, 857-59 (1986).
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there been a serious proposal for reducing, in a manner consistent with
the respective institutional responsibilities of an agency and its reviewing
court, the debilitating tensions between these two institutions that nonac-
quiescence engenders. Our study principally addresses these issues.
Section I is primarily definitional. First, it establishes that the Supreme
Court's refusal to apply nonmutual collateral estoppel against the federal
government, in United States v. Mendoza,"5 does not, by itself, resolve the
legitimacy of nonacquiescence. Section I also categorizes the different
types of administrative action that might be included under the rubric of
nonacquiescence: (1) intercircuit nonacquiescence, in which the agency
refuses to follow the case law of a court of appeals other than the one that
will review its decision; (2) intracircuit nonacquiescence, in which the
agency refuses to follow the case law of the court of appeals that will
review its decision; and (3) nonacquiesence in the face of venue choice,
where review may be had either in a court that has rejected the agency's
position or in one that has not. Finally, this section describes the possible
components of an agency's nonacquiescence policy.
Section II presents detailed case studies of the nonacquiescence practices
of SSA and the NLRB, which have been most visible, as well as a brief
survey of how other federal agencies have engaged in nonacquiescence.
We show that nonacquiescence is pervasive and longstanding, and ex-
amine the interaction between an agency's structure and the ways that it
deals with adverse court decisions.
Section III considers the constitutionality of intracircuit nonacquies-
cence, the category that raises the most troubling questions. Even here, we
reject the argument, advanced by several courts and commentators, that
there is a per se constitutional bar against nonacquiescence.' 6 We do not
find it necessary to consider whether this practice, if left entirely un-
checked, might not, under some circumstances, raise constitutional con-
cerns; we believe that any nonacquiescence that might come close to trans-
gressing constitutional norms would also be proscribed by
nonconstitutional constraints.
Section IV evaluates the policy considerations implicated by nonacqui-
escence to determine whether limitations on the practice are desirable. We
conclude that intracircuit nonacquiescence can be justified only as an in-
terim measure that allows the agency to maintain a uniform administra-
tion of its governing statute at the agency level, and only while federal law
on the subject remains in flux and the agency is making reasonable at-
tempts to persuade the courts to validate its position. This limitation is
informed, in large part, by the undesirable distributional consequences
15. 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 97-126 (discussing Social Security litigation); supra note 8
(collecting authorities).
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that arise when only parties with sufficient resources to pursue an appeal
to the courts can benefit from a favorable rule of law.1" With respect to
the other two categories of nonacquiescence, we do not believe that any
restrictions are desirable.
Section V sets out the appropriate judicial response to intracircuit non-
acquiescence. We conclude that unjustifiable intracircuit nonacquiescence
contravenes the rationality review under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).18
Section VI considers the question of venue choice. While we believe
that nonacquiescence should not be limited where there is venue choice,
we favor the elimination of such choice because it unnecessarily exacer-
bates agency-court tensions.
I. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
A. The Relationship Between Nonacquiescence and Nonmutual Collat-
eral Estoppel
Defenders of nonacquiescence argue that the Supreme Court's unani-
mous decision in United States v. Mendoza, 9 holding the doctrine of non-
mutual collateral estoppel"0 inapplicable against the federal government,
legitimates nonacquiescence.2 The Mendoza Court recognized that the
government plays a distinctive role in the national lawmaking process,
"both because of the geographic breadth of [its] litigation and also, most
importantly, because of the nature of the issues [it] litigates." 22 Applica-
17. See infra text accompanying notes 325-26. Of course, Congress can prohibit nonacquiescence
in the agency's governing statute if it deems the distributional consequences decisive.
18. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1982).
19. 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
20.
Offensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when a plaintiff seeks to foreclose a defendant from
relitigating an issue the defendant had previously litigated unsuccessfully in another action
against the same or a different party. Defensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when a de-
fendant seeks to prevent a plaintiff from relitigating an issue the plaintiff has previously liti-
gated unsuccessfully in another action against the same or a different party.
Id. at 159 n.4.
21. For example, in its brief in Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986), the Justice
Department argued that a "rule of mandatory acquiescence in all cases ... is nothing more than a
rule of mandatory nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government. This rule the Supreme
Court unanimously rejected in [Mendoza]." Brief for Appellants at 41. More recently, responding to a
prior draft of this Article and to a proposed recommendation of the Administrative Conference, see 53
Fed. Reg. 12,444 (1988), the Solicitor General's Office stated:
At bottom, the assertion that a government official, such as the Secretary of Health and
Human Services in his administration of the Social Security Act, must follow the reasoning of
a court of appeals decision in other circumstances involving other parties is merely an assertion
of nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government, which the Supreme Court unani-
mously rejected even as a nonconstitutional matter in [Mendoza].
Letter from Thomas W. Merrill, Deputy Solicitor General, and Edwin S. Kneedler, Assistant to the
Solicitor General, to Mary Candace Fowler at 4 (May 9, 1988) [hereinafter Merrill Letter] (public
comment on draft ACUS policy).
22. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 159.
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tion of nonmutual collateral estoppel, the Court reasoned, would prema-
turely truncate the process of dialogue and percolation among the circuits.
It would require the government to treat an adverse ruling by a court of
appeals as a nationally binding resolution of the particular legal question,
thereby barring relitigation not only in the circuit that entered the adverse
ruling but also in circuits that had not yet addressed the question.23
Mendoza's rejection of nonmutual collateral estoppel against the gov-
ernment,24 however, does not compel any particular answer to the nonac-
quiescence controversy. As a logical matter, the fact that the government
may not be precluded in court from relitigating issues that it lost in prior
cases does not imply that it may disregard rulings of the courts of appeals
in the conduct of its internal proceedings. 25 One can well imagine a legal
regime under which the agency must internalize the relevant judicial deci-
sions, but where it can challenge the precedent through a declaratory
judgment action.21 Under such a scenario, once an agency suffers a judi-
cial setback, it must conduct its administrative proceedings in accordance
with the adverse ruling until the agency's preferred policy has been up-
held in a declaratory judgment action. Nonacquiescence would therefore
be prohibited but the government would nonetheless, as a formal matter,
remain free to relitigate.
Under current law, however, an agency generally does not have the
23. Justice Rehnquist observed for the Court:
A rule allowing nonmutual collateral estoppel against the Government in such cases would
substantially thwart the development of important questions of law by freezing the first final
decision rendered on a particular legal issue. Allowing only one final adjudication would de-
prive this Court of the benefit it receives from permitting several courts of appeals to explore a
difficult question before this Court grants certiorari.
Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160. Because collateral estoppel cannot be applied to nonparties to the prior
proceeding, it would be the first panel ruling adverse to the agency that would freeze the law under
nonmutual collateral estoppel.
In the companion case of United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165 (1984), the Court held
that in the presence of mutuality, collateral estoppel against the government is appropriate. In distin-
guishing this case from Mendoza, the Court noted that "[tihe application of an estoppel when the
Government is litigating the same issue with the same party avoids the problem of freezing the devel-
opment of the law because the Government is still free to litigate that issue in the future with some
other party." Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 164.
24. The Court could have decided Mendoza on narrower grounds. Due to a change in the admin-
istration, the adverse ruling in In re Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veterans, 406 F. Supp. 931
(N.D. Cal. 1975), had not been appealed, and the Court could have said that relitigation was permis-
sible because the law in the Ninth Circuit had yet to be determined by the court of appeals. Or, the
Court could have ruled that nonmutual collateral estoppel, whatever its general applicability, was
inappropriate in this case because an intervening decision in the Second Circuit in the government's
favor, Olegario v. United States, 629 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 980 (1981),
created a basis for seeking reexamination of 68 Filipino War Veterans in the Ninth Circuit. The
Mendoza Court opted, instead, for a broader rule, eschewing the application of nonmutual collateral
estoppel to the government.
25. Many courts have taken this position in litigation involving SSA. See infra text accompanying
notes 97-126.
26. Apparently referring to this mechanism, Professor Neuborne notes: "There is, of course, a
considerable difference between recognizing that the executive should be free to ask the judiciary to
change its mind and permitting the executive to refuse to comply with settled precedent." Neuborne,
supra note 8, at 1002 n.32.
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authority, in the absence of a concrete administrative determination, to
return to a court that ruled against it for the purpose of seeking a recon-
sideration of that ruling.2" Moreover, a declaratory judgment procedure
would raise difficult constitutional and practical questions of its own,
would require a revamping of the way agencies make decisions, and
would significantly undercut the role of agencies as the primary policy-
makers in our administrative lawmaking system.2
In Mendoza, notably, relitigation did not take the form of a declaratory
judgment action. Instead, what precipitated the case was a decision by an
administrative official, a naturalization examiner, that was inconsistent
with the unappealed ruling of a district court. This nonacquiescence was,
therefore, the necessary predicate to the government's ability to relitigate
the underlying issue.
More generally, without a declaratory mechanism, limitations on non-
acquiescence may block the only readily accessible avenue to relitigation.
If so, a rigid insistence that administrative proceedings adhere to a circuit
court's rulings may produce some of the same undesirable consequences
for the process of national law development that led to the rejection of
nonmutual collateral estoppel in Mendoza."'
Nonetheless, Mendoza is not dispositive of the question of the legiti-
macy of nonacquiescence. As a formal matter, the Court did not consider
the propriety of the examiner's conduct and hence did not pass explicitly
on the nonacquiescence question. More importantly, agency nonacquies-
cence raises concerns over distributional equities (because the availability
of a more favorable legal rule depends on a party's ability to pursue an
appeal to the courts) and over agency-court tensions (because the agency
appears to be flouting the judicial mandate). Such concerns are less salient
to collateral estoppel, where the issue is strictly one of whether relitigation
is precluded once the parties are in court.
27. See infra text accompanying note 312.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 314-15.
29. Relitigation is an important tool of the federal government. As Professor Carrington has
noted:
The United States does not regard a decision of the United States Court of Appeals as authori-
tative in the traditional common law sense. It is quite prepared to continue to litigate in other
circuits a question that has been resolved in only one; even in the same circuit, the United
States may be willing to relitigate an issue if minor factual distinctions can be made between
the pending matter and the preceding decision. It appears to be the house rule of the Justice
Department that three unanimous Courts of Appeals decisions are sufficient to establish au-
thoritatively that a government position is wrong.
Carrington, United States Appeals in Civil Cases: A Field and Statistical Study, 11 Hous. L. REv.
1101, 1104 (1974). The government's policy of broad relitigation has been criticized. See, e.g., Levin
& Leeson, Issue Preclusion Against the United States Government, 70 IOWA L. REv. 113, 133-39
(1984); Vestal, Relitigation by Federal Agencies: Conflict, Concurrence and Synthesis of Judicial
Policies, 55 N.C.L. REv. 123, 174-79 (1977).
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B. Categories of Nonacquiescence
The term "nonacquiescence" is often used loosely to include three dis-
tinct types of agency behavior. To evaluate properly the arguments for
and against the practice, we must examine each of these categories
separately.
First, an agency engages in intercircuit nonacquiescence when it refuses
to follow, in its administrative proceedings, the case law of a court of ap-
peals other than the one that will review the agency's decision. Second, an
agency engages in intracircuit nonacquiescence when the relevant venue
provisions establish that review will be to a particular court of appeals
and the agency nonetheless refuses to follow, in its administrative proceed-
ings, the case law of that court.30
The third category is defined by reference to venue choice. Here, the
agency refuses to follow the case law of a court of appeals that has re-
jected its position, but review may be had either in that court or in one
that has not rejected the agency's position. Broad venue choice is fairly
common, since the Clayton Act's venue provision, on which many other
provisions are based,' provides for review in any circuit in which a party
aggrieved by agency action "transacts business. '3 2 In the case of national
actors, practically any one of the regional circuits may be appropriate.
Normally, under conditions of venue choice, the identity of the review-
ing court will be uncertain at the time the agency makes its decision.33
Such uncertainty is not eliminated simply because the agency has a basis
for predicting which circuit will hear the case. Only where all uncertainty
is removed-for example, because all courts of proper venue have adopted
positions contrary to the agency's policy-does an agency's continued
nonadherence to circuit law become intracircuit nonacquiescence. 3 '
None of these three categories is implicated when an agency attempts in
good faith, and with reasonable basis in fact and law, to distinguish an
adverse decision of a court of appeals. Nonacquiescence arises only where
the agency, unable to invoke such a distinction, nevertheless declines to be
bound by the adverse circuit rule.
All three categories are agency-centered. They each look to the posture
30. Of course, in the case of a court of national jurisdiction, or one that reviews agency action
pursuant to an exclusive venue provision, the only relevant category will be that of intracircuit
nonacquiescence.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 378-81.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1982).
33. For a discussion of the factors contributing to venue uncertainty, see infra note 305.
34. Cases on remand are somewhat more difficult to characterize. The "law of the case," as
articulated by the court of appeals, would seem to apply. See Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB,
204 F.2d 529, 532 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 909 (1953); NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, Inc., 632
F.2d 208, 211-12 (2d Cir. 1980). However, unless the first court retained jurisdiction, the agency's
order on remand would be reviewable in accord with the organic statute's venue provisions and could
be reviewed elsewhere (although it is in fact likely that it would ultimately be transferred back to the
court that had remanded the case).
1989]
The Yale Law Journal
of the case at the time of the administrative decision, rather than at the
time of the judicial decision. Such a focus is particularly important in the
venue choice category. There will be times when the agency's action will
be reviewed in a circuit that previously had rejected the agency's position.
From the perspective of that court, the case will look like one of intracir-
cuit nonacquiescence, since the court will be reviewing an administrative
decision that was inconsistent, even at the time it was made, with circuit
law. But when the agency decided the case, by definition, the range of
possible venues precluded certain prediction that the case would be re-
viewed in that court, rather than in a court that had not rejected the
agency's position. Because the purpose of our study is to devise standards
for agency conduct, only an ex ante perspective, specifying what conduct
may be realistically expected of the agency at the time of its decision, is
appropriate.
C. Components of a Nonacquiescence Policy
In considering whether an agency engages in nonacquiescence, it is a
mistake to focus exclusively on the actions of the agency's top deci-
sionmakers. Consider a hypothetical multi-member agency, headed by
commissioners, that develops policy primarily through adjudication.35
While the commissioners' decisions are undoubtedly the most visible, non-
acquiescence at other levels of the administrative structure will also affect
regulated parties or claimants. Assume that the hypothetical agency is or-
ganized as follows. The enforcement staff files complaints citing violations
of regulations promulgated pursuant to the governing statute. A cited
party that contests such a complaint is accorded a hearing before an ad-
ministrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ's decision can be reviewed by the
agency's commissioners sua sponte, or upon a petition for review filed by
the recipient of the citation or the agency's enforcement staff. The com-
missioners have discretionary jurisdiction and thus can decline petitions
for review. The agency's orders are not self-enforcing; the agency must
seek enforcement in a court of appeals under a statutory scheme in which
proper venue was ascertainable at the time of the administrative
proceedings.
This hypothetical agency's acquiescence policy has several components.
The first concerns the actions of the agency's commissioners in adjudicat-
ing cases. Two additional components are the behavior of the enforcement
staff and of the ALJs. The fact that many citations by the enforcement
staff will not be contested and that many ALJ decisions will not be ap-
35. Nonacquiescence typically occurs when the agency makes policy through administrative adju-
dication. It can also occur, however, with respect to rulemaking and purely prosecutorial decisions,
when an agency must go to court to bring an enforcement proceeding in the federal district court. Our
Article focuses primarily on the adjudicatory context.
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pealed,36 coupled with the limited decisional capacity of the commission-
ers, may effectively make the enforcement staff and the ALJs the final
decisionmakers for the vast majority of parties to the agency's proceedings.
Thus, if there is nonacquiescence on the part of these actors, the agency's
policy will be effectively one of nonacquiescence, even though the commis-
sioners would actually acquiesce in the law of the circuit if an appeal
were taken to them.
With respect to the enforcement staff and the ALJs, nonacquiescence
can take one of three forms. The staff and the ALJs may be instructed to
ignore the law of the reviewing circuit in making their respective deci-
sions.37 Alternatively, they may be given no guidance on the issue, but
independently decide to nonacquiesce.3' Or they may be oblivious to cir-
cuit law and nonacquiesce unknowingly.
A fourth component concerns the manner in which the commissioners
exercise their discretionary jurisdiction. The commissioners may view
lower-level nonacquiescence as a factor pointing strongly toward review;
alternatively, however, they may view it as a neutral factor or even as one
counseling against review. A related question is whether the commission-
ers consider nonacquiescence by the lower echelons to be a strong reason
for invoking their sua sponte jurisdiction.
In setting out the preceding four components, we implicitly assumed
that it is easy for each actor within the agency to tell when the agency's
policy is inconsistent with the case law of the courts of appeals. If that
were the case, the enforcement staff could simply be instructed not to issue
citations that would be defective under the rulings of the appropriate court
of appeals. But it is extremely inefficient for each of the agency's prosecu-
tors to study the volumes of the Federal Reporter and ascertain possible
conflicts with the instructions manuals that govern their tasks. As a prac-
tical matter, an acquiescence policy requires charging another branch
within the agency, which we shall call an acquiescence review board (or
perhaps a unit of the General Counsel's office itself), with the function of
36. Parties may well contest only a small percentage of complaints or appeal only a small percent-
age of ALJ decisions. For example, at a meeting with representatives of the Solicitor of Labor and of
the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) on July 17, 1987, we were told that
only about three percent of OSHA's citations are contested.
There are a number of reasons for this phenomenon. First, the cited party may not be sufficiently
sophisticated to understand that, if it challenged the citation or ALJ decision, it might ultimately
obtain relief from the commissioners. Second, the party might know that relief is possible but might
not have the resources to mount the necessary legal challenge. Third, the party might decide that the
cost of mounting such a challenge could be so high in relation to the expected payoff that compliance
with the citation or ALJ decision would prove less onerous. An economically rational party will
challenge a citation or appeal an ALJ decision if it estimates that the benefits of prevailing, discounted
by the probability of not prevailing, are greater than the costs of mounting the necessary challenge.
37. This is true of SSA in the absence of an explicit instruction by the agency heads to acquiesce
in a particular ruling. See infra text accompanying notes 92-94.
38. Apparently, this is the case with the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
(OSHRC). Conversation between Professors Estreicher and Revesz, and Earl Ohman, General Coun-
sel, and Arthur Sapper, Deputy General Counsel, OSHRC (June 18, 1987).
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screening the relevant cases decided by the courts of appeals and translat-
ing them into instructions for the enforcement staff.
The task of identifying conflicts between legal principles is neither
mechanical nor wholly objective. Whether there is a conflict depends on
whether distinctions between two cases justify different results. In turn,
whether a difference is legally significant must be assessed by reference to
the agency's substantive policy. The work of such a board will certainly
be affected by such factors as the instructions under which it operates, the
resources that it can command, and the status that it enjoys within the
agency. Thus, the manner in which an acquiescence review board is con-
stituted, and more generally the method by which the agency ascertains
the existence of adverse circuit law and communicates it to the relevant
decisionmakers, is a fifth component in an agency's acquiescence policy.
One might question why an agency that is committed to acquiescence at
its top level would not instruct its lower-level actors to acquiesce as well.
There are several reasons why the commissioners might not wish to ex-
tend an acquiescence policy to the entire agency. The agency may view a
split policy as a convenient compromise between its desire to enforce a
uniform interpretation of the law and a concern with openly challenging
the courts of appeals. The actions of the commissioners will receive the
most attention, and acquiescence on their part will be widely equated with
acquiescence at all levels. At the same time, most parties will be affected
primarily by the actions of lower-level agency actors, and, to a large ex-
tent, the agency will be able to enforce a uniform policy through lower-
level nonacquiescence.3 9
On a less Machiavellian plane, the commissioners might view acquies-
cence at all levels as a desirable but unnecessary luxury. It might, for
example, be onerous to instruct the agency's enforcement staff on the law
of the different circuits. The staff might be centrally trained, supervised
and evaluated, operate throughout the country under a single set of in-
structions, and lack the skills to navigate a multi-tiered instructions man-
ual.4 To bring the law of each circuit to the level at which it can be
applied by the agency's typically non-lawyer enforcement personnel could
well require the establishment of a special unit within the agency. More-
over, the cost of updating instruction manuals in each circuit would natu-
39. Of course, an acquiescence policy limited to the agency heads poses serious distributional
consequences by having a more favorable body of law-that which results from acquiescence-apply
disproportionately to parties with greater litigation resources. As we discuss below, this is the central
cost of nonacquiescence at any level. See infra text accompanying notes 325-26.
40. Referring to the difficulty of nonuniformity in the initial administrative process, the IRS notes
that "[tlhe tax return forms and the instruction booklets issued to the more than 100,000,000 taxpay-
ers all contain a uniform instruction. Most computer programs and processing procedures are
designed with that uniformity in mind." Letter from James J. Keightley, Associate Chief Counsel to
Mary Candace Fowler at 3 (May 9, 1988) (public comment on draft ACUS policy). The IRS notes
that it is far easier for appeals officers at higher levels to consider adverse circuit court law. Id.
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rally be far higher than that of maintaining nationally uniform
instructions.41
A split acquiescence policy will be particularly likely in agencies in
which the commissioners are committed only to a limited acquiescence
practice under which they generally follow adverse circuit law but reserve
the right to relitigate issues of particular importance to the agency.42 It
would be impossible for the commissioners to nonacquiesce, and thereby
force the relitigation of an issue, if the enforcement staff does not file cita-
tions that would be proper under the agency's policy, though defective
under the law of the court of appeals. In such circumstances, the agency
will never have the opportunity to ask the court to reexamine adverse
circuit precedent.
43
Acquiescence by the ALJs would also make relitigation difficult. It is
true that if the ALJs acquiesced but the enforcement staff did not, the
enforcement staff could still file a petition for review of the ALJ decision.
Under such an arrangement, however, the commissioners would have to
grant review to make relitigation possible. In contrast, if the ALJs nonac-
quiesced, relitigation could follow the denial of discretionary review by the
commissioners. Given the commissioners' limited decisional capacity, this
difference could be significant. Thus, the simplest way to preserve the
commissioners' option to engage in selective nonacquiescence is to re-
quire-or tolerate-nonacquiescence on the part of both the enforcement
staff and the ALJs.
Some agencies may also be reluctant to decide what position they will
take on a question immediately after a court of appeals has issued an
adverse decision. The commissioners may prefer to make such determina-
tions in adjudicatory proceedings rather than by issuing prospective in-
structions. Indeed, some agencies have opted for an administrative struc-
ture that confines policymaking by the commissioners to the vehicle of
case-by-case adjudication. 4 Thus, the primacy of the commissioners' role
as decisionmakers is enhanced by having the agency's lower-level compo-
41. These problems are exacerbated in agencies with regional offices that do not match the geo-
graphic jurisdictions of the courts of appeals. For example, "[t]welve of the [NLRB's] 33 regional
offices straddle two different circuits, three more operate within three circuits, and one office, Region
5 in Baltimore, operates within four circuits." Letter from Rosemary Collyer, General Counsel,
NLRB to Mary Candace Fowler at 8 (April 29, 1988) [hereinafter Collyer Letter] (public comment
on draft ACUS policy).
42. For this reason, SSA adopted a split acquiescence policy under Office of Hearings and Ap-
peals, Interim Circular No. 185 (June 3, 1985) [hereinafter Interim Circular]. See infra text accom-
panying notes 68-94.
43. For example, in those cases in which SSA made its acquiescence policy applicable at all ad-
ministrative levels, it effectively relinquished the ability to relitigate the issues covered by the policy in
the circuits that rendered the adverse rulings. See infra text accompanying notes 92-93.
44. See infra note 142 (discussing NLRB's resistance to making policy through rulemaking). The
Supreme Court has made clear that, absent contrary directives in its organic statute, an agency has
unlimited discretion in deciding whether to use adjudication or rulemaking as the vehicle for poli-
cymaking. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); SEC v. Cheney Corp., 332 U.S.
194 (1947).
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nents pursue a somewhat broader nonacquiescence policy than that fol-
lowed by the commissioners themselves.
In summary, in addition to the adjudicatory decisions of the commis-
sioners, an agency's acquiescence policy will depend upon the commission-
ers' case-selection decisions, the actions of both the enforcement staff and
the ALJs, and the internal mechanisms for identifying and transmitting
adverse circuit court decisions. Clearly, not all agencies are organized like
the hypothetical agency that forms the basis of this discussion.4" But in
almost all cases, the extent to which the agency engages in nonacquies-
cence cannot be determined solely by reference to the actions of the
agency's top decisionmakers.
II. A DESCRIPTION OF AGENCY PRACTICES
We discuss in this section the nonacquiescence practices of SSA under
its disability program and of the NLRB-two agencies that have pro-
voked considerable reaction from courts and commentators. These two
case studies raise most of the important issues relevant to an analysis of
nonacquiescence, and therefore provide a useful background for the re-
mainder of this Article. In addition, to illustrate the pervasiveness of non-
acquiescence, we summarize the results of our survey of the practices of
over fifty major administrative agencies.
A. Social Security Administration
1. General Description of the Agency
Within SSA, nonacquiescence has been most prevalent under the disa-
bility program.46 The administrative structure of this program contains
four levels. A claimant seeking disability benefits applies first to a state
disability agency. 4' State disability examiners make the initial determina-
tion about eligibility based solely on a paper record.4 These examiners
also ascertain whether individuals receiving disability benefits continue to
be entitled to such benefits. 49 If benefits are denied or terminated at the
initial level, the claimant may request reconsideration by the state disabil-
45. Our focus in this Article is on agencies such as the NLRB, Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) that use adjudication as a principal means
for setting policy. See supra note 35.
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-33 (1982). For excellent discussions of SSA administrative practices, see J.
MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983); J. MASHAW, C. GoETz, F. GOODMAN, W. SCHWARTZ,
P. VERKUIL & M. CARROW, SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS (1978).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 421(a)(1) (1982).
48. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1615(b) (1988).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 425 (1982); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1588-99 (1988).
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ity agency.5" Additional paper evidence can be presented at this second
level.5"
A claimant denied benefits at the reconsideration level can seek a hear-
ing before an ALJ employed directly by SSA.52 At this hearing, the claim-
ant may appear in person, submit new evidence, examine the evidence
used in making the decision under review, and present and question wit-
nesses.53 Claimants can be represented by counsel at the hearing, but SSA
is not separately represented.5" The ALJ both adjudicates and develops
the record. Thus, Social Security ALJs play a role somewhat akin to that
of judges in civil law inquisitorial systems.55
The fourth level of administrative consideration is review of an ALJ's
decision by the SSA Appeals Council, either at the claimant's request,
which the Appeals Council has the discretion to deny, or on its own mo-
tion.5" When the Appeals Council accepts review of a case, it may con-
sider evidence beyond that which was before the ALJ and may hear oral
argument in significant cases. 57 A decision on the merits by the Appeals
Council, or the ALJ's decision itself if it is unreviewed, constitutes a final
agency decision.
Claimants can challenge such decisions in the district courts. A district
court has the power to "affirm[], modify[], or revers[e] the decision of the
Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for rehearing." ' The
agency's factual findings are reviewed under the "substantial evidence"
standard.59 Either the Secretary or the claimant can appeal, as of right, to
the court of appeals.
There is very little uncertainty of venue concerning petitions for review
of SSA decisions. The Act provides for review in the district court for the
district "in which the plaintiff resides or has his principal place of busi-
50. 20 C.F.R. § 404.907 (1988).
51. Id. § 404.913(a).
52. Id. § 404.929.
53. Id. § 404.950.
54. SSA's nonacquiescence may be caused in part because the agency is not separately represented
and therefore cannot mold the record in a way that would make the agency more likely to withstand a
challenge under the standards of the reviewing court of appeals. For several years, SSA tested a
program under which, in certain hearings, SSA would be represented by special personnel known as
"SSA Representatives." 47 Fed. Reg. 36,117 (1982). After having been enjoined by the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Virginia and after it became the focus of negative reactions in
Congress, the program was terminated on May 7, 1987. See 52 Fed. Reg. 17,285 (1987). For an
analysis of the program, see Social Security Administration, Office of Hearings and Appeals, SSA
Representation Project: Interim Report (June 1986).
55. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971) (rejecting due process challenge to ALJ's
"advocate-judge-multiple-hat"). Where the claimant is not represented by counsel, the hearing exam-
iner can be said to wear three hats rather than two, as he must "scrupulously and conscientiously
probe into, inquire of, and explore for all the relevant facts surrounding the alleged right or privi-
lege." Gold v. Secretary of HEW, 463 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1972) (quoting Hennig v. Gardner, 276
F. Supp. 622, 624-25 (N.D. Tex. 1967)).
56. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.967-70 (1988).
57. 20 C.F.R. § 404.976 (1988).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982).
59. Id.
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ness."60 The vast majority of district court appeals are filed in the district
where the plaintiff resides."1
2. The Agency's Nonacquiescence Policy
From the 1960's (and perhaps earlier) until June 1985, SSA's policy
was not to acquiesce in decisions of the courts of appeals that differed
from the agency's positions. The agency described its intracircuit nonac-
quiescence policy as follows:
While the ALJs are bound by decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court, they should also make every reasonable effort to follow
the district or circuit court's views regarding procedural or eviden-
tiary matters when handling similar cases in that particular district
or circuit.
However, where a district or circuit court's decision contains in-
terpretations of the law, regulations, or rulings which are inconsis-
tent with the Secretary's interpretations, the ALJs should not con-
sider such decisions binding on future cases simply because the case
is not appealed. In certain cases SSA will not appeal a court decision
it disagrees with, in view of special circumstances of the particular
case (e.g., the limited effect of the decision).
When SSA decides to acquiesce in a district court decision, or a
circuit court decision, which is inconsistent with our previous inter-
pretation of the law, regulations, or rulings, SSA will take appropri-
ate action to implement changes by means of regulations, rulings,
etc. ALJs will be promptly advised of such action. 2
Similarly, a statement by the Associate Commissioner for Hearings and
Appeals, issued to Social Security ALJs in January 1982, advised that
"[t]he Federal courts do not run SSA's programs, and [SSA's adjudicators]
are responsible for applying the Secretary's policies and guidelines regard-
less of court decisions below the level of the Supreme Court."6
In addition to this general policy, the agency occasionally issued formal
nonacquiescence rulings which indicated the agency's explicit disagree-
ment with particular circuit court decisions. A total of ten such rulings
were adopted, the first in 1966 and the last in 1982." The purpose of
60. Id. If a plaintiff does not reside or have his principal place of business in any district, the
action can be brought in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Id.
61. Letter from Donald A. Gonya, Chief Counsel for Social Security, to Professor Revesz at 2
(March 23, 1987) [hereinafter Gonya Letter] (on file with authors). Similarly, the majority of admin-
istrative proceedings occur in the claimant's state of residence. Id.
62. Office of Hearings and Appeals Handbook § 1-161 (quoted in J. MASHAW, supra note 46, at
186-87). It follows, afortiori, that the agency also engaged in intercircuit nonacquiescence.
63. Quoted in H.R. REP. No. 618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. at 24 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3061 [hereinafter HousE REPORT].
64. The following are the cases subject to these rulings with the number of the relevant ruling
indicated parenthetically: Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982) (SSR 82-49c); Campbell v.
Secretary of HHS, 665 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1981) (SSR 82-33c); Finnegan v. Matthews, 641 F.2d 1340
[Vol. 98: 679
Nonacquiescence
such rulings was not only to ensure that ALJs disregarded the circuit law
that was inconsistent with the agency's policy, but also to indicate for-
mally the agency's disagreement with particularly significant adverse
decisions."
SSA defended its pre-1985 nonacquiescence policy principally on the
grounds of horizontal equity. For example, in 1984, the Acting Commis-
sioner of Social Security testified before Congress that the agency's
policy of nonacquiescence is essential to ensure that the agency fol-
low its statutory mandate to administer the Social Security program
in a uniform and consistent manner. In a program of national scope,
it would not be equitable to people to subject their claims to differing
standards depending on where they reside. 6
The policy seeks to further horizontal uniformity (similar treatment at the
agency level of all claimants similarly situated), but it does not promote
vertical uniformity (similar treatment in the same geographic area of all
claimants similarly situated). Because one set of rules obtains in the
agency and another in the court of appeals that will review the case, non-
acquiescence creates distinctions between claimants who are able to appeal
to the circuit courts and who will ultimately prevail against the agency,
and those who are unable to appeal and will therefore be denied
benefits.
67
Partly in response to congressional criticism expressed during the con-
sideration of the 1984 amendments to the Social Security Act,68 SSA de-
parted from its blanket nonacquiescence approach in 1985 through the
adoption of Interim Circular No. 185.69 Under the Circular, the agency
(9th Cir. 1981) (SSR 82-10c); Hutcheson v. Califano, 638 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1981) (SSR 81-28c);
Boyland v. Califano, 633 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1980) (SSR 81-1c); Johnson v. Califano, 607 F.2d 1178
(6th Cir. 1979) (SSR 80-10c); Levings v. Califano, 604 F.2d 591 (8th Cir. 1979) (SSR 80-11c);
Rasmussen v. Gardner, 374 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1967) (SSR 68-48c); Hodgson v. Celebrezze, 357
F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1966) (SSR 67-14c); Cyrus v. Celebrezze, 341 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1965) and
Massey v. Celebrezze, 345 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1965) (SSR 66-23c). Eight of these ten rulings were in
effect in 1984, at the time that Congress considered barring nonacquiescence by SSA. See S. REP. No.
466, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1984) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
65. Social Security Disability Insurance Program: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1984) [hereinafter SSA Senate Hearing] (statement of Carolyn B. Kuhl,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division).
66. Id. at 105-06 (statement of Commissioner Martha A. McSteen). The Commissioner also
made an argument of administrative convenience, noting that "[tihere would be enormous problems
with circuit-by-circuit acquiescence since we would need to keep track of applicants as they move
through the decisionmaking process, determine which circuit law should apply, and separately handle
claims by jurisdiction." Id. at 106.
67. See HousE REPORT, supra note 63, at 24, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG & ADMIN. NEws at 3061.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 126-37.
69. Interim Circular, supra note 42.
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would prepare Acquiescence Rulings7" that identified circuit court deci-
sions at variance with established SSA policy.7
For cases covered by Acquiescence Rulings, the ALJ would analyze the
facts both under the agency's policy and under the adverse circuit court
decision. An ALJ prepared to rule unfavorably to the claimant under
agency policy, but favorably under circuit law, would enter a recom-
mended decision, rather than an initial decision," favorable to the claim-
ant.73 If the Appeals Council agreed with the ALJ's recommendation, it
would ordinarily enter a favorable decision.
7 4
An unfavorable decision would follow only if the agency decided, after
several stages of further review, that relitigation in the context of that case
was appropriate. The Appeals Council itself would make the initial deci-
sion whether to relitigate; this decision would be reviewed by the agency's
Special Policy Review Committee and the Office of General Counsel.
Before making a final decision, the agency would seek the advice of the
Justice Department.
7 5
Interim Circular No. 185 applied only to the ALJ and Appeals Council
levels; the prior nonacquiescence practice would continue to be followed
by state agencies both at the initial and reconsideration levels.76 Also, it
applied only in the circuit that issued the adverse ruling; the agency
would continue to apply its policy in other circuits, thereby engaging in
intercircuit nonacquiescence.77 Moreover, a necessary condition for acqui-
escence under Interim Circular No. 185 was the publication of an Acqui-
escence Ruling. The agency contended that such rulings would issue in all
cases of disagreement with adverse circuit court precedent; to the extent
70. Initially, these rulings were referred to as Social Security Rulings (SSRs). Because the agency
eventually began to refer to SSRs dealing with acquiescence issues as Acquiescence Rulings, we refer
to them in this manner from the outset.
71. To draft these Rulings, the agency established a 12-member Task Force on Acquiescence,
composed of staff from the regional and central offices. See Judicial Review of Agency Action-HHS
Policy on Nonacquiescence: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and
Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1985) [here-
inafter SSA House Hearing] (statement of Martha MeSteen, Acting Commissioner of Social Security).
72. An initial decision by an ALJ becomes binding if it is not reviewed by the Appeals Council.
In contrast, a recommended decision by an ALJ must be reviewed by the Appeals Council.
73. Interim Circular, supra note 42, at 3. There are two other relevant categories. First, if the
ALJ is prepared to rule favorably for the claimant under SSA policy, the decision need not consider
the impact of the circuit law. The ALJ would then issue an initial decision in the usual manner.
Second, if the ALJ is prepared to rule unfavorably to the claimant under the agency's policy, he must
then consider the circuit law, and if he would rule against the claimant under circuit law as well, he
must enter an unfavorable initial decision. Id. at 2.
74. Id. at 4.
75. Id. If the ALJ's initial decision is unfavorable to the claimant and the Appeals Council deter-
mines that a favorable decision should have been entered under circuit law, it will treat the case in the
manner described above. Ordinarily, it will enter a favorable decision, but it will enter an unfavorable
decision where it believes that relitigation is appropriate. Id.
76. The agency considered extending its acquiescence policy to the state level, but rejected this
option as too cumbersome. See SSA House Hearing, supra note 71, at 9.
77. Interim Circular, supra note 42, at 1.
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that they did not, however, the prior nonacquiescence practice would
continue."8
As a practical matter, Interim Circular No. 185 was never implemented
since the agency changed its policy, at least in part as a result of the
litigation in Stieberger v. Heckler,"9 before it had issued any Acquiescence
Rulings. A new policy provided that under certain conditions acquiescence
would be extended to all four administrative levels.80 It contemplated two
different types of Acquiescence Rulings: one that would apply only at the
ALJ and Appeals Council levels, as had been the case under Interim Cir-
cular No. 185, and another that would apply at the state agency levels as
well."1 The procedures with respect to the first type of Ruling were the
same as those under the Circular. 2 As to the second type, the agency
noted that it was unlikely that cases would reach the ALJs or the Appeals
Council because the benefit would have been granted at the state agency
level.83
Consistent with its new policy, the agency published proposed regula-
tions.84 They provided that Acquiescence Rulings would apply within the
appropriate circuit at all administrative levels if
(1)(a) No prompt relitigation of the relevant policy at issue will be
sought in the relevant circuit; and
78. See infra text accompanying notes 93-94 (discussing silent nonacquiescence).
79. 615 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), prelim. inj. vacated sub noma. Stieberger v. Bowen, 801
F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986). See infra text accompanying notes 114-26.
80. See Memorandum of Acting Commissioner of Social Security to Principal Deputy Undersec-
retary of HHS (Jan. 15, 1986). The recommendations contained in this memorandum were approved
by HHS on January 16, 1986. On that day, HHS also approved the issuance of three Acquiescence
Rulings, applicable at all four administrative levels. Id. The Memorandum stated the hope that adop-
tion of the new policy would "assist in obtaining a favorable ruling in Stieberger." Id. at 3. It ended
with the comment: "SSA and the Office of General Counsel strongly urge that the revised policy be
approved, or at least the concept of acquiescing in some circuit court decisions at all adjudicative
levels. Such a position would strengthen the hand of Justice in the crucial Stieberger case." Id. The
new policy was later embodied in OHA Staff Guides and Program Digest, Transmittal No. X-7,
SGPD Bulletin No. 111-2(86) (Aug. 22, 1986) [hereinafter SGPD Bulletin] which formally replaced
Interim Circular No. 185.
81. See SGPD Bulletin, supra note 80, at 2.
82. Id. at 3-5.
83. Id. The Bulletin provided that because the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York in Stieberger had enjoined the practice of limiting the agency's acquiescence policy to the
ALJ and Appeals Council levels, in the case of New York residents, all Acquiescence Rulings would
apply to the four administrative levels, unless the injunction in Stieberger were modified or vacated.
Id. at 2 n.2; see infra text accompanying notes 114-26.
84. 52 Fed. Reg. 2557 (1987). After this Article was in page proofs, SSA withdrew these pro-
posed regulations and proposed a different set of regulations, under which Acquiescence Rulings
would apply at all four administrative levels. See 53 Fed. Reg. 46,628 (1988). These proposed regula-
tions contemplate intracircuit relitigation following the publication of an Acquiescence Ruling only
where (1) "occurrence of an activating event ...raises the question of whether the circuit court
would reach the same decision if the issue(s) previously decided were presented to it again," (2) the
General Counsel of the Department of Health and Human Services, after consulting with the Depart-
ment of Justice, concurs that relitigation is appropriate, and (3) a notice that SSA will begin to apply
its own interpretation of the issue that had been the subject of the Acquiescence Ruling is published in
the Federal Register. See 53 Fed. Reg. 46,629-30 (1988).
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(b) Application of the Ruling at all administrative levels would be
workable (i.e., would not result in administrative inefficiency) and
feasible and would not have an unacceptably adverse effect on Social
Security programs or disadvantage individuals already on the Social
Security benefit rolls; or
(2) A regulatory change to conform national policy to a circuit court
ruling is being pursued and there is little doubt of its ultimate
publication."5
If neither condition was met, the Acquiescence Ruling would apply only
at the ALJ and Appeals Council levels.86
On June 4, 1986, the agency published, in the Federal Register,17 a
notice indicating that 14 such Rulings had been issued between January
23 and April 30, 1986.88 The agency also indicated that future rulings
would be published periodically in the same manner, " and on August 7,
1987, it published 12 such rulings which had been issued between May
20, 1986 and March 31, 1987.90 By March 1988, the agency had issued
an additional seven rulings which have not yet been published in the Fed-
eral Register.1
85. Id. at 2557.
86. Id.
87. When Acquiescence Rulings are first issued, they are not published in the Federal Register.
88. 51 Fed. Reg. 20,354 (1986). The agency published acquiescence rulings for the following
cases: Summy v. Schweiker, 688 F.2d 1233 (9th Cir. 1982) (AR 86-1 (9)); Rosenberg v. Richardson,
538 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1976) and Capitano v. Secretary of HHS, 732 F.2d 1066 (2d Cir. 1984) (AR
86-2 (2)); Martinez v. Heckler, 735 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1984) (AR 86-3(5)); Paskel v. Heckler, 768
F.2d 540 (3d Cir. 1985) (AR 86-4 (3)); Leschniok v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1983) (AR 86-
5(9)); Aubrey v. Richardson, 462 F.2d 782 (3d Cir. 1972) and Shelnutt v. Heckler, 723 F.2d 1131
(3d Cir. 1983) (AR 86-6(3)); Autrey v. Harris, 639 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1981) and Wages v.
Schweiker, 659 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1981) (AR 86-7(5)); Johnson v. Califano, 607 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir.
1979) (AR 86-8(6)); Secretary of HEW v. Meza, 368 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1966) and Gardner v.
Wilcox, 370 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1966) (AR 86-9(9)); Edwards v. Califano, 619 F.2d 865 (10th Cir.
1980) (AR 86-10(10)); Autrey v. Harris, 639 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1981) (AR 86-11(11)); Hutcheson
v. Califano, 638 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1981) (AR 86-12(9)); McNeal v. Schweiker, 711 F.2d 18 (3d Cir.
1983) (AR 86-13(3)); Jones v. Secretary of HEW, 629 F.2d 334 (4th Cir. 1980) (AR 86-14(4)). Note
that this list includes two cases decided as early as in 1966 and three cases decided in the 1970s.
The number of the Acquiescence Ruling is indicated in parenthesis. For example, AR 86-1(9)
refers to the first (1) acquiescence ruling issued in 1986 (86), which is applicable only in the Ninth
Circuit (9).
89. 51 Fed. Reg. 20,354 (1986).
90. 52 Fed. Reg. 29,441 (1987). The agency published acquiescence rulings for the following
cases: Boyland v. Califano, 633 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1980), Parker v. Schweiker, 673 F.2d 160 (6th
Cir. 1982), and Childress v. Secretary of HHS, 679 F.2d 623 (6th Cir. 1982) (AR 86-15(6)); Damon
v. Secretary of HEW, 557 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1977) (AR 86-16(2)); Owens v. Schweiker, 692 F.2d 80
(9th Cir. 1982) (AR 86-17(9)); Woodson v. Schweiker, 656 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir. 1981) (AR 86-18(5)
and AR 86-19(11)); Grigg v. Finch, 418 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1969) (AR 86-20(6)); Adams v. Wein-
berger, 521 F. 2d 656 (2d Cir. 1975) (AR 86-21(2)); Parsons v. Secretary of HHS, 762 F.2d 1188
(4th Cir. 1985) (AR 86-22(4)); Doran v. Schweiker, 681 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1982) (AR 86-23(9));
Hansen v. Heckler, 783 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1986) and Elliott v. Heckler, No. 84-2055 (10th Cir.
1986) (AR 86-24(10)); Fagner v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1985) (AR 86-25(9)); Webb v.
Richardson, 472 F.2d 529 (6th Cir. 1972) (AR 87-1(6)). Note that this list includes a case decided as
early as 1969 and three cases decided in the 1970s.
91. Butterworth v. Bowen, 796 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1986) (AR 87-2(11)); Hart v. Bowen, 799
F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1986) (AR 87-3(9)); Iamarino v. Heckler, 795 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1986) (AR 87-
4(8)); Velazquez v. Heckler, 802 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1986) (AR 87-5(3)); Groseclose v. Bowen, 809
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These rulings all apply at all four administrative levels; 2 thus, the
agency has not invoked its split policy under which it would acquiesce
only at the ALJ and Appeals Council levels. Also, by acquiescing at all
four levels, the agency has essentially foreclosed relitigation of questions
covered by Acquiescence Rulings in the circuits that rendered the adverse
decisions.
It is debatable whether one can assume that SSA is now engaged in a
policy of blanket intracircuit acquiescence. It may well be, for example,
that SSA is not issuing Acquiescence Rulings for cases in which there are,
in fact, irreconcilable inconsistencies between the agency's position and
circuit law, 93 and therefore, decisionmakers at all levels are continuing to
apply agency policy even though this policy has been rejected by the court
of appeals which will review the agency's action.94
3. Judicial Reaction to the Agency's Nonacquiescence Policy
SSA's pre-1985 policy of blanket nonacquiescence has been roundly
criticized by the courts. We focus primarily on two such cases-Lopez v.
Heckler95 and Stieberger v. Heckler9 -that are representative of the judi-
cial rebuke that intracircuit nonacquiescence by SSA has engendered.
a. Lopez v. Heckler
This class action was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California to challenge the procedures used by SSA in termi-
nating disability benefits pursuant to its program of Continuing Disability
Investigations.9 7 In two earlier cases, the Ninth Circuit had held that disa-
bility benefits could not be terminated unless SSA had come forward with
evidence of improvement in the recipient's medical condition.98 The
F.2d 502 (8th Cir. 1987) (AR 88-2(8)); McDonald v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 153 (7th Cir. 1986),
amended on reh'g, 818 F.2d 559 (7th Cir. 1987) (AR 88-3(7)).
92. See 52 Fed. Reg. 29,441 (1987); 51 Fed. Reg. 20,354 (1986). The HHS General Counsel has
indicated that the only Acquiescence Ruling that does not apply at all four levels concerns a case,
Butterworth v. Bowen, 796 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1986), that involved only the actions of the Appeals
Council; by definition, then, the Ruling could not have applied at lower levels. See Letter from Ron-
ald Robertson to Mary Candace Fowler at 2 (April 21, 1988) [hereinafter Robertson Letter] (public
comment on draft ACUS policy).
93. Where the agency studies a potentially adverse decision and decides that there is no conflict, it
prepares a document entitled: "Decision That Ruling of Acquiescence Is Not Needed." These state-
ments are not widely disseminated.
94. Attorneys representing claimants believe that such silent nonacquiescence is widespread. See
Brief for the City of New York and the Stieberger Class as Amici Curiae, No. 87-6244 (2d Cir.
1987). For a discussion of the problem of silent nonacquiescence, see infra text accompanying notes
338-39.
95. 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984).
96. 615 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), prelim. inj. vacated sub nom., Stieberger v. Bowen, 801
F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986).
97. See 42 U.S.C. § 421(h) (1982).
98. Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982); Finnegan v. Matthews, 641 F.2d 1340 (9th
Cir. 1981).
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agency had published formal notices of nonacquiescence in both of these
cases.9 9 The Lopez plaintiffs attacked the constitutionality of SSA's nonac-
quiescence policy on separation of powers and due process grounds.1 00
The district court certified a class of Ninth Circuit claimants 1 and
granted a preliminary injunction requiring SSA to apply the rulings of the
two Ninth Circuit cases to all claimants residing in the circuit." 2 The
court noted that "for the Secretary to make the general assertion that a
decision of the Court of Appeals is not to be followed because she dis-
agrees with it is to operate outside the law.' 0 3 Its conclusion was
grounded on the principle "laid down many years ago by Chief Justice
Marshall in the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison" that "govern-
mental agencies, like all individuals and other entities, are obliged to fol-
low and apply the law as it is interpreted by the courts."'0 4
The court also stressed the vertical disuniformity caused by a policy of
nonacquiescence. It noted that if a claimant
has the determination and the financial and physical strength and
lives long enough to make it through the administrative process, he
can turn to the courts and ultimately expect them to apply the law as
announced [by the Ninth Circuit]. If exhaustion overtakes him and
he falls somewhere along the road leading to such ultimate relief, the
nonacquiescence and the resulting termination stand. Particularly
with respect to the types of individuals here concerned, whose re-
sources, health and prospective longevity are, by definition, relatively
limited, such a dual system of law is prejudicial and unfair.'0 5
A unanimous panel of the Ninth Circuit denied the Secretary's request
for a partial stay of the preliminary injunction, finding "little chance that
the Secretary will succeed in her argument that nonacquiescence is a legit-
imate policy."'0 6 In a concurrence, Judge Pregerson compared nonacqui-
escence to the "repudiated pre-Civil War doctrine of nullification" and
found that the Secretary's refusal to follow Ninth Circuit law "flouts some
very important principles basic to our American system of govern-
ment-the rule of law, the doctrine of separation of powers imbedded in
the constitution, and the tenet of judicial supremacy laid down in Mar-
bury v. Madison.""'
Justice Rehnquist, sitting as Circuit Justice, then granted a partial stay
99. See supra note 64.
100. Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26, 28 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
101. Id. at 30-32.
102. Id. at 32.
103. Id. at 30.
104. Id. at 29 (citations omitted). This view is criticized infra text accompanying notes 226-62.
105. Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. at 30.
106. Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1983).
107. Id. at 1441 (Pregerson, J., concurring).
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of the preliminary injunction but did not consider the merits of the nonac-
quiescence question.'0 8 Subsequently, the full Court denied, on a five-to-
four vote, an emergency application to vacate the stay entered by Justice
Rehnquist. 10 9
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction, except as ap-
plied to benefits denied before the Ninth Circuit had held that medical
improvement was a necessary condition for the termination of disability
benefits." 0 On the question of nonacquiescence, the court said: "That the
Secretary, as a member of the executive, is required to apply federal law
as interpreted by the federal courts cannot seriously be doubted.""' The
Supreme Court ultimately vacated and remanded for reconsideration in
light of the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, with-
out reaching the legality of nonacquiescence." 2 Thus, in the Lopez v.
Heckler litigation, both the district court and the Ninth Circuit concluded
that intracircuit nonacquiescence was a per se violation of separation of
powers doctrine."'
b. Stieberger v. Heckler
This case, brought in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York, involved a frontal challenge to SSA's nonacquiescence pol-
icy." Plaintiffs argued that SSA had nonacquiesced in many decisions of
the Second Circuit. In considering whether to enter a preliminary injunc-
tion, however, the court focused only on the Second Circuit's treating phy-
sician rule, which concerns the weight to be given to the opinion of the
claimant's treating physician." 5
As a threshold matter, the court rejected the agency's claim that there
was no inconsistency between its policy and the Second Circuit's rule."'
Finding that SSA in fact had not been applying the Second Circuit's rule
to claimants residing within its territory, the court turned to the legality of
108. Heckler v. Lopez, 463 U.S. 1328 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers).
109. Heckler v. Lopez, 464 U.S. 879 (1983). Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented, and Jus-
tices Blackmun and Stevens dissented in part. Justice Brennan noted that SSA "has not paid due
respect to a coordinate branch of Government by expressly refusing to implement the binding deci-
sions of the Ninth Circuit." Id. at 887 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
110. Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1510 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 469 U.S. 1082
(1984).
111. Id. at 1503. Here, too, the court invoked Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803), to support its conclusion that nonacquiescence is illegal.
112. Heckler v. Lopez, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984). On remand, the district court in turn remanded the
case to the Secretary, also for reconsideration in light of the statutory amendments. Lopez v. Heckler,
106 F.R.D. 268 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
113. See infra text accompanying notes 226-62 (criticizing this view).
114. Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), prelim. inj. vacated sub.
nom., Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986). The case also involved a challenge to the
agency's "Bellmon Review" policy, under which the decisions of ALJs with a high percentage of pro-
claimant determinations were subject to agency-initiated review by the Appeals Council. Id.
115. Id. at 1343 & n.23, 1344-49.
116. Id. at 1344-49.
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the agency's nonacquiescence policy. Dismissing the contention that non-
acquiescence was permissible in light of the status of SSA as part of a
coordinate branch of government,11 Judge Sand concluded that plaintiffs
were likely to succeed in showing that the agency's pre-1985 policy "was
inconsistent with the constitutionally required separation of powers." ''
The court also stressed the problem of vertical disuniformity:
The Secretary emphasizes the disuniformity of a rule which would
require the SSA to apply one legal standard in Connecticut but an-
other in California. We have just as much, if not more, difficulty
with a policy whereby one claimant is governed by one legal stan-
dard but his neighbor, lacking in either financial resources, litiga-
tional persistence, or physical or mental stamina, is governed by
another. 19
The court found that the problems caused by nonacquiescence persisted
even under the split acquiescence policy contemplated by Interim Circular
No. 185, which allowed for nonacquiescence by the state agencies, because
it created distinctions "between those who appeal adverse state agency de-
terminations and those who do not."12° The court entered a preliminary
injunction, barring intracircuit nonacquiescence. 2'
The Second Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction 22 in light of the
injunction that had issued in Schisler v. Heckler.12 Under the Schisler
injunction, SSA was required to "'state in relevant publications . . . that
adjudicators at all levels, state and federal, are to apply the treating physi-
cian rule of [the Second] [C]ircuit.' "124 Even though the Stieberger in-
junction was broader and "was not necessarily erroneous when issued,"' 25
the Second Circuit concluded that the Secretary should be given the op-
portunity "to demonstrate his good-faith compliance with the law of this
Circuit."' 26
117. Id. at 1357 ("The judiciary's duty and authority, as first established in Marbury, 'to say
what the law is' would be rendered a virtual nullity if coordinate branches of government could
effectively and unilaterally strip its pronouncements of any precedential force.").
118. Id. at 1367.
119. Id. at 1363.
120. Id. at 1370.
121. Id. at 1375-76, 1400. Nonetheless, the court recognized that intracircuit nonacquiescence
might be less troublesome if, after the adverse decision, the agency's policy had been upheld in other
circuits. Id. at 1366.
122. Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986).
123. Schisler v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1986). The court in Schisler considered whether
the entry of an injunction would be an "unnecessary intrusion into the administrative process." Id. at
84. But the court concluded that it would not be an intrusion because the agency was asked only to do
what it said it was already doing when it represented to the court that it was following the Second
Circuit's case law on the "treating physician" rule. Id. Hence, Schisler does not squarely address the
legality of an openly articulated nonacquiescence determination by SSA.
124. Stieberger, 801 F.2d at 37 (quoting Schisler, 787 F.2d at 84).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 38. Nonacquiescence by SSA was also enjoined by the district court in Hyatt v. Heck-
ler, 579 F. Supp. 985 (D.N.C. 1984). The Fourth Circuit, however, vacated the injunction. 757 F.2d
[Vol. 98: 679
Nonacquiescence
4. Congressional Reaction to the Agency's Nonacquiescence Policy
SSA's nonacquiescence policy received close scrutiny from Congress
during the consideration of the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform
Act of 1984. The House bill would have barred intracircuit nonacquies-
cence outright. It provided that when a court of appeals interprets the
governing statute or regulations,
the Secretary shall acquiesce in the decision and apply the interpre-
tation with respect to all individuals and circumstances covered by
the provision in the circuit, until a different result is reached by the
Supreme Court of the United States on the issue involved or by a
subsequently enacted provision of federal law. 27
The bill authorized the Secretary to nonacquiesce in decisions of the
courts of appeals only during the time allowed for filing a jurisdictional
statement or certiorari petition before the Supreme Court. 8
The report accompanying the House bill gave several reasons for the
bar against intracircuit nonacquiescence. Although it noted the importance
of the uniform administration of the disability program, it added that
SSA's nonacquiescence policy did not "substantially achiev[e] that end,"
because of "distinctions which exist within circuits between policies ap-
plied to those claimants who pursue their claims to the appeals court level,
and those who cannot."' 29 The report also expressed concern over the "in-
creasing number and intensity of confrontations between the agency and
the courts as SSA refuses to apply circuit court opinions."' 30 It faulted
SSA for frequently declining to seek Supreme Court review of circuit
court decisions with which it did not agree: "This practice ensures that
1455 (4th Cir. 1985). It reasoned that Congress had rejected a blanket bar against nonacquiescence
during its consideration of the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984. See infra text
accompanying notes 127-37. The court also relied on Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104 (1984), where
the Supreme Court vacated an injunction requiring the Secretary to adjudicate claims and pay benefits
within specified times, in part because Congress had rejected legislation imposing mandatory deadlines
on disability reviews. Hyatt, 757 F.2d at 1459. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals'
ruling for reconsideration in light of Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467 (1986). See Hyatt v.
Bowen, 476 U.S. 1167 (1986). Upon reconsideration, the Fourth Circuit noted that "[tihe separation
of powers doctrine requires administrative agencies to follow the law of the circuit whose courts have
jurisdiction over the cause of action." Hyatt v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 376, 379 (4th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 79 (1987). It did not enjoin the agency's nonacquiescence, however, because it
determined that the question of the propriety of an injunction had not been embraced within the scope
of the Supreme Court's remand. See id. at 381. For other nonacquiescence cases in which injunctions
were entered, see Thomas v. Heckler, 598 F. Supp. 492 (M.D. Ala. 1984); Holden v. Heckler, 584 F.
Supp. 463 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
127. H.R. 3755, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 302(a) (1984).
128. Id. § 302(b). If the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal or denied certiorari, the agency
would then be required to acquiesce in the adverse decision of the court of appeals. Id.
129. HousE REPORT, supra note 63, at 24, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3061.
130. Id. at 24, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. Naws at 3062. According to the report,
"[w]hile the issue of the constitutionality of the non-acquiescence policy may be in doubt, the undesir-
able consequences of escalating hostility between the Federal courts and the agency are clear." Id.
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the Supreme Court will not have the opportunity to review the issue and
render a decision with which the agency would be compelled to
comply."''
The Senate bill took a different approach. Rather than bar intracircuit
nonacquiescence outright, it mandated the use of procedural safeguards
when nonacquiescence was invoked. It required the Secretary to publish,
in the Federal Register, and to send to the Committees on Finance and on
Ways and Means a statement of her decision not to acquiesce, and the
specific facts and reasons in support of that decision.'" 2 The Secretary had
to comply with these requirements within ninety days of the issuance of
the court decision, or the last day for filing an appeal, whichever was
later.' Treating the constitutionality of nonacquiescence as an open
question, the bill stated that "nothing in [the section dealing with nonac-
quiescence] shall be interpreted as sanctioning any decision of the Secre-
tary not to acquiesce in the decision of a U.S. Court of Appeals.' 3 4
The relevant provisions of both bills were deleted in conference. The
Conference Report nonetheless noted that the decision to eliminate statu-
tory language should not "be interpreted as approval of 'non-acquiescence'
by a federal agency to an interpretation of a U.S. Court of Appeals as a
general practice.' 31 s5 Rather, the conferees urged that "a policy of non-
acquiescence be followed only in situations where the Administration has
initiated, or has the reasonable expectation and intention of initiating, the
steps necessary to receive a review of the issue in the Supreme Court."'u 6
The report further urged the Secretary to propose remedial legislation to
deal with the nonacquiescence problem.' 7
131. Id. at 23, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3060.
132. SENATE REPORT, supra note 64, at 21. The reporting requirement would apply also to
decisions to acquiesce in significant cases. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1039, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 3095.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 38, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 3096.
The implications of the Conference Report for the legitimacy of continued intracircuit nonacquies-
cence by SSA are difficult to assess because the legislators held a range of views. According to Senator
Long, one of the Senate conferees, the Conference Report recognized that "it may not always be
possible to immediately initiate an appeal" and that a total bar against nonacquiescence would there-
fore be too harsh on the agency. 130 CONG. REC. S11,458 (Sept. 19, 1984). Nonetheless, he added,
the report "urges that the practice of nonacquiescence be used only in conjunction with a continuing
good faith effort of the administration to obtain a resolution of the outstanding issue." Id. Several
Senators complained about the abandonment of the per se bar of the House bill. Id. at S11,460 (Sen.
Sasser), S11,469 (Sen. Bingaman). Senator Sasser noted that if SSA continued to follow a nonacquies-
cence policy despite the statement of the conferees, he would introduce legislation to require the
agency to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court. Id. at S11,460.
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B. National Labor Relations Board
1. General Description of the Agency
The NLRB's principal responsibilities are to enforce the unfair labor
practice (ULP) provisions of section 8 of the National Labor Relations
Act and to hold elections under section 9 to determine whether the em-
ployees of an appropriate unit wish to be represented by a collective bar-
gaining agent. 138 The five members of the Board, appointed by the Presi-
dent with the advice and consent of the Senate, sit for five-year terms with
statutory protection from discharge without "cause."'139 The General
Counsel, also a Presidential appointee, is an independent officer with fi-
nal, unreviewable authority over the investigation of charges and issuance
of ULP complaints.14°
Representation proceedings are handled administratively at the regional
level, with only discretionary review by the Board. A party aggrieved by
the agency's determination in a representation case-say, because of objec-
tions to the election unit or to the conduct of the election-cannot obtain
direct judicial review. 41 Such review may be obtained only by converting
the case into an ULP proceeding-in the case of an employer, by refusing
to bargain with the union which has been certified as the bargaining
representative.
ULP proceedings are triggered by the General Counsel's issuance of a
complaint. Absent settlement, there will be a trial-type adjudication before
an ALJ in which the General Counsel acts as prosecutor with the assis-
tance of the charging party. The ALJ's proposed report and recommended
order, if not excepted to, become the order of the Board. Typically, how-
ever, exceptions are filed, which the Board reviews on the basis of the
record compiled before the ALJ and the briefs filed by the parties.""
138. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158-59 (1982).
139. The Board exercises virtually exclusive authority over the administration of the Act; there is
no private right of action save for secondary boycott violations under § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)
(1982). See also 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1982). A private action is also available for violations of collec-
tive bargaining agreements under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1982).
140. See NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 108 S. Ct. 413 (1987) (post-
complaint, pre-hearing informal settlement by General Counsel held not subject to judicial review).
141. See AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940) (NLRB certifications in representation proceedings
are not reviewable "final orders"). A narrowly confined action in the nature of mandamus, however,
may be available in special circumstances. See Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
142. Although empowered to engage in substantive rulemaking, the Board has opted, with a few
limited exceptions, to utilize case-by-case agency adjudication as the vehicle for policy formulation as
well as enforcement. For criticism of the Board's reluctance to use rulemaking, see Morris, The
NLRB in the Dog House-Can an Old Board Learn New Tricks?, 24 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 9, 27-42
(1987); Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L.
REV. 163 (1985); Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970). For the first time, the Board has embarked on a
substantive rulemaking proceeding on the question of health care industry bargaining units. See 53
Fed. Reg. 33, 900 (1988) (second notice of proposed rulemaking); 52 Fed. Reg. 25,142 (1987) (notice
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NLRB orders are not self-enforcing. The Board must convert its orders
into judicial decrees either by seeking enforcement in the courts of appeals
under section 10(e) or by cross-moving for enforcement in the circuit
where an "aggrieved" party has petitioned under section 10(f).143 Under
section 10(e), the Board can petition either in the circuit where the ULP
occurred or where the respondent "resides or transacts business," but the
Board's general practice is to petition only in the circuit where the ULP
occurred."" "Aggrieved" persons can petition either in the circuit where
the ULP occurred, "wherein such person resides or transacts business," or
in the D.C. Circuit. 4 5 When an NLRB order renders both the union (or
employee) and the employer "aggrieved," it is possible for petitions to be
filed in three different circuits-setting in motion a "race to the court-
house" that is only partially mitigated by recent legislation. 46
2. The Agency's Nonacquiescence Policy
Although it is difficult to pinpoint the precise date, it appears that at
least since its Acme Industrial Police decision in 1944,147 the Board has
reserved the right to continue its disagreement with circuit court rulings
that are contrary to the Board's interpretation of national labor policy,
even where it is not prepared to seek Supreme Court review in the partic-
ular case. Of course, in many cases the Board does acquiesce in the court
of appeals' view of the law, but this agency, more than most, has openly
asserted the authority to decline to acquiesce in appropriate cases.'
48
of proposed rulemaking).
143. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (1982).
144. See Arvin Automotive, 285 N.L.R.B. No. 102 (Sept. 10, 1987); Remarks of Rosemary M.
Collyer before Southwestern Legal Foundation, Oct. 18, 1985, at 9, reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. No.
206, Oct. 24, 1985, at E-1 [hereinafter Remarks of Rosemary M. Collyer]; Comment, Forum-Shop-
ping in the Review of NLRB Orders, 28 U. CH. L. REv. 552, 558 (1961) (only one of 411 Board
enforcement actions under § 10(c) from January 1955 through November 1960 was brought outside
of circuit where ULP occurred).
145. 29 U.S.C. § 160(0 (1982).
146. On January 8, 1988, President Reagan signed H.R. 1162 into law, amending 28 U.S.C. §
2112 to provide that petitions filed within 10 days after an agency order will be referred to the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation for random selection of the circuit for review. Pub. L. No.
100-236, 101 Stat. 1731 (1988). The race to the courthouse is only partially mitigated because if
petitions are filed after the 10-day period, the first-to-file rule will control.
147. 58 N.L.R.B. 1342 (1944); see Brief for the National Labor Relations Board, Lone Star Steel
Co. v. NLRB, No. 77-1667, at 30-31 (10th Cir. 1983) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Lone Star
Brief]. For other early intimations of a nonacquiescence policy, see Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109
N.L.R.B. 591, 593 (1954) (overruling per se rule barring interrogation because of contrary views of
"at least" six circuits); Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 768 (1957), enforcement denied,
260 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1958), affd, 361 U.S. 477 (1960); Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 99
N.L.R.B. 1448 (1952), enforced, 204 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 909 (1953).
148. When the court of appeals has remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings, the
agency will typically treat the circuit's view as the "law of the case," even where it has decided to
relitigate the point in other circuits or in other cases even in the same circuit. Lone Star Brief, supra
note 147, at 12 n.6 (citing R. J. Smith Constr. Co., 208 N.L.R.B. 615 (1974)); Longview Furniture
Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1734, 1738 (1954); Tiidee Prod. Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 1234 (1972), modified on
other grounds, 502 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975)). For a recent
example of judicial criticism of the Board's policy of limiting its acquiescence to the treatment of a
Nonacquiescence
The NLRB's policy is well captured in its 1957 decision in Insurance
Agents International Union,14 9 where it issued the following general di-
rective to ALJs:
It has been the Board's consistent policy for itself to determine
whether to acquiesce in the contrary views of a circuit court of ap-
peals or whether, with due deference to the court's opinion, to ad-
here to its previous holding until the Supreme Court of the United
States has ruled otherwise. But it is not for a Trial Examiner [now
called an ALJ] to speculate as to what course the Board should fol-
low where a circuit court has expressed disagreement with its views.
On the contrary, it remains the Trial Examiner's duty to apply es-
tablished Board precedent which the Board or the Supreme Court
has not reversed. Only by such recognition of the legal authority of
Board precedent, will a uniform and orderly administration of a na-
tional act, such as the National Labor Relations Act, be achieved.150
Thus, while the Board will occasionally abandon its policy as a result of
an adverse circuit court decision, ALJs must nonacquiesce unless the
Board has announced that it is prepared to accept the adverse judicial
ruling.
The General Counsel, like the Board, will normally not consider ad-
verse circuit law binding in deciding whether to issue a complaint. How-
ever, she may suspend action on charges or enforcement proceedings be-
cause of adverse circuit precedent in anticipation of developments in other
circuits. Her attorneys in the region also will, if possible, shape their
presentations in the ALJ hearings to accommodate contrary circuit views.
The reasons given for this prosecutorial nonacquiescence include the need
to bring cases before the Board so that it (as the delegatee of congressional
authority) can decide whether or not to acquiesce, and the uncertainty at
the outset of a proceeding as to whether the legal question in dispute will
be material to the outcome. 5 ' Once the Board issues its order, of course,
particular case on remand, see NLRB v. Ashkenazy Property Management Corp., 817 F.2d. 74 (9th
Cir. 1987).
We have found a few examples of apparent NLRB refusal to accord "law of the case" treatment to
a disfavored circuit decision. See Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 966 (3d Cir. 1979);
NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, Inc., 602 F.2d 1100 (2d Cir.), on remand, 236 N.L.R.B. 1700 (1979),
enforcement denied, 632 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1980); Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 1448
(1952), enforced, 204 F.2d 529, 532 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 909 (1953).
149. 119 N.L.R.B. 768 (1957), enforcement denied, 260 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1958), affd, 361
U.S. 477 (1960).
150. 119 N.L.R.B. at 773 (emphasis added); see also Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 615,
616 (1963), enforced in part, 331 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1964).
151.
[The General Counsel's issuance of complaint on grounds inconsistent with a circuit ruling]
merely represents a recognition that the Board has not yet determined whether or not it will
follow this Court's decision in future cases, and that the determination should be made by the
Board, in a decision reviewable by this Court, rather than in an unreviewable administrative
action.
Lone Star Brief, supra note 147, at 15-16.
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the General Counsel-now acting as lawyer for the Board-does take ac-
count of circuit law in framing her presentation to the court of appeals. As
Rosemary Collyer, the current General Counsel, explained in a 1985 ad-
dress to the Southwestern Legal Foundation:
The Board, which has had a longstanding practice of filing for en-
forcement only in the circuit in which the unfair labor practices oc-
curred, does not ordinarily initiate enforcement proceedings in an
adverse circuit unless it is prepared to distinguish the prior case on
its facts or to ask the circuit for reconsideration of the earlier deci-
sion. If the respondent seeks review in an adverse circuit, the Board
does not ordinarily seek to reargue the matter but acknowledges the
controlling authority of the prior circuit decision and submits to the
entry of a judgment against it.152
Sometimes, of course, the court of appeals rejects the agency's attempt to
distinguish, or declines its invitation to reconsider, established precedent.
In these cases, the Board, through the General Counsel, will appear to the
court to be asking for enforcement of an order in defiance of the court's
prior ruling.
The Board has articulated three principal reasons for its nonacquies-
cence. First, as the quote from Insurance Agents indicates, the Board be-
lieves that, pursuant to its congressionally delegated responsibility to en-
sure a nationally uniform administration of its organic statute, it has the
authority to pursue its vision of national labor policy at the administrative
level, except where the Supreme Court has announced a different nation-
ally binding rule. 53 Second, the Board notes that it is the primary poli-
cymaker under the statute and that the Supreme Court has often sided
with it even in the face of adverse circuit court decisions.
154
152. Remarks of Rosemary M. Collyer, supra note 144, at 9 (citing McElrath Poultry Co. v.
NLRB, 494 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1974)). It is noteworthy, however, that in a recent dissent, the then
Chairman of the NLRB argued vigorously against the agency's nonacquiescence policy. See Arvin
Automotive, 285 N.L.R.B. No. 102, at 17 (Sept. 10, 1987) (Dotson, dissenting).
153. NLRB officials whom we interviewed also expressed the concern that mandating agency
compliance with differing circuit views on important labor law issues, such as the bargainability of
plant closings or the obligations of purchasers of companies, would undermine the statutory design to
prevent competition fueled by differing labor standards among different sections of the country. See
infra text accompanying notes 316-20 (discussing cross-circuit effects).
154. As Elliot Moore, recently retired Deputy Associate General Counsel, has written:
On reflection, it appeared to me that an unstated premise for the concern over the Board's
failure to acquiesce in a decision of a court of appeals is that the court of appeals is at least as
likely as the Board to be expressing what will ultimately be regarded as national labor policy
.... During [the last 10 years], the Board prevailed in 20 of 32 cases [before the Supreme
Court]; in most of these cases, where a court of appeals was reversed, it was for not giving
sufficient deference to the Board's interpretation of the statute . . . . Sixteen of the cases de-
cided during the 10-year period involved conflicts among three or more circuits. In thirteen of
those cases, the Court upheld the Board. In so holding, the Court disagreed with decisions of a
total of 34 courts of appeals that had disagreed with the Board, either in the case before the
Court or in other cases presenting the same issue. In three of the 16 cases, the Court disagreed
with the Board. In so holding, the Court agreed with the decisions of only six courts of appeals
that had disagreed with the Board.
Letter from Elliot Moore to Professor Estreicher 1-2 (July 27, 1987) (on file with authors).
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Third, the Board explains, perhaps most persuasively, that because of
the broad venue choice available under section 10(f),15 it cannot be cer-
tain which court of appeals eventually will hear the case. Even though it
is the Board's policy to seek enforcement only in the circuit where the
ULPs transpired,1"" aggrieved parties often challenge the Board's orders
in other circuits.157 Where petitioners are genuinely aggrieved by such
orders,15 some circuits, while lamenting such forum shopping, hold that
they have little latitude-despite the apparent breadth of the transfer stat-
From 1977 to 1986, the Supreme Court sided with the Board in NLRB v. Pipefitters, 429 U.S.
507, 527 n.15 (1977) (four circuits had ruled against Board); Bayside Enters., Inc. v. NLRB, 429
U.S. 298, 299 n.4 (1977) (two circuits); NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335
(1978) (one circuit); Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 567 n.17 (1978) (two circuits); NLRB v.
Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 219 n.5 (1978) (two circuits); Beth Israel Hosp. v.
NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 489 n.5 (1978) (three circuits); American Broadcasting Cos. v. Writers Guild,
437 U.S. 411, 422 n.17 (1978) (one circuit); Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 493 n.6 (1979)
(three circuits); NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773 (1979) (one circuit); NLRB v. Retail
Store Employees Union, 447 U.S. 607 (1980) (one circuit); NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322
(1981) (one circuit); NLRB v. Hendricks County Elec. Corp., 454 U.S. 170 (1981) (one circuit);
Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 412 (1982) (three circuits); Woelke &
Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 652 n.6 (1982) (one circuit); Shepard v. NLRB, 459
U.S. 344, 349 (1983) (one circuit); Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 702 (1983)
(one circuit); NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 397 n.3 (1983) (three
circuits); NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 825-26 n.4 (1984) (six circuits); NLRB v.
Ironworkers, 466 U.S. 720 (1984) (one circuit); NLRB v. Action Automotive, Inc., 469 U.S. 490, 494
n.3 (1985) (one circuit); Pattern Makers League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 98 n.4, 100 n.6 (1985) (one
circuit).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 143-46.
156. See supra text accompanying note 144. Apparently, this was not the Board's original prac-
tice. J. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 187 (1974) (quoting
Charles Fahy, the Board's first General Counsel); see, e.g., NLRB v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 124
F.2d 50, 52-53 (6th Cir. 1941), affd, 318 U.S. 9 (1943) (ULP in 7th Circuit).
157. See, e.g., Purolator Armored, Inc. v. NLRB, 764 F.2d 1423, 1425 (11th Cir. 1985) (review-
ing case which arose in 6th Circuit); McLean Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 689 F.2d 605, 607 (6th Cir.
1982) (5th Circuit); Chevron U.S.A. v. NLRB, 672 F.2d 359, 360-61 (3d Cir. 1982) (9th Circuit);
Magic Pan, Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 105, 106 (7th Cir. 1980) (D.C. Circuit); Thrift Drug, 215
N.L.R.B. 259, 260-61 (1974), enforced, 521 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911
(1976) (3d Circuit); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 448 F.2d 8, 10-11 (4th Cir. 1971) (5th
Circuit); New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 491, 492 n.3 (7th Cir. 1971) (9th Circuit). One
study of 563 NLRB cases decided by the courts of appeals from January 1955 through November
1960 found that 13 of 89 (14.6%) employer appeals and 41 of 63 (65.1%) union appeals were brought
in circuits other than where the alleged ULPs occurred. See Comment, supra note 144, at 558-59.
158. The courts of appeals will disregard the forum selection of petitioners who are not substan-
tially aggrieved by the agency's order, see, e.g., J.L. Simmons Co. v. NLRB, 425 F.2d 52, 54-55 (7th
Cir. 1970); Chatham Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 1116, 1118 (4th Cir. 1968); Insurance Workers
Int'l Union v. NLRB, 360 F.2d 823, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1966), or whose aggrievement stems solely from
the denial of extraordinary relief, see Liquor Salesmen's Union v. NLRB, 664 F.2d 1200 (D.C. Cir.
1981). In addition, some courts will require a substantial showing of transaction of business in the
forum circuit lest "large corporations . . . be free to roam the entire country in search of venues
which might provide them with what, in their opinion, would be a more favorable hearing." S.L.
Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 673 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1982); Davlan Eng'g, Inc. v. NLRB, 718 F.2d 102, 103
(4th Cir. 1983).
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ute"'5 -to transfer the case to a circuit having more substantial contacts
with the underlying controversy. 60
The Board's venue uncertainty contention requires some qualification.
The Board, by stated policy, seeks enforcement only in the circuit where
the ULPs transpired."' It can be assumed that the respondent will seek
out a circuit with venue over the action that has rejected the agency's
position. The problem for the Board, however, is that even if it were to
engage in such a calculus, and adhere to the law of the circuit to which
the respondent is likely to repair, it has to contend with the fact that the
charging party will now be "aggrieved" and seek review in some other
circuit." 2 Acquiescence in these circumstances also puts the agency in the
awkward position of having to defend a position it does not favor.'
6 3
3. Judicial Reaction to the Agency's Nonacquiescence Policy
Both courts and commentators have been quite critical of the NLRB's
nonacquiescence policy. 64 Indeed, virtually every circuit has issued opin-
159. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (1982), the court of appeals of first filing would appear to have
fairly broad discretion to transfer the case: "For the convenience of the parties in the interest of justice
such court may thereafter transfer all the proceedings with respect to such [agency] order to any other
court of appeals." A similar transfer authority is contained in the 1988 amendments. See infra text
accompanying note 386.
160. Compare Rikal, Inc. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 402, 404 (1st Cir. 1983) ("a court of appeals in
which venue lies under the statute may not decline jurisdiction simply because it believes that another
circuit would be the more appropriate forum") and NLRB v. Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 124
F.2d 50, 53 (6th Cir. 1941), affd, 318 U.S. 9 (1943) (same) with Farah Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 481
F.2d 1143, 1145 (8th Cir. 1973) (transfer to circuit where ULP arose despite fact petitioner trans-
acted business in forum circuit); cf United States Elec. Motors v. NLRB, 722 F.2d 315, 319 (6th Cir.
1983) (criticizing forum-shopping but accepting stipulation of both parties that petitioner transacted
business in forum circuit). See generally McGarity, Multi-Party Forum Shopping for Appellate Re-
view of Administrative Action, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 302, 332-34 & n.152 (1980).
161. See supra text accompanying note 144.
162. The Board recently explained its decision to refuse to follow Eleventh Circuit precedent in
Arvin Automotive, 285 N.L.R.B. No. 102 (Sep. 10, 1987):
[If we were to dismiss the complaint, the individual Charging Party would be free to seek
review in the District of Columbia Circuit. Because we are finding the violations, the Respon-
dent Union is the aggrieved party, and its venue choices would include not only those open to
the Charging Party but also any circuit in which it is incorporated (i.e., resides) or in which it
"transacts business." Although the Respondent Employer did not file exceptions, it should be
noted that, had it done so, it would be free to file in the Seventh Circuit, where it is incorpo-
rated, and if it transacts business nationwide, all the circuits would be open to it. It is thus
apparent that we operate under a statute that simply does not contemplate that the law of a
single circuit would exclusively apply in any given case.
Id. at 14 (citations omitted).
A consistent Board practice of acquiescence in the law of the circuit where the ULP occurred
might, however, induce these other circuits to forego an independent consideration of the applicable
law. See United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 140, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("we certainly cannot
hold the Board to have been in error when it decided to follow a decision of a Court of Appeals,
especially of the circuit in which the relevant affairs occurred").
163. See infra text accompanying note 173.
164. For critical academic commentary, see Hruska Commission Report, supra note 5, at 354-58;
Ferguson & Bordoni, The NLRB vs. the Courts: The Board's Refusal to Acquiesce in the Law of the
Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals, Proc. of the 35th NYU Annual Conf. on Lab. 125 (1983);
Kafker, Nonacquiescence by the NLRB: Combat Versus Collaboration, 3 LAB. LAW. 137 (1987);
Mattson, The United States Circuit Courts and the NLRB: "Stare Decisis" Only Applies if the
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ions highly critical of that policy. 65 The earliest judicial reaction appears
to be the Seventh Circuit's decision in Morand Brothers Beverage Co. v.
NLRB,' in which the Board on remand declined to follow prior law of
that circuit:
[W]e think it not unwise to recall a basic tenet in our federal system
of administrative practice and review. The position of any adminis-
trative tribunal whose hearings, findings, conclusions and orders are
subject to direct judicial review, is much akin to a . . . District
Court . . . . That is to say, it is the "inferior" tribunal, whose deci-
sions, both substantive and, in some instances, adjective, are subject
to review and consequent approval or disapproval by the reviewing
body.
1 67
This district-court analogy is also the theme struck in more recent opin-
ions. Thus, for example, in Allegheny General Hospital v. NLRB,168 the
Third Circuit declared:
[T]he Board is not a court nor is it equal to this court in matters of
statutory construction. Thus, a disagreement by the NLRB with a
decision of this court is simply an academic exercise that possesses no
authoritative effect. . . .[I]t is in this court by virtue of its responsi-
Agency Wins, 53 OKLA. B. J. 2561 (1982). For similar views by former members of the Board, see
Dotson & Williams, NLRB v. The Courts: The Need for an Acquiescence Policy at the NLRB, 22
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 739 (1987); Zimmerman & Dunn, Relations Between the NLRB and the
Courts of Appeals: A Tale of Acrimony and Accommodation, 8 EMPLOYEE REL. J. 4 (1982); see also
Estreicher, The Second Circuit and the NLRB 1980-1981: A Case Study of Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 48 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1063, 1077-78 (1982) (criticizing nonacquiescence in cases on
remand). For a defense of the Board's policy, see Modjeska, The NLRB Litigational Processes: A
Response to Chairman Dotson, 23 WAKE FORESr L. REv. 399 (1988).
165. See NLRB v. Ashkenazy Property Management Corp., 817 F.2d 74, 75 (9th Cir. 1987);
Beverly Enter. v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 591, 592-93 (6th Cir. 1984); Kitchen Fresh, Inc. v. NLRB, 716
F.2d 351, 357 & n.12 (6th Cir. 1983); Yellow Taxi Co. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366, 382-83 (D.C. Cir.
1983); PPG Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 671 F.2d 817, 823 & n.9 (4th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. HMO
Int'l, 678 F.2d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 1982); Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 975 (1980); Mary Thompson Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858, 864 (7th Cir.
1980); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 969-70 (3d Cir. 1979); Federal-Mogul Corp.
v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 1245, 1252 (5th Cir. 1978); Coletti's Furniture, Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 1292,
1293 (1st Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Gibson Prod. Co., 494 F.2d 762, 766 (5th Cir. 1974); Morand Bros.
Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 529, 532 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 909 (1953); cf
Enerhaul, Inc. v. NLRB, 710 F.2d 748, 751 (11th Cir. 1983) (awarding attorney's fees under Equal
Access to Justice Act (EAJA)).
The only judicial endorsement of sorts is Judge Wright's approving quotation of a Fifth Circuit
ruling that "assumed without deciding" that an agency was "free to decline to follow decisions of the
courts of appeals with which it disagrees, even in cases arising in those circuits." Yellow Taxi Co., 721
F.2d at 384 (Wright, J., concurring) (quoting S & H Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. OSHRC, 659 F.2d
1273, 1278-79 (5th Cir. 1981)). Judge Bork in the same case observed that "[ain agency with nation-
wide jurisdiction is not required to conform to every interpretation given a statute by a court of
appeals," but found that the Board "appears less to have been seeking reconsideration of a legal issue
than trying to achieve a desired result by a somewhat disingenuous treatment of the facts." Yellow
Taxi Co., 721 F.2d at 385 (Bork, J., concurring).
166. 204 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 909 (1953).
167. Id. at 532 (citations omitted).
168. 608 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1979).
The Yale Law Journal
bility as the statutory court of review of NLRB orders that Congress
has vested a superior power for the interpretation of the congres-
sional mandate. Congress has not given to the NLRB the power or
authority to disagree, respectfully or otherwise, with decisions of this
court. . . . For the Board to predicate an order on its disagreement
with this court's interpretation of a statute is for it to operate outside
the law.""9
According to critics of nonacquiescence, not only must the Board itself
apply the law of the reviewing circuit, but adherence to circuit law is also
a duty of the ALJs 17 0 and other agency decisionmakers.
In general, the reactions of the courts of appeals share certain charac-
teristics. First, the courts are quick to condemn NLRB nonacquiescence as
"outside the law" without any attempt to justify this conclusion except by
reference to the district-court analogy, which is itself analytically ques-
tionable.17 1 Second, the courts appear to be operating on the assumption
that what is going on is a form of intracircuit nonacquiescence. This is
true even when there has been no prior remand, or when the reviewing
circuit is not the place where the alleged ULPs occurred.172 Third, the
courts appear not to be aware that, because of the range of venue choice
open to "aggrieved" parties, no particular circuit exercises exclusive au-
thority over the dispute. Predicting which circuit will ultimately review
the case is frequently difficult, and agency acquiescence may create a new
aggrieved party, putting the agency in the position of having to defend a
circuit court's position, not its own.1' 3 Fourth, these decisions do not ac-
knowledge that nonacquiescence may be justified in particular circum-
stances. Finally, although there have been suggestions that continued
nonadherence by the NLRB might result in additional sanctions, 174 the
courts in these cases have confined their reaction to nonenforcement of the
Board's orders.
169. Id. at 970 (citations omitted).
170. See PPG Industries, 671 F.2d at 823 & n.9; Federal-Mogul, 566 F.2d at 1252.
171. For a criticism of this analogy, see infra text accompanying notes 229-37.
172. Some of the cases, however, were on remand from the reviewing circuit, and hence it was
virtually certain they would return to that court, whether by initial filing or transfer. See, e.g.,Ja-
maica Towing, Inc., 632 F.2d at 208; Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 608 F.2d at 966; Gibson Prods., 494
F.2d at 763; Estreicher, supra note 164, at 1077-78.
173. On the problem of nonacquiescence under conditions of venue choice, see infra text accom-
panying notes 302-07.
174. See Ashkenazy Property Management Corp., 817 F.2d at 75 ("Any future act of 'nonacqui-
escence' should be dealt with by this court in the specific context in which it occurs so that we may
address the agency's particular violation of the rule of law and fashion a remedy that is appropriate in
light of all the relevant circumstances."); Yellow Taxi Co., 721 F.2d at 383 ("Should the Board con-
tinue to act in defiance of well established decisional law of this and other courts, we may be required
to secure adherence to the rule of law by measures more direct than refusing to enforce its orders.");
cf. Enerhaul, Inc., 710 F.2d at 751 (attorney's fees under EAJA). The use of EAJA sanctions as a
means of curbing agency nonacquiescence is discussed infra text accompanying notes 347-48.
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C. Survey of Other Major Federal Agencies
The experience of SSA and the NLRB is far from unique. For exam-
ple, the IRS, which like SSA operates under a scheme that is essentially
venue-certain,"7 5 has frequently engaged in intercircuit nonacquiescence.
Many of the cases that have reached the Supreme Court since 1976 in-
volved issues which the IRS had lost in one or more circuits and had
continued litigating in other circuits. 17  Former Chief Counsel Lester R.
Uretz described the IRS's informal policy with respect to intercircuit non-
acquiescence as follows:
It may be stated as a general rule of thumb, to which exceptions
must of necessity be made, that the Service will accept a result
reached by two courts of appeals where there are no contrary appel-
late decisions. However, if the Service has been successful in litigat-
ing simultaneously several cases which present the same issue, deci-
sions may result in quick succession from more than two circuits.1
7 7
Though less frequently, the IRS has also engaged in intracircuit
nonacquiescence. 1
8
175. Taxpayers who are dissatisfied with an administrative determination may bring suit in one
of three trial forums: if they pay the disputed tax, they can file a refund suit in the district court or
the Claims Court, 26 U.S.C. § 7422 (1982), and if they withhold payment, they can contest the
proposed deficiency in the Tax Court, 26 U.S.C. §§ 7451-65 (1982). Both the Tax Court and the
Claims Court are trial courts of nationwide jurisdiction.
Refund suits by individuals may be brought in the district court in which they reside, and in the
case of corporations, in the district court in which they maintain their principal place of business or
principal office or agency, 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a) (1982), and may be appealed to the court of appeals
that embraces the district, 28 U.S.C. § 1294 (1982). The venue provision for appeals from the Tax
Court to the courts of appeals corresponds to the venue provision for refund suits in the district courts.
26 U.S.C. § 7482(b) (1982). The decisions of the Claims Court are reviewable only by the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (1982).
Since 1970, the Tax Court has been following the case law of the court of appeals that will review
its decision whenever the identity of this court is ascertainable. See Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.
742 (1970), affd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971); Geier, The Emascu-
lated Role of Judicial Precedent in the Tax Court and the Internal Revenue Service, 39 OKLA. L.
REv. 427, 438 (1986). Thus, whether a case originates in the district court or the Tax Court, it will
be appealed to the same court of appeals and governed by the same legal standard. The only venue
uncertainty in the system (other than occasional uncertainty over where a Tax Court decision will be
appealed) is caused by the presence of alternative venue in the Claims Court, which accounts for a
small number of cases.
176. See, e.g., Jersey Shore State Bank v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 782 (1987) (four circuits had
ruled against IRS); Sorenson v. Secretary of the Treasury, 106 S. Ct. 1600 (1986) (two circuits);
United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985) (one circuit); Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc. v. United States,
469 U.S. 310 (1985) (one circuit); Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386 (1984) (one circuit);
United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16 (1982) (one circuit); Commisssioner v. Portland
Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156 (1981) (one circuit); United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707 (1980) (two
circuits); United Cal. Bank v. United States, 439 U.S. 180 (1978) (one circuit); Commissioner v.
Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77 (1977) (four circuits); United States v. Foster Lumber Co., 429 U.S. 32 (1976)
(four circuits); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (one circuit).
177. Uretz, The Chief Counsel's Policy Regarding Acquiescence and Nonacquiescence in Tax
Court Cases, 14 TAx COUNS. Q. 129, 144 (1970).
178. See, e.g., Boyle v. United States, 710 F.2d 1251 (7th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 469 U.S. 241 (1985)
(nonacquiescing in Rohrabaugh v. United States, 611 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1979)); Portland Cement
Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 450 U.S. 156 (1981) (nonacquiescing in
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In defense of its nonacquiescence, the IRS takes the position that hori-
zontal uniformity among similarly situated taxpayers is particularly im-
portant in the administration of the tax laws.179 Supreme Court review,
however, generally cannot be obtained until the agency is able, by contin-
ued relitigation, to create a split in the circuits. Although the IRS's prac-
tice has been strongly criticized by the Hruska Commission180 and the
secondary literature,"8' we have not found extensive judicial censure. A
notable recent example of disquiet is Keasler v. United States,"2 where
the Eighth Circuit awarded attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Jus-
tice Act (EAJA)... because the IRS had refused to acquiesce in an earlier
Tenth Circuit ruling on the same issue. Given the importance of uniform-
ity in tax cases, the court indicated that it would follow sister circuit rul-
ings unless they are "'demonstrably erroneous or there appear cogent rea-
sons for rejecting them,' ""84 and that it would seek to deter even
intercircuit nonacquiescence in the absence of a demonstrated basis for
believing that relitigation was "an important step in creating a meaningful
conflict between the circuits." ' 5
The Occupational Health and Safety Review Commission (OSHRC),
an adjudicatory agency which, like the NLRB, operates under venue-
uncertain conditions," 6 has also made significant use of nonacquiescence.
United States v. Ideal Basic Indus., 404 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 936
(1969)); United States v. Oliver, 505 F.2d 301, 305 (7th Cir. 1974) (nonacquiescing in United States
v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969)); Home Constr. Corp. v. United States, 439 F.2d 1165,
1171 (5th Cir. 1971) (nonacquiescing in Davant v. Commissioner 366 F.2d 874 (1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1022 (1967)); see also Cardwell v. Kurtz, 765 F.2d 776, 781-82 (9th Cir. 1985) (attorney's
fees under EAJA).
179. An oft-cited statement of this policy can be found in Uretz, supra note 177, at 139; see also
Hauser, Litigation Policy of the Chief Counsel in Civil Tax Cases, 14 TAX EXECUTIVE 218 (1962).
180. Hruska Commission Report, supra note 5, at 350-54.
181. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 4; Geier, supra note 175; Herzberg, Blueprint of a Fair Tax
Administration, 41 TAXES 161, 163 (1963); Miller, A Court of Tax Appeals Revisited, 85 YALE L.J.
228, 234 (1975); Nevitt, Achieving Uniformity Among the 11 Courts of Last Resort, 34 TAxEs 311
(1956); Rodgers, The Commissioner "Does Not Acquiesce," 59 NEB. L. REv. 1001 (1980); Vestal,
supra note 29, at 124-25; Note, Treasury Department's Practice of Non-acquiescence to Court Deci-
sions, 28 ALB. L. REv. 274 (1964); Note, The Commissioner's Nonacquiescences: Their Effect Upon
Tax Planning, 28 J. TAXATION 57 (1968); Note, The Commissioner's Nonacquiescence, 40 S. CAL.
L. REv. 550, 566-68 (1967). Prior to the Golsen decision, see supra note 175, the Tax Court had
also been criticized for its nonacquiescence. See Comment, Heresy in the Hierarchy: Tax Court Rejec-
tion of Court of Appeals Precedents, 57 COLuM. L. REV. 717 (1957).
182. 766 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1985); see also Divine v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 1041, 1049 (2d
Cir. 1974).
183. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1982).
184. 766 F.2d at 1233, (quoting North American Life & Casualty Co. v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d
1046, 1051 (8th Cir. 1976)).
185. 766 F.2d at 1237.
186. Any person aggrieved by a final order of OSHRC, including unreviewed ALJ decisions, may
obtain review within 60 days in the court of appeals where the violation is alleged to have occurred,
where the employer has its "principal office," or in the D.C. Circuit. 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1982). The
Secretary of Labor can obtain review or enforcement of any final order in the court of appeals where
the alleged violation occurred or where the employer has its principal office. Id. § 660(b).
The range of venue choice is, however, narrower than under the NLRA. In addition to the circuit
where the alleged violations occurred and alternative venue in the D.C. Circuit, the petitioner's re-
maining option is limited to the circuit where it has its "principal office" rather than the broader
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In its 1976 ruling in Grossman Steel & Aluminum Corp., 1 7 OSHRC
embraced a nonacquiescence policy that avowedly mirrored the NLRB's:
"Like the National Labor Relations Act, the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 is national in scope, and its orderly administration
requires that administrative law judges follow precedents established by
the Commission ... unless reversed by the Supreme Court." 88 In 1980,
the Commission explained its policy as primarily the product of venue
uncertainty:
While we are aware that the Third Circuit has held that an agency
has no discretion to decline to follow a court's view,... the Third
Circuit has more recently recognized that the application of the law
of one circuit by an administrative agency with national jurisdiction
may be difficult because venue for judicial review may lie in more
than one circuit and the law of one circuit may be inconsistent with
that of others. 8
In the face of criticism, 90 however, OSHRC has qualified its nonacquies-
cence policy. It will now follow circuit law where there is no dispute as to
the identity of the reviewing court.1 91
The experience of the IRS and OSHRC suggest that the more visible
nonacquiescence policies of SSA and the NLRB are not aberrational. 92
"transacts business" formulation of the NLRA. More importantly, there is likely to be only one
aggrieved private party: the employer.
187. 4 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1185, 1975-76 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 20,691 (1976).
188. 4 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 1188, 1975-76 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 24,790.
189. Raybestos Friction Materials Co., 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1141, 1143 (1980).
190. See Borton, Inc. v. OSHRC, 734 F.2d 508, 510 (10th Cir. 1984); Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp. v. Marshall, 636 F.2d 32, 33 (3d Cir. 1980); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. OSHRC, 622 F.2d
1160, 1166-68 (3d Cir. 1980). Other courts, however, have declined to take a position on the legality
of OSHRC's nonacquiescence. See Brock v. L.R. Willson & Sons, Inc., 773 F.2d 1377, 1382 (D.C.
Cir. 1985); S & H Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. OSHRC, 659 F.2d 1273, 1278-79 (5th Cir. 1981).
191. See Davis Metal Stamping, Inc., 12 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1259, 1261, affd, 800 F.2d 1351
(5th Cir. 1986).
Earl R. Ohman, Jr., OSHRC's General Counsel, describes the Commission's current practice as
follows:
In the interest of judicial economy and predictability, the Commission will defer to the legal
interpretations of a Court of Appeals to which its decision would be appealed. In one case
there was a conflict between the precedents of two circuits to which it could be appealed. The
Commission applied its own precedent, which was congruent with the precedent of one of
those circuits. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, [9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1346, 1349 n.12, 1981
O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 25,208, at 30,134 n.12 (1981)]. Similarly, the Commission feels free to
apply its own judgment when the circuits to which the case is appealable have not addressed
the issue, even if other courts have. Williams Enterprises of Georgia, Inc., [12 O.S.H. Cas.
(BNA) 2097, 2101-02, 1986 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 27,692, at 36,152 (1986)], appeal filed,
No. 86-8825 (1lth Cir. Nov. 10, 1986). But see views of Commissioner Wall, [12 O.S.H. Cas.
(BNA) 2115, 2117, 1986 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 27,692, at 36,166 (1986)]. In that instance,
however, the Commission carefully reexamines its views in light of the rationale of each court
that has reviewed the matter.
Letter from Earl R. Ohman, Jr. to Professor Revesz (May 8, 1987) (on file with authors).
192. See Branson, SEC Nonacquiescence in Judicial Decisionmaking: Target Company Disclo-
sure of Acquisition Negotiations, 46 MD. L. REv. 1001, 1001-02 (1987) (discussing nonacquiescence
by Securities and Exchange Commission).
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To test this proposition, we conducted a general survey of the practices of
the other major federal administrative agencies.19 While this Article is
not the place to provide the full results of that survey,"" some conclusions
are appropriate.
First, the agencies generally reported that they had no written or other
formal policy or guidelines on how they would deal with adverse circuit
decisions, whether in the course of formulating enforcement policy or in
the conduct of agency adjudications. None of the agencies indicated that
they had procedures in place to inform enforcement staff or ALJs either
of the existence of circuit decisions contrary to agency policy or of the role
such decisions should play in internal agency proceedings. This tendency
to consider acquiescence in court of appeals rulings on an ad hoc basis is
consistent with the results of a similar survey conducted by Professors
David Currie and Frank Goodman in their 1974 study for the Adminis-
trative Conference.' 95
Second, where review of agency action is vested exclusively in a particu-
lar court of appeals, the agencies reported that they would conform their
internal proceedings to accord with the rulings of that court. Similarly,
where alternative venue lies in the D.C. Circuit, the decisions of that
court are given special weight. Several agencies also reported that deci-
sions interpreting regulations of national applicability are normally given
nationally binding effect. 198
Third, most agencies reported that in appropriate cases they would en-
gage in intercircuit nonacquiescence or nonacquiescence in the face of
193. During February and March 1987, we wrote to the general counsels of the major federal
agencies asking for "any written statements, pronouncements, directives or procedures for determining
when your agency will follow, in subsequent administrative proceedings, circuit court decisions that
are inconsistent with your agency's policies." We also asked for a list of the factors taken into account
in making such determinations in the absence of written or formal policies. We indicated that we were
particularly interested in intracircuit nonacquiescence, problems created by venue uncertainty, and the
different considerations applied with respect to rulemaking as opposed to adjudication. Follow-up
letters were written to agencies that failed to respond. For agencies for which there were reported
court decisions involving nonacquiescence practices, we also followed up with more pointed inquiries
seeking to elicit justifications for such practices.
194. The responses are collected as an appendix to our final report to ACUS.
195. See Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the
Optimum Forum, 75 COLuM. L. REV. 1 (1975). Although their questionnaire sought to elicit infor-
mation concerning agency acquiescence policies, the study as published did not focus on this issue.
196. See, e.g., Letter from Diane S. Killory, General Counsel, Federal Communications Commis-
sion to Professor Estreicher, at 1 (Jun. 8, 1987) (on file with authors) ("The FCC thus generally does
not consider a rule or regulation valid in other circuits when one court of appeals has invalidated a
rule or regulation of general applicability."); Letter from Robert D. Paul, General Counsel, Federal
Trade Commission to Professor Estreicher, at 1 (May 11, 1987) (on file with authors) ("Where a
court exercising statutory review authority vacates or sets aside a Commission rule its judgment ap-
plies to the operation of the rule in every circuit, not only in the circuit in which vacation of the rule
took place.") [hereinafter Paul Letter]. This is true even in the case of SSA. See Gonya Letter, supra
note 61, at 3 ("Only occasionally is the rulemaking function involved in the Social Security acquies-
cence process when, for instance, a court requires the Secretary to issue regulations. Unless the court's
order is reversed or stayed on appeal, the agency, of course, complies with such a court order." (cita-
tions omitted)).
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venue choice. The finding that agency nonacquiescence is common under
conditions of venue choice is significant because, as we indicate in Section
VI, most agencies operate under statutes affording a broad range of such
choice." '
Only two agencies indicated that they did not engage in either of these
forms of nonacquiescence. Diane S. Killory, General Counsel of the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC), wrote:
[T]his agency generally does not attempt to cling to policies that the
courts specifically have rejected on review. This is so regardless of
whether a subsequent agency decision will be reviewed in the same
circuit that rendered the adverse decision. You should be aware that
a broad range of FCC decisions-those generally having to do with
radio licensing-is reviewable only in the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, so that the question of seeking more favorable law in another
forum simply does not arise in a great many cases. As to those cases
that are reviewable in other circuits, however, this agency has not
taken the position that the rulings of a particular circuit are binding
only in the territory that circuit serves.1 98
Ms. Killory noted, however, that sometimes the agency is able by
rulemaking "to develop a record that would support a policy that has been
rejected in review of particular adjudications." 99
Similarly, in our discussions with Francis Blake, General Counsel of
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),20 ° we learned that with re-
spect to both rulemaking °1 and enforcement actions, 0 2 EPA's general
policy is to eschew relitigation of an issue that has been squarely decided
against it in any circuit. Enforcement actions are brought in the district
courts, however, and EPA will on occasion seek to preserve its position by
not appealing an adverse district court decision. Mr. Blake explained that,
because of a special need to maintain uniformity in the environmental
context, and a relatively responsive Congress, the agency has avoided relit-
igation as a tool of policy.
Fourth, several agencies reported that they engage in intracircuit nonac-
197. See infra text accompanying notes 378-81.
198. Letter from Diane S. Killory to Professors Estreicher and Revesz, at 1 (Mar. 2, 1987) (on
file with authors) [hereinafter Killory Letter]. But see ITT World Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 635
F.2d 32, 43 (2d Cir. 1980) (example of nonacquiescence).
199. Killory Letter, supra note 198, at 1 (citing FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582
(1981) (upholding FCC policy statement relegating media format choices to market forces despite
prior circuit ruling requiring hearing into possible market failure)).
200. Interview with Francis Blake, General Counsel of EPA (Mar. 6, 1987).
201. For example, in Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116 (1985), EPA amended a
regulation to conform to an adverse circuit decision even though this regulation had been upheld in
other circuits. See id. at 123-25; id. at 136 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting). But see NRDC v. EPA,
703 F.2d 700, 712 (3d Cir. 1983) (EAJA fees awarded for failure to provide notice and opportunity
for public comment, as required in Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1979)).
202. But see United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165 (1984).
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quiescence. The Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) will nonac-
quiesce, even when it can predict venue, out of "a desire for uniform ap-
plication of Authority decisional precedent in a program that uniquely
involves labor-management relations in the federal community, a program
that is worldwide in scope."203 Robert D. Paul, General Counsel for the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), reported that "[iln rendering adjudi-
catory decisions, the Commission applies the same law, regardless of the
identity or geographic location of the respondent,"2 " although an effort is
made to take account of circuit precedent in fashioning remedies. 205 Llew-
ellyn M. Fischer of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) indi-
cated that in "mixed cases" involving discrimination charges as well as
civil service claims, and hence not reviewable solely in the Federal Circuit,
the MSPB has abandoned its earlier attempt to follow the diverse circuit
positions and will apply agency policy in conformity with Federal Circuit
precedent.2"'
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AGENCY NONACQUIESCENCE
Several courts and commentators have concluded, often without detailed
elaboration, that an administrative agency's refusal to acquiesce in con-
trary circuit court rulings is unconstitutional, or, at the very least, comes
close to transgressing constitutional limitations.207 Such critics of nonac-
quiescence have excoriated the practice in broad strokes, seemingly ex-
cluding the possibility of justification in particular circumstances.208 If this
203. Letter from Ruth E. Peters, Solicitor, Federal Labor Relations Authority, to Professors Es-
treicher and Revesz, at 2 (Mar. 3, 1987) (on file with authors). On remand, however, the FLRA has
in several instances accepted adverse circuit court decisions as the "law of the case." Id.
204. Paul Letter, supra note 196, at 2.
205. See id. (citing Holiday Magic, Inc., 85 F.T.C. 90, 91 (1975) (vacating restitution provision
in part because review was sought in Ninth Circuit)).
206. Letter from Llewellyn M. Fischer of the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board to Professor
Revesz, at 2-3 (Apr. 27, 1987) (on file with authors) (citing Afifi v. Department of the Interior, DC
531D8610254 (MSPB, Apr. 16, 1987)) (MSPB will apply "substantial evidence" test approved in
Romane v. Defense Contract Audit Agency, 760 F.2d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 1985), for denials of step
increases in pay, despite conflicting views in other circuits, e.g., Stankis v. EPA, 713 F.2d 1181 (5th
Cir. 1983); White v. Department of the Army, 720 F.2d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Schramm v. HHS,
682 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1982)).
207. See, e.g., Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1441 (9th Cir. 1983) (Pregerson, J., concurring)
(agency policy of refusing to obey decisional law of circuit is "akin to the repudiated pre-Civil War
doctrine of nullification"); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 970 (3d Cir. 1979) (for
NLRB to predicate order on its disagreement with circuit court's interpretation of statute is "for it to
operate outside the law"); Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (accept-
ance of nonacquiescence doctrine would render "[t]he judiciary's duty and authority ... to say what
the law is .. .a virtual nullity"), prelim. inj. vacated sub. nom. Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29
(2d Cir. 1986). For commentators, see Neuborne, supra note 8, at 1001-02 and other sources cited
supra note 8.
208. But see Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. at 1365-66 (intracircuit nonacquiescence may be
justified "in certain situations [where] the passage of time will be accompanied by criticism and grad-
ual erosion of a particular legal rule such that it is reasonably certain that reconsideration by the
circuit court will soon be forthcoming;" or "where the agency has substantial reason to believe that
subsequent consideration of the disputed issue in other forums has created conditions which are likely
to lead . . . to reconsideration"); cf Maranville, supra note 14, at 522 ("The leap from Marbury to a
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view-the per se unconstitutionality of agency nonacquiescence-is cor-
rect, our inquiry should move directly to the question of remediation: how
best to ensure that agencies are suitably deterred from straying beyond
constitutional limits. On the other hand, if there is no per se bar, and the
validity of a nonacquiescence policy depends on what justification an
agency can present in a particular case, we should proceed to analyze the
competing interests implicated by nonacquiescence.
We reject a blanket constitutional bar against nonacquiescence, finding
unpersuasive the separation of powers, due process, and equal protection
arguments that have been raised in support of such a bar. Moreover, we
do not believe that there is a need to answer the abstract question whether
nonacquiescence, if left entirely unchecked, might not in some circum-
stances raise constitutional concerns. As we explain in Section IV, agency
nonacquiescence is subject to fairly significant checks by virtue of rational-
ity review under the APA;20 9 therefore, such concerns should be ade-
quately addressed through statutory limitations on agency action, without
need for resort to the Constitution.210
A. Specifying the Argument
It is important to define with specificity the contours of our considera-
tion of the constitutional argument. First, we deal explicitly only with
intracircuit nonacquiescence-with cases in which the agency, at the time
of its administrative proceedings, knows, by virtue of the venue rules,
which court of appeals will review its action, and yet proceeds contrary to
a ruling of that court. If the per se argument fails here, it follows aforti-
ori that it will also fail for the two other categories of nonacquiescence
that we have defined. Indeed, in pursuing a policy of intercircuit nonac-
quiescence, by definition the agency is not acting inconsistently with the
case law of the court of appeals that will review its action, and that court
is under no obligation to follow the ruling of the circuit that previously
rejected the agency's position.211 The disregard of judicial authority,
which undergirds the charge of unconstitutionality, is therefore less direct,
and the claim of obedience less compelling. For the same reason, the claim
of unconstitutionality is also stronger in the intracircuit context than
where, because of venue choice, the agency does not know with absolute
certainty, at the time of its administrative proceedings, whether its action
conclusion about nonacquiescence . . . is a long one.").
209. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). For our view of the requirements of APA rationality review,
see infra text accompanying notes 335-62. The organic statute under which the agency operates may
give rise to similar limitations. For ease of exposition, we refer explicitly in the text only to the APA.
210. Our position is consistent with the general policy in favor of avoiding unnecessary constitu-
tionalization of administrative law, as embodied in the "clear statement" approach to statutory ques-
tions trenching upon constitutional values. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S.
490 (1979).
211. On the absence of intercircuit stare decisis, see infra text accompanying notes 274-75.
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will be reviewed in a court of appeals that rejected its position rather than
in a court that either has not addressed the legality of the agency's posi-
tion or has upheld that position.
Second, our discussion addresses only cases in which the organic statute
under which the agency operates does not, of its own force, command the
agency to conform its administrative proceedings to the law of the circuit
that will review its action.212 Where such a bar is present, an agency acts
ultra vires if it refuses to adhere to circuit law, and the legality of the
agency's action can be decisively resolved as a matter of statutory con-
struction. Therefore, the claim of unconstitutionality has independent
force and significance only in cases in which nonacquiescence is not pro-
hibited by statute.
Third, we deal only with situations where the grounds for the agency-
court disagreement involve interpretations of statutes. As we show be-
low,213 it is partly because Congress has charged agencies with responsi-
bility for the uniform administration of their enabling statutes that they
have institutional competence, in the absence of a contrary congressional
indication and within certain limits, to persist in their disagreement with
the reviewing circuit.
2 1.
Fourth, we confine our inquiry to the analysis of the claim that in-
tracircuit nonacquiescence is per se unconstitutional. If, instead, the chal-
lenge contemplates a case-by-case inquiry, it must rest on the premise that
an agency acts unconstitutionally only when it nonacquiesces without suf-
ficient justification and must envision a balancing of the agency's interests
in nonacquiescence against the harms of such a practice. An inquiry of
this sort, which we perform in Section IV, fits comfortably within the
requirement of rationality that the APA imposes on all agency action;
nonacquiescence that is not properly justified can (and should) be struck
down as "arbitrary and capricious." 2x5 Absent a per se rule, it is difficult
to conceive of a situation in which the application of the agency's policy
would be held to survive rationality review under the APA and yet violate
constitutional norms, since presumably both inquiries would focus on the
same factors and balance them in similar ways. 16 Here, too, for the claim
212. Cf supra text accompanying notes 126-37 (discussing congressional attempts to limit nonac-
quiescence by SSA).
213. See infra text accompanying notes 233-35.
214. The status of nonacquiescence in a constitutional interpretation presents a much more troub-
ling question. Similarly, the legitimacy of nonacquiescence in the interpretation of a statute other than
the agency's organic statute cannot be defended by reference to the congressional delegation of poli-
cymaking authority to that agency. See infra text accompanying notes 233-35.
215. Of course, if Congress were to amend the APA or an agency's organic statute to endorse
intracircuit nonacquiescence across the board, or courts were to decline to use the APA as a tool for
scrutinizing the justifiability of nonacquiescence in particular circumstances, the validity of the prac-
tice would have to be analyzed under the Constitution, and the balancing of competing factors that we
present in Section IV might become the basis for a constitutional standard.
216. By analogy to the Supreme Court's tiers of review under the equal protection clause, it is
conceivable that courts might conclude that the Constitution demands a more thoroughgoing review of
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of unconstitutionality to have any independent force and significance, it
must go to the validity vel non of the policy.
Fifth, we deal only with situations in which the circuit court ruling to
which the agency refuses to acquiesce is not accompanied by an injunction
ordering the agency to conform its administrative practices to circuit law,
or was not itself the product of a class action lawsuit in which all residing
in that circuit who are, and who in the future may be, potentially affected
by the agency policy were formally made parties to the judicial proceed-
ing.2"' As to judgments emerging from class actions that include individu-
als who will come into contact with the agency only in the future,218 non-
acquiescence would be inconsistent with the norm, which is a bedrock of
our scheme of separation of powers, that a final decision of an Article III
court is binding on all parties before that court, absent reversal on direct
appeal. Similarly, it is difficult to take seriously the claim that an admin-
istrative agency has the option, under our constitutional scheme, to disre-
gard an injunction entered against it.
That the entry either of an injunction or of certain types of classwide
relief makes nonacquiescence unlawful does not mean that such interven-
tion is appropriate whenever a court strikes down agency action. The pro-
priety of such relief must therefore depend on a case-by-case evaluation of
agency nonacquiescence than the rationality review envisioned by the APA. But we think that it is
highly unlikely that, if the per se rule is rejected, the levels of scrutiny would in fact diverge. Because
review of agency action under the APA is far more substantively demanding than the highly deferen-
tial "rationality review" accorded to legislative or administrative classifications in equal protection
analysis, there would be no need to create an intermediate level of review, as there has been in the
gender area, simply to ensure meaningful judicial oversight. Moreover, the "strict scrutiny"-strict in
theory, fatal in fact-prong of equal protection jurisprudence is merely a mild variant of a rule of per
se invalidity, with the courts simply leaving some room for the possibility of an extraordinary, overrid-
ing justification in what would otherwise be plainly impermissible action. We believe that a rejection
of "strict scrutiny" review of nonacquiescence is fairly subsumed in our rejection of the per se argu-
ment of unconstitutionality.
217. For example, in the Lopez v. Heckler litigation, the district court certified a circuit-wide
class consisting of all persons in the circuit "whose rights and benefits are, have been, or will be
denied by defendants' express refusal to follow [the Ninth Circuit's] precedent" and issued an injunc-
tion directing the Secretary of Health and Human Services and her agents to "apply the standards set
forth" in previous Ninth Circuit rulings. 572 F. Supp. 26, 30, 32 (C.D. Cal. 1983). See supra text
accompanying notes 106-13 (discussing subsequent history).
218. Although we recognize that in other contexts class actions including future members have
been certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, see Note, The Inclusion of Future Members
in Rule 23(bX2) Class Actions, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 397 (1985), we believe that since declarations of
invalidity in the context of such class action suits will be the functional equivalent of an injunction
that effectively bars nonacquiescence, any final determination to include future members within the
reach of the court's judgment should be subject to the same standards that govern the issuance of such
injunctive relief. Procedural devices like class actions cannot be employed to accomplish goals fore-
closed by the substantive law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982); Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of
1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1027-35, 1106-31 (1982).
Admittedly, future litigants were included in class action certifications sustained in Califano v.
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1979). But the Court in that case limited its focus to the permissi-
bility of a nationwide class action, and did not consider the validity of agency nonacquiescence.
Yamasaki cannot plausibly be read to have resolved that question sub silentio in the course of constru-
ing Rule 23.
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the costs and benefits of nonacquiescence, a matter that we take up in
Section IV.
With these five specifications in mind, we turn to consider whether the
Constitution bars an administrative agency from ever pursuing a policy of
intracircuit nonacquiescence, even though the organic statute does not it-
self erect such a prohibition, the agency can justify the particular applica-
tion of its policy sufficiently to withstand APA-style rationality review,
and no court has explicitly insisted on generalized compliance either by
issuing an injunction directly restraining the agency or entering certain
forms of classwide relief.
Although the judicial pronouncements and secondary writings on the
subject have not always carefully defined which constitutional provisions
are implicated by nonacquiescence, we see essentially three lines of argu-
ment. The first claim, which is by far the most central, is premised on
principles of separation of powers. By analogy to the Supreme Court's
articulation of its role in Marbury v. Madison"9 and Cooper v. Aaron,2
courts and commentators have argued that just as a Supreme Court ruling
has coercive force beyond the parties to the immediate dispute, so must a
ruling of a court of appeals command obedience by all within its jurisdic-
tion.221 A second position flows from due process jurisprudence and holds
that agency action works a deprivation of property or liberty without due
process when it is inconsistent with the applicable law announced by the
court of appeals that will review that action.222 Another due process objec-
tion is constructed from the test in Mathews v. Eldridge223 and balances
the agency's interest in nonacquiescence against the interest of participants
in the administrative process in having the agency follow the ruling of the
relevant court of appeals.2 4 Finally, a claim based on both due process
and equal protection principles maintains that intracircuit nonacquies-
cence produces discrimination based on wealth or litigation resources by
limiting the benefits of favorable circuit law to those litigants who are able
to seek judicial review of the agency's action.225 We examine each of these
arguments in turn.
219. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
220. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 95-126 (discussing judicial treatment of SSA); Note,
Social Security Administration in Crisis: Non-Acquiescence and Social Insecurity, 52 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 89, 103-10 (1986); Note, Executive Nonacquiescence: Problems of Statutory Interpretation and
Separation of Powers, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1143, 1158-71 (1987); Note, Denying the Precedential
Effect of Federal Circuit Court Decisions: Nonacquiescence by Administrative Agencies, 32 WAYNE
L. REv. 151, 186 (1985).
222. See Note, Social Security Administration in Crisis, supra note 221, at 122 ("SSA instruc-
tions to its adjudicators to ignore judicially mandated legal rules favorable to claimants operates to
effectively deny many claimants their right to a meaningful hearing.") (footnotes omitted).
223. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
224. See Note, Federal Agency Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 252-60.
225. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 105 (discussing Lopez v. Heckler), note 119 (discuss-
ing Stieberger v. Heckler); Note, Collateral Estoppel and Nonacquiescence, supra note 14, at
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B. The Separation of Powers Objection
Attorney General Meese's October 1986 address at Tulane Univer-
sity228 sparked intense debate over whether the Supreme Court's rulings
are indeed owed the generalized acquiescence envisioned by the nine Jus-
tices who each signed the Cooper v. Aaron opinion, in an effort to stem
the resistance of several southern governors to the desegregation mandate
of Brown v. Board of Education. 7 We do not intend in this study to
question the premises of Cooper v. Aaron. Our approach assumes that the
Supreme Court's pronouncements on federal law must be obeyed not only
by the particular parties to the dispute, but also by all within the regula-
tory reach of federal law. This obligation of obedience entails the internal-
ization of the Supreme Court's rules in the conduct of primary behavior.
For example, the Court's Miranda v. Arizona228 rule applies to all police
departments in this country and requires that the internal operations of
those departments be conducted in compliance with that rule; hence, the
Constitution is violated when Miranda warnings are not given in the
course of interrogating suspects held in custody even if indictments or con-
victions flowing from such questioning are later overturned. The question
here is whether our constitutional system requires that federal administra-
tive agencies acting within the jurisdictional reach of a court of appeals
must accord the same measure of obedience to a ruling of that court.
In addressing this question, we first reject two competing views of the
relationship between an administrative agency and its reviewing courts,
conceptions that have figured prominently in the judicial and secondary
writings on the subject: first, that the status of an agency, particularly that
of an adjudicatory agency, is analogous to that of a district court in the
circuit;229 and, second, that an agency is part of a co-equal branch of gov-
ernment with independent responsibility for the interpretation of federal
law.23
0
The first characterization argues strongly against intracircuit nonacqui-
escence, for a district court is bound in all instances to follow the rulings
of its supervising court of appeals. This view, however, fails to account for
the congressional delegation of substantive policymaking authority to the
administrative agencies and the resulting constraints on the review role of
857-59.
226. Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987); Meese, The Tulane
Speech: What I Meant, Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 1986, at A-21, col. 4.
227. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For a collection of responses to the Meese speech, see Perspectives on
the Authoritativeness of Supreme Court Decisions, 61 TUL. L. REV. 977, 991-1095 (1987).
228. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
229. See, e.g., Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228 (2d Cir.) ("as must a district court, an
agency is bound to follow the law of the Circuit"), cert. denied, 449 U.S, 975 (1980).
230. See Meese, The Law of the Constitution, supra note 226, at 985-86. If this latter analogy is
at all helpful, it is more applicable to agencies that are clearly within the Executive Branch, the top
officials of which serve at the pleasure of the President, than to independent agencies, whose heads are
insulated from direct presidential control by "for cause" removal provisions.
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the federal courts under basic administrative law principles as articulated
in SEC v. Chenery Corp.2"' Administrative agencies, unlike district courts,
are responsible for a nationally uniform administration of the statutes en-
trusted to them,2 2 and are typically the principal decisionmakers under
these statutes. The court's role is the reactive one of checking for abuse of
discretion or other transgressions of statutory limitations. Indeed, even on
questions of statutory interpretation, a strong rule of deference to agency
views operates in lieu of the de novo review characteristic of appellate
consideration of trial court determinations of questions of law.
The differences between an agency's interpretation of law and that of
the reviewing court were recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in
Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC233 and INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,234 where the
Court made clear that the federal courts must uphold an agency's inter-
pretation of the statute it administers if that interpretation is reasonable
and is not inconsistent with the clear intent of Congress.235 That a federal
court, in the first instance, might have interpreted the statute differently is
irrelevant, for Congress delegated the policymaking role to the agency,
and not to the federal judiciary.2 6 The district court analogy also fails to
take account of the tension between the national responsibilities of admin-
231. 318 U.S. 80 (1943) (Chenery 1); 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (Chenery I). In FCC v. Pottsville
Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940), the Court stated:
This was not a mandate from court to court but from a court to an administrative
agency. . . .A review by a federal court of the action of a lower court is only one phase of a
single unified process. But to the extent that a federal court is authorized to review an admin-
istrative act, there is superimposed upon the enforcement of legislative policy through adminis-
trative control a different process from that out of which the administrative action under re-
view ensued. The technical rules derived from the interrelationship of judicial tribunals
forming a hierarchical system are taken out of their environment when mechanically applied
to determine the extent to which Congressional power, exercised through a delegated agency,
can be controlled within the limited scope of "judicial power" conferred by Congress under
the Constitution,
Id. at 141 (emphasis added).
232. See United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 294-95 (1970).
233. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
234. 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987).
235. To the extent the disagreement does not involve the agency's organic statute, agency nonac-
quiescence in a circuit ruling must be justified, if at all, on other grounds. This question, like the
question of nonacquiescence in constitutional rulings, see supra note 214, is beyond the scope of this
Article.
236. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 & n.11. We do not believe that the constitutional analysis
changes when Congress separates enforcement and policymaking from adjudications, as it has done for
internal revenue and occupational safety, by conferring adjudicatory responsibility on bodies indepen-
dent of the enforcement/policymaking agency (the Tax Court and OSHRC, respectively). The en-
forcement/policymaking agency's duty to acquiesce in the rulings of the adjudicatory agency is solely
a question of congressional design. As to the latter agency, unless its role is limited to factfinding
without any substantive policymaking prerogative, and, hence, it may properly be viewed as an ad-
junct to the court of appeals, its obligations to adhere to the rulings of the circuit that will review its
orders is no different from that of an agency that combines enforcement/policymaking and adjudica-
tory functions. Presently, however, both the Tax Court and OSHRC have opted for a policy of in-
tracircuit acquiescence. See Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th
Cir. 1971); Davis Metal Stamping, Inc., 12 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1259, 1261 (1985), affld, 800 F.2d
1351 (5th Cir. 1986).
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istrative agencies and the limited geographic reach of the regional. circuits,
a matter we discuss below.237
Unlike the district court analogy, the co-equal branch analogy, at least
in its strong form, argues sweepingly for the constitutionality of nonacqui-
escence because it does not recognize for any federal court a superior role
in the interpretation of federal statutory law to that exercised by adminis-
trative agencies, except with respect to the adjudication of the rights of the
parties before the court. The co-equal branch analogy significantly over-
states the autonomy of administrative agencies. Like the district court
analogy, the co-equal branch, analogy is inconsistent with our constitu-
tional scheme. It cannot coexist with the holding of the Supreme Court in
Cooper v. Aaron and would justify nonacquiescence even in the face of a
pronouncement by the Supreme Court.238
A more useful starting place is to ask whether the Supreme Court and
the courts of appeals occupy positions in our legal system sufficiently dif-
ferent to place in question the applicability of Cooper v. Aaron to in-
tracircuit nonacquiescence. We focus initially on the regional courts of
appeals and on statutory schemes that do not provide for exclusive venue
to a single court of appeals with nationwide jurisdiction. It is here that the
differences are most salient.
In thinking about whether the courts of appeals should be treated like
the Supreme Court, it is important to bear in mind that the Cooper v.
Aaron principle assumes that the law forming the basis for the obligation
to acquiesce is no longer in flux. The southern governors were embarking
on a fundamentally illegitimate campaign of resistance precisely because
the Supreme Court in Brown and its progeny made clear that all public
schools had to desegregate. The desegregation principle was established
and reaffirmed by the Court at a level of generality that precluded any
effort at common law modification or narrowing through the drawing of
factual or legal distinctions. The duty of generalized compliance in the
Cooper v. Aaron sense emerges, however, only when the process of fed-
eral law development has been completed in this manner.239 Any contin-
ued resistance to a ruling of the Supreme Court after that point must be
237. See infra text accompanying notes 241-46.
238. See Meese, The Law of the Constitution, supra note 226, at 985 ("[constitutional] decisions
do not necessarily determine future public policy[;] . . . constitutional interpretation is not the busi-
ness of the Court only, but also properly the business of all branches of government").
239. See Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 CoLuM. L. REV. 1001, 1008 (1965)
(Supreme Court's decisions are not statutes "calling for obedience by all within the purview of the
rule that is declared," but once rule is settled and reaffirmed, "its acceptance is demanded"). There
will be occasions, however, where previously well-established precedent has either fallen into desue-
tude or been substantially eroded by changes in the legal landscape. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling "separate but equal" doctrine); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938) (denying previously asserted existence of "general" federal common law). In such
circumstances, nonacquiescence may be a legitimate strategy.
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confined to the arena of public opinion and, ultimately, to the Article V
amendment process.24
The rulings of the courts of appeals, by contrast, are in a sense only
intermediate points of decision in this process of federal law development.
This conclusion follows most directly from the absence of intercircuit stare
decisis and from other features of the federal system's commitment to the
process of intercircuit percolation. The fact that the circuits are free to
disagree with each other,241 that the government is insulated under United
States v. Mendoza24 2 from the constraints of nonmutual collateral estoppel
in order to ensure the possibility of multiple circuit consideration of a rule
of law, and that the Supreme Court itself relies on intercircuit conflicts as
an important signaling device for case selection and as a source of doctri-
nal materials for decisionmaking,243 makes clear that the law remains in a
state of flux even well after a particular court of appeals has announced
its rule on a subject.
It might be argued, of course, that even if the law is in flux nationally,
the process of legal development has ended in the particular circuit, hence
rendering illegitimate an agency's policy of intracircuit nonacquiescence.
A court of appeals, however, does not enjoy sovereign responsibility over
its territory akin to that enjoyed by a state court on questions of state law;
it is still engaged in the process of interpreting a unitary national law
244
and remains a part of that process even after it has ruled on the subject.
2 5
240. But cf. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013
(1984) (constitutional change may come about through extraconstitutional upheaval in public values).
241. See infra notes 274-75.
242. 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
243. See S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME CouRT's ROLE 48 (1986).
244. Even where the federal court acquires authority over the case by interdistrict transfer, it "has
an obligation to engage independently [of the views of the transferor court] in reasoned analysis."
Binding precedent for all is set only by the Supreme Court, and for the district courts within a circuit,
only by the court of appeals for that circuit. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 829 F.2d 1171, 1176
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1407). Hence the rule of Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376
U.S. 612 (1964), which requires federal courts in diversity cases to apply the law of the transferor
court, does not apply to federal question cases. See generally Marcus, Conflict Among Circuits and
Transfers Within the Federal Judicial System, 93 YALE L.J. 677, 721 (1984); Steinman, Law of the
Case: A Judicial Puzzle in Consolidated and Transferred Cases and in Multidistrict Litigation, 135
U. PA. L. REv. 595, 662-706 (1987).
245. We recognize that for purposes of assessing whether state officials have acted in violation of
"clearly established" constitutional rights, and hence are shorn of official immunity from liability in
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, some courts have held that rights can be "clearly established" by
circuit law even in the absence of a Supreme Court ruling on the subject. See, e.g., Weber v. Dell, 804
F.2d 796, 803-04 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3263 (1987); McCann v. Coughlin, 698
F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1983).
Two distinctions are relevant. First, nonacquiescence by federal administrative agencies normally
arises over statutory questions, and as to such questions administrative agencies play the special role
that was underscored by the Supreme Court in Chevron. Second, federal administrative agencies have
statutory responsibilities outside of the jurisdiction of a regional court of appeals and have a responsi-
bility for the uniform administration of their governing statute. As a result, the fact that an agency's
policy is inconsistent with the ruling of a court of appeals is itself a relevant consideration in ascer-
taining whether the rule articulated by the court of appeals is "clearly established," for the contrary
agency position detracts from the clarity of the rule.
At some point, however, the law will no longer be in flux, even if the Supreme Court has not ruled.
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Thus, a court of appeals is expected to be open to reconsidering, prior
rulings in the light of developments in other circuits; the role of the cir-
cuits in harmonizing federal law in this manner is an important adjunct to
the Supreme Court's role as conflict-resolver.
246
This is not to say that the legal system or the courts of appeals them-
selves should view with indifference widespread, unjustified disregard of
circuit law by administrative agencies (or other actors). For example, even
in the absence of Supreme Court review, at some point the law in a par-
ticular circuit and across circuits will no longer be in flux. As developed
below, the means are available under APA-style rationality review, possi-
bly the EAJA,247 and, in egregious cases, the courts' own injunctive pow-
ers to prevent nonacquiescence that is not adequately justified. The modi-
fiable, intermediate status of a circuit ruling does suggest, however,
substantial differences from the Cooper v. Aaron paradigm.
These arguments are less persuasive for courts of appeals of national
jurisdiction, such as the Federal Circuit in patent cases, and for the re-
gional circuits themselves where they have been given nationally exclusive
responsibility over particular subject matter, such as the D.C. Circuit has
over various types of administrative appeals.24 In those cases, of course,
the law is much more resistant to change because, at least for certain is-
sues, there will be no intercircuit dialogue and percolation.2 49 But it
would nonetheless be a mistake, in considering the per se constitutionality
of nonacquiescence, mechanically to equate these courts with the Supreme
Court.
The fact that circuit law is typically made by panels of three judges
(some of whom may not be active members of the court of appeals) ren-
ders a single decision on a particular issue more open to reexamination by
a subsequent panel than is true of the Supreme Court's pronouncements.
This result is reinforced by the fact that a court of appeals generally acts
on the basis of mandatory jurisdiction, and therefore almost certainly con-
siders a particular issue more frequently and in more diverse factual con-
texts than does the Supreme Court, with its largely discretionary docket.
We do not mean to place too much emphasis, however, on the panel/en
Then, a court might be able to enjoin nonacquiescence or sanction the agency, for example, by making
it pay attorney's fees under the EAJA. See infra text accompanying notes 347-48.
246. See S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 243, at 48-52, 53-59.
247. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982); see infra text accompanying notes 347-48; see also 5 U.S.C. § 504
(1982) (award of fees in connection with administrative adjudications).
248. See infra text accompanying notes 394-96 (discussing exclusive venue provisions).
249. However, for issues common to different administrative schemes, particularly procedural
questions, a court with exclusive venue will be engaged in dialogue with the regional circuits. It will
enjoy a monopoly of the decisionmaking authority at the circuit court level only over pure questions of
statutory interpretation; even as to those questions, it will be affected by the developing jurisprudence
of statutory construction in the regional circuits. There will thus be circumstances in which the rele-
vant legal landscape remains unsettled. But as to these questions-statutory interpretations not involv-
ing the agency's organic statute-the legitimacy of nonacquiescence will be weaker. See supra text
accompanying notes 213-14, 233-35.
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banc distinction. Indeed, to the extent that the courts of appeals have pro-
vided, as most have, that a decision of a panel is binding on all subsequent
panels and can be overruled only by the en banc court,25 the distinction
cannot be made to carry too much weight. At the same time, however, in
part because of the practical barriers to frequent resort to en banc consid-
eration, a subsequent panel, without formally overruling a decision, might
be receptive to finding ways of distinguishing a prior precedent of a differ-
ent panel. 51 Whether a particular litigation posture constitutes nonacqui-
escence must depend on whether legally plausible arguments can be made
to distinguish the agency's policy from the ruling of the court of appeals.
Thus, aggressive positions that would be considered nonacquiescence in
the face of a Supreme Court decision, or of an en banc decision by a court
of appeals, might not be considered nonacquiescence when they follow an
initial panel decision on the subject.
It is questionable whether, for the purposes of the rule laid down in
Cooper v. Aaron, these differences between a court of appeals of national
jurisdiction and the Supreme Court should count.252 We do not find it
necessary to resolve this point definitively, however, because, as we ex-
plain in Section IV, nonacquiescence in decisions of courts of appeals of
national jurisdiction, or of the regional courts of appeals over matters in
which they have been given exclusive venue, should not ordinarily with-
stand rationality review under the APA.
The foregoing would suggest that, to the extent that intracircuit nonac-
quiescence has a claim to legitimacy, this claim flows from the intermedi-
ate and nonuniform character of the ruling of the regional circuit court.
The relevant question, therefore, is how an agency with national jurisdic-
tion over a particular problem must react to the rulings of a court of
limited geographic jurisdiction, which can render neither final nor nation-
ally uniform rules of decision.2"'
In considering whether (and how) the Constitution speaks to this ques-
250. For the Second Circuit rule, see United States v. lanniello, 808 F.2d 184, 190 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3229, 3230 (1987); In re Jaylaw Drug, Inc., 621 F.2d 524, 527 (2d
Cir. 1980).
251. For example, in Field v. Trump, 850 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1988), the court stated: "The plain-
tiff correctly argues that this legal conclusion is inconsistent with our decision in United States v.
Janniello. However, the defendants correctly respond that the result reached by the district
court-dismissal-is entirely consistent with our decisions in cases such as Beck v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co." Field v. Trump, 850 F.2d at 950 (citations omitted).
252. Of course, one difference is that the Supreme Court is at a different level in our judicial
hierarchy. This difference is particularly relevant to the question whether, following an adverse deci-
sion by a court of appeals of national jurisdiction, an agency may nonacquiesce while it litigates the
case before the Supreme Court. In the event of such an adverse circuit decision, however, it seems
likely that either the court of appeals or the Supreme Court will enter a stay and that the nonacquies-
cence question would therefore not arise.
253. Of course, the question is presented only where Congress has not provided a precise answer
in the organic statute, and where the court of appeals itself has not insisted, or cannot insist (because
of limitations in the statute or in the substantive standard we advance in this Article), upon Cooper v.
Aaron obedience through the issuance of an injunction.
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tion, it is useful to ask whether the following hypothetical statute would
be unconstitutional. Assume that Congress passes a generic cross-agency
statute akin to the APA, providing that, in the absence of contrary direc-
tion in the agency's organic statute, the following rules apply: (1) any
decision by a regional court of appeals in an appeal from agency action
will be binding on the parties (unless overturned by the Supreme Court);
(2) agencies are not subject to nonmutual collateral estoppel; (3) the rul-
ing of a court of appeals will be given the usual stare decisis effect in its
own circuit; (4) courts are free to sanction an agency for continued unjus-
tified nonacquiescence through the EAJA, injunctive process, or other le-
gally available means; and (5) absent an injunction, the agency need not
conform its internal proceedings to the rulings of a regional court of ap-
peals, if it can invoke justification, sufficient under APA standards, for
such nonacquiescence.
The first four elements of this hypothetical statute reflect the status
quo; the fifth authorizes nonacquiescence subject to review for justifica-
tion. We believe that this hypothetical statute reflects Congress's implicit
understanding in constructing our administrative lawmaking system and
that it is consistent with principles of separation of powers.
Two serious objections can be raised to our reliance on this hypothetical
statute. The first is that Congress has not explicitly enacted such a statute,
but at best has been silent on the subject of intracircuit nonacquiescence.
This objection fails to account, however, for the fact that agencies act pur-
suant to broad delegations of authority and normally do not have to
demonstrate explicit authorization.254 Moreover, an implicit authorization
of nonacquiescence is embedded in the congressional choice in favor of
administrative government. One of the goals that Congress sought to pro-
mote was uniformity in the administration of federal law.2 55 At first
glance, uniformity appears to fit uncomfortably with percolation and with
the lack of intercircuit stare decisis. After all, if the different regional cir-
cuits were precluded from taking different approaches, uniformity would
be achieved far more easily and without the need to tolerate agency/court
conflict. But there is no reason why our federal system cannot express a
preference for the uniform administration of federal law at the agency
level, and still desire a scheme of judicial review that improves the quality
of legal rules through dialogue and percolation. Intracircuit nonacquies-
cence permits an agency to preserve uniform administration while the
state of the law in the circuits is still in flux.256 We believe that this dual
254. Except where there are "clear statement" barriers. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v.
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Note, Intent,
Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 892 (1982).
255. See supra text accompanying note 232.
256. See discussion in Section IV of the difference between horizontal and vertical uniformity.
The prevalence of broad venue provisions permits many agencies to pursue uniform policies at the
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objective is the best account of the congressional objectives in enacting stat-
utes providing for administrative policymaking and enforcement subject to
judicial review. Thus, for the purposes of assessing the constitutionality of
nonacquiescence, we are prepared to treat the current administrative land-
scape as if the hypothetical statute permitting nonacquiescence by the
courts of appeals had in fact been enacted.
The second objection is that such a statute, if enacted, would contravene
constitutional limits. We do not believe this to be the case, however, be-
cause of the wide-ranging power that Congress enjoys over the jurisdiction
of the lower federal courts. To reach this conclusion, we focus on two
distinct arguments.
First, unlike the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts are creatures
of Congress. The Constitution merely authorizes Congress to establish
them; it does not mandate their establishment.257 As a result, it is certainly
not inconceivable that Congress might have the constitutional authority to
make administrative action reviewable only by the Supreme Court on writ
of certiorari.2 58 If Congress need not establish the lower federal courts, it
can entrust them with jurisdiction over certain subject matters but not
others. We may feel uneasy, it is true, about limiting Article III review in
this manner, given the Supreme Court's inability to review more than a
small percentage of the cases on its certiorari docket, but it is far from
clear whether this problem is one of constitutional significance.259 If Con-
gress can pursue uniformity at the administrative level to the extent of
abolishing circuit court review of agency action altogether, then in what
sense can it be said to be acting unconstitutionally by taking the less ex-
treme step of providing for review in the courts of appeals while authoriz-
ing intracircuit nonacquiescence, subject to court review and, where ap-
propriate, sanctions and injunctions?
This line of argument might be criticized on the grounds that the
administrative level without being subject to accusations of intracircuit nonacquiescence. If Congress
were to eliminate venue choice, as we propose in Section VI below, a Cooper v. Aaron rule of obedi-
ence would entail considerable costs in terms of the agency's ability to administer a coherent, uniform
set of policies under its organic statute.
257. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested
in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.").
258. It also remains an open question whether Congress need provide for any Article III review
at all, except perhaps for constitutional questions. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co.,
473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985) ("Many matters that involve the application of legal standards to facts and
affect private interests are routinely decided by agency action with limited or no review by Article III
courts."). Compare United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201, 206 (1982) (no review of Medicare
reimbursements, but without reaching Article III question) with Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361
(1974) (statutory preclusion of Veterans Administration determinations does not extend to constitu-
tional claims). For academic discussions, see Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Monaghan, Marbury and
the Administrative State, 83 COLuM. L. REV. 1 (1983).
259. But see Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Jurisdiction, 83 YALE
L.J. 498 (1974) (limits of Supreme Court resources require reconceptualization of traditional congres-
sional power under Article III).
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"greater" power of eliminating circuit court review altogether does not
necessarily carry with it the "lesser" power of preserving circuit court
superintendence yet authorizing intracircuit nonacquiescence. There are
many instances in our legal system in which the government makes itself
subject to constitutional limitations by undertaking activities that it is
under no constitutional obligation to undertake. For example, if the gov-
ernment creates a public park system it may not discriminatorily deny
access to speakers of disfavored views; more to the point, the fact that a
right to an intermediate appeal is not constitutionally mandated does not
mean that litigants can be denied due process rights on appeal.
But in many other contexts, "greater includes the lesser" arguments, as
they might be called, are a perfectly acceptable mode of legal analysis.260
It is quite possible that such an argument holds for our hypothetical stat-
ute as well. But while the existence of a plausible "greater with the
lesser" argument informs the constitutional inquiry, we do not rely exclu-
sively on such an argument, because we believe that the "lesser" power
can stand on its own, and thus that its legitimacy does not depend on
Congress's authority to eliminate judicial review of administrative action
by the lower federal courts.
Thus, our second argument is that-without regard to the "greater"
power, and even if it is assumed that circuit court review is required for
questions of law and to police agency factfinding for substantial evi-
dence-Congress would nonetheless have fairly broad authority to define
the respective roles of agency and reviewing court. And in this process of
structural definition, Congress could opt for arrangements that authorize
administrative agencies to pursue the goal of uniform administration even
in the face of contrary rules in particular circuits, until the Supreme
Court has spoken. It is essential to our conclusion, however, that the for-
mal authority of the court of appeals remains unimpaired under our hy-
pothetical statute; in no sense would Congress be providing for judicial
review without permitting the court to function as a full-fledged Article
III tribunal. The court, for example, retains the authority it otherwise
would have had to generalize compliance through issuance of an injunc-
tion or certification of an inclusive class action.2 61
The conclusion that our hypothetical statute is consistent with princi-
ples of separation of powers does not require acceptance of similar argu-
ments that might be made for legislation authorizing agency nonacquies-
260. See Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1304-14 (1984).
261. Indeed, those claiming intracircuit nonacquiescence is per se unconstitutional would auto-
matically transform every case into a class action and every remedy into an injunction. With respect to
the latter, they would do so without requiring the court to engage in the cost-benefit calculus normally
required of such extraordinary relief in equity. Such outcomes are acceptable only where nonacquies-
cence is always improper, as might be the case with agency disagreements over constitutional rulings.
See supra note 214.
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cence in decisions of the Supreme Court-that is, an attempt by Congress
to overrule Cooper v. Aaron. Even with respect to statutory issues, Con-
gress's power to overrule courts by amending statutes does not extend to
authorizing agencies to disregard final, definitive rulings of the Supreme
Court. We come back to the differences between the Supreme Court, on
the one hand, and the courts of appeals of regional jurisdiction, on the
other. When the state of the law has been settled at the top of the federal
judicial system, continued agency disagreement is shorn of all justification,
and presents a far greater affront to judicial authority than when only
intermediate actors have spoken.
It is also relevant that Congress has great leeway in structuring the
courts of appeals. It can create new circuits, consolidate others, redefine
the geographic jurisdictions of the existing circuits, replace review in the
generalist courts with review in specialized courts, and change venue
rules. 62 In contrast, Congress is far more constrained in its dealings with
the Supreme Court, and cannot compromise the Court's responsibility as
the final expositor of a uniform federal law.
In summary, because the hypothetical statute outlined above survives
constitutional scrutiny, the Cooper v. Aaron objection fails, at least in the
context of courts of appeals that do not have exclusive nationwide jurisdic-
tion over a particular statutory scheme.
C. The Due Process and Equal Protection Objections
Similarly, due process and equal protection doctrines do not erect a per
se bar against nonacquiescence. The argument premised on due process
principles that conceivably could yield such a bar is that an administrative
agency works a deprivation of protected interests in property or liberty
when it conducts its administrative processes in disregard of applicable
law.263 This merely restates the Cooper v. Aaron objection. If the agency
has an absolute constitutional or statutory obligation to internalize, in its
administrative proceedings, the rulings of the court of appeals that will
review its action, then, of course, it acts in disregard of applicable law
when it nonacquiesces. If, however, nonacquiescence is justified in certain
circumstances, disagreement with the reviewing court of appeals cannot be
equated with disregard of the applicable law, and therefore does not give
rise to a due process violation.26
A second due process argument would balance, by analogy to Mathews
262. For example, in 1981 Congress split the Fifth Circuit, creating the Eleventh Circuit. It also
created the Federal Circuit, removing patent jurisdiction from all of the regional circuits, and transfer-
ring other jurisdiction from the D.C. Circuit. Each of these actions can affect the applicable legal
rules, as the lack of intercircuit stare decisis leaves courts at the same level in the judicial hierarchy
free to fashion their own case law.
263. See supra text accompanying note 222.
264. Thus, the separation of powers objection is both a necessary and sufficient condition for this
due process objection; the latter objection is subsumed in the former.
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v. Eldridge, the agency's interest in nonacquiescence against the interests
of regulated parties or claimants in having the agency follow the rulings
of the relevant court of appeals.265 What is envisioned here is a context-
specific weighing of a particular agency's interests under its organic stat-
ute as against the interests of those aggrieved by the agency action. It is
questionable, however, whether the Mathews calculus, which seeks by
procedural redesign to minimize the occurrence of agency errors, can be
used to alter substantive arrangements.266 Even if it is assumed, argu-
endo, that this procedural due process framework can be applied to non-
acquiescence, it is not likely to generate a rule of per se invalidity. Be-
cause the relative magnitudes of the interests of the agency and of its
opponents will depend on the particular statutory scheme and administra-
tive decision at stake, this type of "as applied" challenge should be taken
up, in the first instance, in the course of APA rationality review. As previ-
ously stated, we think it unlikely that an agency's nonacquiescence policy
would survive APA review and yet violate constitutional norms.267
A third argument stresses the differential resources of litigants, main-
taining that the government violates due process and perhaps equal pro-
tection as well when it applies one set of legal rules to those who can
afford to press their case on appeal, and therefore can benefit from a
favorable court of appeals decision, and a different set of rules for litigants
who lack the resources for an appeal, and must therefore accept an unfa-
vorable agency decision.
This litigant equality argument, in its strong form, would doom not
only intracircuit nonacquiescence but also other features of our legal sys-
tem where differential access to litigation resources may spell different
outcomes. It would certainly extend to agency nonacquiescence under un-
certain venue conditions and would challenge the Mendoza ruling immu-
nizing government from the operation of nonmutual collateral estoppel.268
265. See supra text accompanying notes 223-24. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976),
the Court stated:
[Ildentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three
distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335.
266. The third prong of the Mathews test-the risk of erroneous deprivation-would seem inap-
posite to the nonacquiescence context, for once it has been determined that an agency may legitimately
pursue its position despite a prior reversal in the reviewing circuit, it is difficult to understand why a
litigant's inability to secure review in that circuit should necessarily count as an incidence of error in
the system.
267. We do concede, however, that a Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test might require provision
of additional procedures that a court, laboring under the restrictions of Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), would lack authority to fashion as an APA
requirement.
268. See Note, Collateral Estoppel and Nonacquiescence, supra note 14, at 859.
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This claim would also lead to transferring to the civil administrative con-
text the procedural safeguards-such as appointment of counsel and re-
view for ineffective assistance of counsel-that the Constitution has been
held to require in criminal proceedings.
The Supreme Court has yet to mandate a general rule of litigant equal-
ity. It has exempted indigent litigants from some generally applicable ar-
rangements, though it has fallen far short of transferring criminal law
precedents to administrative proceedings.269 The Court has addressed the
question whether lack of resources can deprive a litigant of the benefit of
a more favorable legal regime in Boddie v. Connecticut 70 and United
States v. Kras. 127 Boddie involved a challenge to state procedures that
imposed access fees for the commencement of divorce actions. The Court
held that "due process does prohibit a State from denying, solely because
of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial
dissolution of their marriages."2 2 In Kras, an indigent petitioner in bank-
ruptcy challenged the fees imposed as a condition to a discharge in volun-
tary bankruptcy. By a five-to-four vote, the Court upheld such fees
against due process and equal protection challenges.
Petitioners securing a divorce or a discharge in bankruptcy obtain the
benefit of legal rules that they consider more favorable. In the case of
bankruptcy, these rules provide a shield from creditors; in the case of di-
vorce, they significantly modify obligations imposed by family law. In this
way, the issues in Boddie and Kras are somewhat analogous to those
raised by nonacquiescence, where the more favorable legal rule is availa-
ble only to those parties with sufficient resources to pursue an appeal.
The issues raised by nonacquiescence are also akin to those in Ortwein
v. Schwab,2 7 3 where the Court sustained, by a five-to-four vote, the consti-
tutionality of filing fees for judicial review of administrative welfare deter-
minations. Unlike the situation in Ortwein, however, nonacquiescence im-
269. For example, indigence has prompted recognition of a right to appointed counsel in criminal
proceedings. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (appeals as of right); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (criminal trials). But Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), did not
require provision of counsel to aid welfare recipients facing termination of benefits. Even in the con-
text of parole revocation hearings, which involve substantial liberty interests, the Court has declined to
adopt "a new inflexible constitutional rule with respect to the requirement of counsel." Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973).
270. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
271. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
272. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374. Writing separately, Justice Brennan viewed the case as implicating
both due process and equal protection principles. Id. at 388 (Brennan, J., concurring). Boddie may
have more to do, however, with the right of personal privacy than equality of access to legal proceed-
ings. As Justice Harlan noted for the majority:
We do not decide that access for all individuals to the courts is a right that is, in all circum-
stances, guaranteed [by due process, for] . . . in the case before us this right is the exclusive
precondition to the adjustment of a fundamental human relationship. The requirement that
these appellants resort to the judicial process is entirely a state-created matter.
Id. at 382-83; see Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
273. 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (per curiam).
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plicates not only the cost of pursuing judicial remedies, but also a scheme
in which different rules of law are used by the administrative and judicial
actors. What is at stake, therefore, is not simply a decision by a different
adjudicator, but also a decision under a different legal standard.
For our purposes, however, it is not necessary to reconcile the some-
what contradictory signals of Boddie, Kras, and Ortwein. Even if nonac-
quiescence were treated like the claim in Boddie (and unlike the claims in
Kras and Ortwein), what would emerge would not be a per se rule
against nonacquiescence extending throughout the administrative land-
scape. A Boddie-based challenge would, in all likelihood, require a show-
ing of indigence, and would in any event entail a weighing of the adminis-
trative action at stake (including the strength of the agency's justification)
as against the resources of the litigants. A balancing of interests responsive
to these concerns would take place in the course of APA rationality re-
view. The applicable Supreme Court precedents do not, however, support
a rule of per se invalidity premised on litigant inequality considerations.
We do not mean to imply that litigant inequality is unimportant. In
Section IV, we identify it as one of the central costs of intracircuit nonac-
quiescence; it is certainly an important factor in assessing the rationality
of agency action under the APA. It does not, however, form the basis for a
per se constitutional proscription.
In summary, we do not believe that the Constitution erects an absolute
bar against intracircuit nonacquiescence. Moreover, the APA requirement
of rationality review makes unnecessary the inquiry whether the Constitu-
tion itself restrains nonacquiescence in cases in which the agency cannot
advance a satisfactory justification for its failure to follow a ruling of the
court of appeals that will review the administrative determination.
IV. AN EVALUATION OF THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
NONACQUIESCENCE
In this section, we evaluate the policy considerations implicated by the
three different categories of nonacquiescence. We conclude that intracir-
cuit nonacquiescence can be justified only as an interim measure that al-
lows the agency to maintain a uniform administration of its governing
statute following an adverse decision by a court of appeals while the
agency reasonably seeks in the courts a national validation of its position.
For the other two categories, we do not believe that limitations would
advance the proper functioning of the administrative lawmaking system.
A. Intercircuit Nonacquiescence
Given the lack of intercircuit stare decisis, and the reasons underlying
our system of intercircuit dialogue, an agency's ability to engage in in-
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tercircuit nonacquiescence should not be constrained.2 74  The costs and
benefits of intercircuit nonacquiescence must be evaluated in light of our
legal system's rejection of intercircuit stare decisis, 217  which, in turn, can
be justified only by reference to the benefits of intercircuit dialogue. 16
Indeed, if such dialogue were not desirable, the uncertainty that results
when different circuits independently examine a legal issue would clearly
suggest making binding on all courts of appeals the ruling of the first
court of appeals to consider a particular issue. 7
The benefits of dialogue can be grouped into four categories. 278 First,
doctrinal dialogue takes place when one court of appeals addresses the
legal reasoning of another and reaches a different conclusion. Such dia-
logue is likely to result in better decisions, as it will produce a more care-
ful and focused consideration of the issues.279
Second, experiential dialogue occurs when courts of appeals are able to
observe and compare the consequences of different legal rules. This em-
pirical evidence is relevant both to circuits that have not yet considered an
issue as well as to ones that may wish to reconsider their position.280
Third, the conflicts produced by intercircuit dialogue play a useful role
274. Although the Supreme Court has declined to hold that a nationwide class action may never
be certified, it has urged that care be taken to ensure "that certification of such a class would not
improperly interfere with the litigation of similar issues in other judicial districts." Califano v.
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979). Such class certification, in our view, should be avoided where it
would have the effect of precluding intercircuit nonacquiescence, or restricting intracircuit nonacquies-
cence that satisfies rationality review as set forth in Section V below.
275. The absence of intercircuit stare decisis, and the concomitant "law of the circuit" rule, may
be largely an accident of history. See Friendly, The "Law of the Circuit" and All That, 46 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 406 (1972); Vestal, supra note 29, at 136-66. The point of departure is the Act of
Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826, the so-called Evarts Act, which created the circuit courts of
appeals. Although § 6 of the Evarts Act provided that "the judgments or decrees of the circuit courts
of appeals shall be final in all cases," 26 Stat. 828, and Congressman Breckenridge of Kentucky
feared for "the preservation of homogeneous jurisprudence," 21 CONG. REc. 3407 (1890), this re-
quirement of finality could have readily co-existed with a rule of intercircuit stare decisis. Indeed,
some early decisions deferred to rulings of other circuits unless they were clearly wrong, see, e.g.,
Beach v. Hobbs, 92 F. 146 (1st Cir. 1899), affd, 180 U.S. 383 (1901); United States v. Flannery, 106
F.2d 315 (4th Cir. 1939). Other courts, however, began to assert a duty of "independent judgment in
cases of first impression in our own court," Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 30 F.2d
219, 222 (2d Cir. 1929), rev'd on other grounds, 280 U.S. 384 (1930); see Heckendorn v. United
States, 162 F. 141, 143 (7th Cir. 1908), cert. denied, 214 U.S. 514 (1909). For the arguments in
favor of intercircuit stare decisis, see Note, Securing Uniformity in National Law: A Proposal for
National Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 87 YALsE L.J. 1219, 1240-46 (1978). Despite its
adventitious beginnings, however, the absence of intercircuit stare decisis is now firmly embedded in
the legal landscape. See S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 243, at 48.
276. See, e.g., S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 243, at 48, 50-52, 73-74; R. POSNER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 163 (1985).
277. In fact, under some statutory schemes, Congress has made a judgment that a quick and
authoritative resolution is more important than the benefits that might result from intercircuit dia-
logue. Thus, for example, challenges to many environmental regulations can be brought only in the
D.C. Circuit. See infra text accompanying notes 394-95 (discussing exclusive venue provisions).
278. The discussion of these four categories is a summary of a more comprehensive inquiry in R.
Revesz, Specialized Article III Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System 30-40 (1987) (un-
published manuscript on file with authors).
279. Id. at 7; see Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed
for a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 913, 929 (1983).
280. See R. Revesz, supra note 278, at 33.
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in signalling to the Supreme Court the difficulty of particular legal issues,
and thereby help the Court make better case selection decisions. Difficult
issues are likely to have been decided incorrectly in the first instance and
are also likely to result in intercircuit conflicts.28' Under a regime of in-
tercircuit stare decisis, the Supreme Court is hampered in two ways: (1)
without the signalling role of intercircuit conflicts, the Court has to ex-
pend more of its resources to identify difficult issues that may have been
resolved incorrectly by the first court of appeals to address them, and (2)
to the extent that the Court fails to identify such cases, it may let stand
erroneous decisions below.282
Fourth, doctrinal and experiential dialogue on the part of the circuits
aids the Supreme Court in deciding cases on the merits. Doctrinal dia-
logue isolates the issues on which the courts of appeals are divided and
presents the competing positions on those issues, probably stated in their
most compelling terms. As to experiential dialogue, the Supreme Court,
like the circuits, benefits from the existence of a store of accumulated
283experience.
If an agency must conform its policy nationwide to an adverse ruling by
a court of appeals, it becomes exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for
either the agency or a private litigant to bring before another court of
appeals the question whether the agency's original policy was permissible
under the statute.28 4 Consider, for example, the question whether EPA
can use independent contractors in enforcement proceedings under the
Clean Air Act-the question at stake in United States v. Stauffer Chemi-
cal Co.2" 5 If the first court of appeals to face this question determined that
EPA could not use independent contractors, a bar against intercircuit non-
acquiescence would prevent the agency from using such contractors any-
where in the country. In addition, it is unlikely that any private- party
would have standing to argue that the agency should be given the option
of using such contractors. Thus, no subsequent court would have the op-
281. As Judge Posner noted:
An issue that provokes a conflict among the circuits that is not immediately eliminated by one
circuit receding from its previous position is likely to involve a difficult legal question; and a
difficult legal question is more likely to be answered correctly if it is allowed to engage the
attention of different sets of judges deciding factually different cases than if it is answered
finally by the first panel to consider it.
R. POSNER, supra note 276, at 163.
282. See R. Revesz, supra note 278, at 33-35.
283. See id. at 34-35. Percolation is not without costs, however. If what matters is not a correct
answer, but instead a uniform rule, intercircuit stare decisis is preferable because it yields a uniform
rule without the need for Supreme Court intervention. As one of us has argued elsewhere, it is un-
likely that this consideration should or will be decisive in those cases where outcome really does
matter. See id. at 39.
284. There will be some cases in which the agency's administrative proceedings will have been
completed before the first adverse ruling. Those cases might give another court of appeals the oppor-
tunity to uphold the agency's initial policy. But there would be no such opportunity for cases in which
the administrative proceedings take place after the first adverse ruling.
285. 464 U.S. 165 (1984).
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portunity to decide whether independent contractors are part of the per-
missible arsenal of enforcement options. 2 a6 As a practical matter, and con-
trary to the systemic judgment underlying the Supreme Court's ruling in
Mendoza, the adverse ruling of the court of appeals would therefore be-
come binding and no further dialogue among the circuits would be
possible.
It is true that even in this scenario, the Supreme Court could grant
certiorari, or Congress could amend the governing statute to explicitly au-
thorize the use of independent contractors. But both the Supreme Court
and Congress would be deprived of the benefits of intercircuit dialogue.287
Moreover, from a managerial perspective, there are important costs at-
tached to involving either of these institutions, which have limited deci-
sional resources, in problems that could be resolved by the circuits them-
selves.2 "' More fundamentally, although our legal system generally
assumes that Congress will be able to correct judicial errors, the combined
influence of inertial forces and unwillingness to open up what may have
been a controversial legislative compromise to reexamination may severely
limit the occasions for congressional intervention of this type. Such an un-
derstanding of the legislative process not only explains why the Court oc-
casionally is willing to overrule prior erroneous statutory construction, but
also undergirds the decision to assign policymaking under federal statutes
to the reversible discretion of administrative agencies.28 9 Allowance of
agency intercircuit nonacquiescence is, therefore, implicit in the system's
commitment to avoiding premature finalization of federal law.2 90
A bar against intercircuit nonacquiescence, in its strongest form, would
force an agency to conform nationwide to an adverse ruling by a court of
appeals even if, prior to that adverse ruling, the agency's position had
been upheld in other courts of appeals. For example, if the first two cir-
cuits to consider the question had found it permissible for EPA to use
independent contractors, but the next circuit had disagreed, the agency
would have to abandon the use of independent contractors everywhere in
the country, even in the two circuits that upheld their use. There would
be no mechanism, absent intervention by Congress or the Supreme Court,
that would permit the agency to use independent contractors ever again.
Thus, not only would adverse decisions truncate further dialogue, but
they would also dominate decisions that are favorable to the agency. The
286. As we explain below, a declaratory judgment mechanism does not provide an adequate alter-
native. See infra text accompanying notes 311-13.
287. Of course, intercircuit disagreement helps signal difficult legal issues not only for the Su-
preme Court, but for Congress as well.
288. See S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 243, at 51-52, 118-19, 132-35.
289. See, e.g., Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37
ADMIN. L. REV. 163, 166-68 (1985); Winter, Judicial Review of Agency Decisions: The Labor Board
and the Court, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 53, 64-67, 71.
290. See S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 243, at 48.
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result would be a one-way ratchet in which the authoritative voice would
be that of the first court of appeals to rule against the agency. We have
already discussed how one central premise of our post-New Deal adminis-
trative law system, recognized by the Supreme Court as early as SEC v.
Chenery Corp.,29 and more recently in Chevron, USA v. NRDC,29 2 is
that the administrative agency as the delegatee of congressional authority,
rather than the Article III courts, is the primary policymaker under the
statute. A system in which the decision of the first court of appeals to rule
against the agency-even in the presence of several decisions favorable to
the agency-becomes binding law nationwide is inconsistent with this gov-
erning premise.29a
Even if administrative law had developed differently, and courts rather
than agencies had been designated as the primary policymakers,294 it
would nonetheless be perverse to accord greater stature to the decision of
the first court to rule against the agency than to favorable decisions ren-
dered by other courts at the same level. It is difficult to imagine a justifi-
cation for such a system, other than perhaps hostility to the decisions of
administrative agencies-regardless of the substance of those decisions.295
The results generated by our independent contractor example, which
involves an issue of internal agency procedure, can be generalized over a
fairly broad spectrum of administrative action. Consider, instead, a regu-
latory agency's interpretation of a substantive statutory question, say, an
NLRB policy determination that particular conduct in a union represen-
tation election constitutes an unfair labor practice. Assume that the
agency's General Counsel issues a complaint applying the Board's policy,
and the Board finds a violation, but enforcement is denied by a court of
appeals on the ground that the Board's definition of an unfair labor prac-
291. 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943) (Chenery 1); 332 U.S. 194, 202, 209 (1947) (Chenery If).
292. 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
293. In a system that eschews intercircuit stare decisis, there is no reason to assume that the
adverse circuit rule correctly identifies a statutory limitation on agency discretion, and indeed there is
every reason to believe that such a determination cannot be conclusively made in advance of an in-
tercircuit dialogue on the point.
294. Such a designation may have occurred under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976).
295. These problems would not be cured even if the bar against intercircuit nonacquiescence were
stated in a weaker form, so that an agency would have to comply with an adverse court of appeals
ruling in all circuits except those that had upheld the agency's position. Here, too, an adverse circuit
court decision would be given an unwarranted one-way ratchet effect-binding force in those circuits
which have not yet ruled-whereas a favorable decision in one circuit would not have binding force in
other circuits.
Moreover, such a rule would create a conflict in the circuits which, without intervention by the
Supreme Court or Congress, could be harmonized only by rejecting the agency's position. Because the
issue could not be relitigated in circuits in which the agency's position had been rejected, or where the
agency was prevented from asserting its position as a result of the bar against intercircuit nonacquies-
cence, harmony would result only if the circuits that originally had upheld the agency's position ruled
against the agency upon reconsideration. Thus, even under the weaker formulation of the bar against
intercircuit nonacquiescence, there remains an asymmetry that is inconsistent with the position of
administrative agencies in our legal system.
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tice in this context exceeds its statutory authority. If the General Counsel
acquiesces in cases arising in other circuits, and consequently issues com-
plaints only in cases that meet the more stringent standard of the adverse
circuit rule, no other circuit will have the opportunity to consider the
Board's original policy, since the General Counsel's decision not to issue a
complaint is unreviewable.296 This result obtains for almost all statutory
schemes because, as the Supreme Court made clear in Heckler v. Cha-
ney,297 a regulatory agency's decision not to bring enforcement proceedings
is almost always unreviewable.
Admittedly, there are other forms of administrative action in which a
bar against intercircuit nonacquiescence does not completely foreclose re-
litigation in other circuits. For example, under the statutory scheme at
issue in Dunlop v. Bachowski,298 where the Supreme Court held that the
Secretary of Labor's decision not to bring an enforcement action was re-
viewable, 299 relitigation in another circuit could result from a challenge by
a party aggrieved by such a decision.3"0
But even in such cases there are asymmetries. In order to have its origi-
nal position vindicated in circuits that had not yet rejected it, the agency
would have to depend entirely on the actions of private parties. In some
statutory schemes, there may be no private parties with standing to seek
review of agency inaction; even where present, such parties might not
have the resources or a sufficient stake in the controversy to litigate.
Moreover, in defending its decision not to bring an enforcement action,
the agency would find itself in the uncomfortable position of arguing
against a position that it actually favors. Judicial deference might thus
attach to the position that the agency actually opposes. Such situations
would, in any event, breed confusion and undermine conventional under-
standings of the respective roles of agency and reviewing court.
In summary, the acceptance of intercircuit nonacquiescence should
properly be seen as a corollary to the rejection of intercircuit stare deci-
sis.30 ' To make the ruling of the first court of appeals that considers an
296. See NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 108 S. Ct. 413, 420 (1987);
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 148 (1975); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
297. 470 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1985).
298. 421 U.S. 560, 566 (1975).
299. Dunlop v. Bachowski involved alleged violations of § 401 of the Labor-Management Report-
ing and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA). Distinguishing this case in Heckler v. Chaney, the Court
stated that the LMRDA "presents an example of statutory language which supplied sufficient stan-
dards to rebut the presumption of unreviewability," 470 U.S. at 833, which normally would attach to
an agency's decision not to commence enforcement proceedings.
300. Similarly, it is possible that in cases in which an agency distributes benefits, a procedure
could be established that permitted such relitigation without intercircuit nonacquiescence. For exam-
ple, if there were statutory authorization, which may not be present in the statute as currently writ-
ten, the Social Security Administration could pay disability benefits under protest rather than engage
in intercircuit nonacquiescence, and then bring an action to recover the benefits. But see infra text
accompanying notes 311-13 (discussing problems with such a procedure).
301. As we noted at the outset, see supra text accompanying notes 24-29, the Court's rejection in
Mendoza of nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government does not logically require any par-
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issue directly binding on all other courts of appeals through the operation
of stare decisis is undesirable because it eliminates the possibility of in-
tercircuit dialogue. For the same reason, it is undesirable to make the
ruling of the first court of appeals rejecting an agency's policy indirectly
binding on other courts by insisting on compliance with that ruling in the
agency's internal proceedings, a requirement which would have the prac-
tical effect of precluding the agency from litigating the issue again in other
courts of appeals.
A bar against intercircuit nonacquiescence would be worse than the
adoption of intercircuit stare decisis. If the ruling of one court of appeals
effectively binds others, it makes little sense to create a system in which
the binding rule is always the one adverse to the agency. Such an asym-
metry would bespeak a hostility to the administrative state fundamentally
at odds with the doctrine of deference to agency action that is a corner-
stone of modern administrative law.
302
B. Nonacquiescence in the Face of Venue Choice
As we have indicated, nonacquiescence in the presence of venue choice
arises where an agency refuses, in its administrative proceedings, to follow
a ruling of a court of appeals, where the other courts to which an appeal
may lie either have upheld the agency's position or have not yet addressed
the legality of that position. For the most part, this category raises the
same issues as intercircuit nonacquiescence.
Consider an example in which, because of the breadth of the venue
provisions, the agency's proceedings could be reviewed in any of the re-
gional circuits. 03 If the agency is to avoid nonacquiescence, it will have to
conform its administrative proceeding to the ruling of the circuit that had
previously rejected its position. Such a practice has the same negative
asymmetries as a bar against intercircuit nonacquiescence.
Moreover, these problems do not disappear in cases in which venue,
while broad, does not include all of the regional courts of appeals. Assume
that review of a particular administrative proceeding is available in the
First, Second, and Third Circuits, and that of these courts, only the Sec-
ond Circuit has rejected the agency's position. If the agency does not con-
ticular conclusion on the legitimacy of nonacquiescence. It would be theoretically possible to permit
relitigation, but only in those circumstances where the agency can do so while adhering to adverse
circuit law in its internal proceedings. However, given the problems with a declaratory judgment
approach, see infra text accompanying notes 311-13, relitigation would, as a practical matter, be
precluded in circumstances in which the agency acted as anything other than a prosecutor bringing
actions in federal court.
302. Intercircuit nonacquiescence is not entirely without costs, as it produces short-term dis-
uniformity. But these costs are no different than those that inhere in the rejection of intercircuit stare
decisis.
303. The NLRB faces this situation when it adjudicates cases involving employers with nation-
wide operations. Its actions can then be challenged in any circuit in which such an employer "trans-
acts business," in addition to the D.C. Circuit. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1982).
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form its proceedings to the ruling of the Second Circuit, it will be engag-
ing in nonacquiescence, as we have defined it, regardless of whether its
administrative proceedings are ultimately reviewed in one of the other two
circuits. 0 4
Nonacquiescence in the presence of venue uncertainty, however, is dif-
ferent from intercircuit nonacquiescence in some important respects. Re-
turning to our last hypothetical, assume that the agency refuses to follow
the ruling of the Second Circuit and that its proceedings are ultimately
reviewed in that circuit. From our perspective, what is relevant is the con-
duct of the agency at the time of the administrative proceedings, not the
posture in which the agency finds itself when it gets to court. In the hypo-
thetical, the agency's order is reviewable in three different circuits, and it
cannot determine with complete certainty whether its action will be re-
viewed in the Second Circuit, rather than in the First or Third Circuit.
30 5
But when the agency finds itself litigating in the Second Circuit, from
the perspective of that court, the agency's behavior looks like intracircuit
nonacquiescence. In fact, courts have severely criticized administrative
agencies in precisely these circumstances, apparently without considering
the differences between pure intracircuit nonacquiescence and nonacquies-
cence in the face of venue choice. 308 The resulting friction between agency
and reviewing court is a cost not encountered with intercircuit
nonacquiescence. 07
In summary, a bar against nonacquiescence under conditions of venue
choice is undesirable for the same reasons as is a bar against intercircuit
nonacquiescence. Moreover, venue choice makes it exceedingly difficult, in
some situations practically impossible, for an agency to continue to press
its preferred policy in circuits that have not rejected it, without thereby
304. Assume, moreover, that the Ninth Circuit, in which review of this hypothetical administra-
tive proceeding is not available, had also rejected the agency's policy. Whether the agency must follow
the ruling of the Ninth Circuit implicates solely the question of intercircuit nonacquiescence.
305. In our hypothetical, it is true that the agency will have a basis for predicting that a losing
party will seek review in the Second Circuit. However, there might be other parties to the administra-
tive proceeding who will be aggrieved by an agency order issued in conformity with the Second Cir-
cuit's position. The agency itself may seek enforcement of its order in a circuit of proper venue that
has not yet ruled against the agency, even if the agency would normally go to the circuit where the
alleged violations occurred. Depending on the luck of the draw, if petitions are filed within the first 10
days after an agency order under Pub. L. No. 100-236, 101 Stat. 1731 (1988) (to be codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2112(a)), or are filed after that period under the rule of first-filing, the case might end up in
the Second Circuit. But such a fortuity does not transform a situation of venue uncertainty into one of
intracircuit nonacquiescence.
306. Where venue is certain, an agency can engage in intercircuit nonaquiescence without thereby
having also to engage in intracircuit nonacquiescence. That is, if the Second Circuit is the only circuit
to have rejected an agency's policy, the agency can acquiesce in that circuit but continue to press its
preferred policy elsewhere. But where venue is uncertain, the agency may find itself litigating before a
court that has previously rejected its position, unless the agency complies with the unfavorable ruling
nationwide. Even though the agency might concede error, as the NLRB often does in this posture,
there are costs attached to administrative behavior that, at first glance, looks to the reviewing court a
great deal like intracircuit nonacquiescence.
307. A more complete understanding of the respective roles of agency and court may alleviate
some of this tension.
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having that policy repeatedly challenged in circuits that have previously
rejected it. To remove the friction between agency and court that is
thereby caused, we recommend the elimination, or at least the substantial
reduction, of venue choice. Under our proposal, an agency would know, at
the time of its administrative proceedings, where its action will be re-
viewed. We consider this issue further in Section VI.
C. Intracircuit Nonacquiescence
Given our conclusion that, even though a court of appeals has rejected
an agency's policy, the agency' should be allowed to continue to press that
policy in other circuits, what rules should apply to cases that are review-
able only in the circuit that has rejected the agency's policy? Consistent
with the proper role of agencies and courts in our legal system, we believe
that there should not be an absolute bar against intracircuit nonacquies-
cence. However, such nonacquiescence can be justified only as an interim
measure that allows the agency to maintain a uniform administration of
its governing statute while it makes reasonable attempts to persuade the
courts to validate its position.30 8
1. Intercircuit Dialogue
It is true that even if an agency must conform its administrative pro-
ceedings to the case law of the court of appeals to which review would lie,
where this case law is inconsistent with the agency's policy, the agency
can continue to press that policy in other circuits if it chooses to do so.
Thus, a bar against intracircuit nonacquiescence would not truncate the
development of the law. Other circuits would have the opportunity to up-
hold the agency's position. If the Supreme Court eventually grants certio-
rari to resolve the conflict among the circuits, it will benefit from being
able to observe the effects of the different legal regimes.
Nonetheless, an inflexible bar against intracircuit nonacquiescence con-
strains the dialogue among the circuits. Returning to the example of
EPA's use of independent contractors, consider a scenario in which that
question comes first before the Second Circuit, which strikes down the use
of such contractors, and then before the Seventh and Ninth Circuits,
which uphold it. It would be desirable for the agency to be able to go back
before the Second Circuit and reargue its position in light of its subse-
quent victories. The Second Circuit might be persuaded by the arguments
of the two other circuits, and the conflicting positions might be harmo-
nized without the need for review by the Supreme Court.
308. At present, because of broad venue choice under most statutes providing for judicial review of
agency action, intracircuit nonacquiescence arises in only a few statutory schemes, notably the Social
Security Act. See infra text accompanying notes 378-81. It is likely to become much more significant,
however, if our proposal for eliminating venue choice, advanced in Section VI, is adopted.
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But the Second Circuit will be unable to reconsider this issue unless
EPA can use independent contractors in cases subject to review in that
circuit.309 To do so, however, entails acting contrary to the case law of the
court of appeals to which review lies-that is, engaging in intracircuit
nonacquiescence. Similarly, intracircuit nonacquiescence is a prerequisite
to judicial reconsideration of a regulatory agency's substantive policy
under schemes in which the agency's failure to bring enforcement actions
is unreviewable.310 Thus, a total bar against intracircuit nonacquiescence
would make it impossible for a circuit that at one time ruled against the
agency to continue a dialogue with circuits that subsequently ruled for the
agency. Resolution of the conflict among the circuits would require Su-
preme Court intervention, thereby adding unnecessarily to the Court's
workload. Moreover, the resulting asymmetry again fits uncomfortably
with the concept of administrative deference. If intracircuit nonacquies-
cence is barred, only the circuit that ruled for the agency would be open to
possible reconsideration of its position; rulings against the agency would
be immune to such reconsideration. Here, too, the one-way ratchet moves
exclusively in the direction of disapproval of the agency's action.
A bar against intracircuit nonacquiescence also delays the harmoniza-
tion of federal law. Were such a bar in place, conflicts could be harmo-
nized without intervention by the Supreme Court only if the courts of
appeals that ruled for the agency reconsidered their position. The courts
that ruled against it would ordinarily not have an occasion to reexamine
their prior rulings, even where they might have found persuasive the
views of the other circuits.
It is true, of course, that the Supreme Court and Congress can always
intervene. But, as we have explained, both of these institutions have lim-
ited decisional capacity, and Congress may be unwilling for other reasons
to reopen consideration of the statute in question. Moreover, the Supreme
Court may be reluctant to intervene every time a conflict arises. Either
because of perceived benefits of further intercircuit dialogue, or in order to
avoid committing its docket excessively to the administrative law area, the
Court may wish to defer its intervention until it is clear that the circuits
that ruled against the agency will not depart from that position, particu-
larly where the adverse rulings preceded those supporting the agency's
views. It is quite likely, therefore, that the conflict may persist for a longer
period of time than if the circuits that ruled against the agency had been
able to take a new look at the agency's policy following its acceptance in
other circuits.
Critics of nonacquiescence urge that agencies have the means to prod
intercircuit dialogue without disregarding the law of the reviewing court
309. See infra text accompanying notes 311-13 (discussing problems with declaratory judgments).
310. See supra text accompanying notes 296-99.
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of appeals. For example, our colleague, Burt Neuborne, has suggested
that, while agencies would have to conform their internal administrative
proceedings to circuit law, they might seek a declaratory judgment when
they were ready to seek reconsideration of the adverse circuit rule.31
There are at least four serious problems with this suggestion. The first,
fatal from a practical standpoint, is the likely unavailability of such a pro-
cedure under current law for many agencies. The typical statute requires
the agency to have made some concrete decision, whether the promulga-
tion of a rule or regulation, or the issuance of an order affecting particular
parties, before judicial review may be had.312 Second, if current law were
revised to authorize such a procedure, there are serious questions whether
Article III courts could be employed to rule on abstract questions of statu-
tory interpretation in the absence of concrete controversies.31 3 Third, even
311. See Neuborne, supra note 8, at 1002 n.32; supra text accompanying note 26.
312. For the two agencies most often involved in nonacquiescence disputes, the NLRB and SSA, a
declaratory judgment procedure is plainly not available. Under § 10(e)-(f of the NLRA, review in
the courts of appeals may be had only of an "order, an adjudicatory decision after hearing, as set forth
in section 10(c)." 29 U.S.C. § 160(c), (e)-(f) (1982). The case law is clear that other determinations
of the Board, such as decisions in representation cases, see AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940), or the
General Counsel's exercise of her prosecutorial discretion, see NLRB v. United Food & Commercial
Workers Union, 108 S. Ct. 413 (1987), are not such orders. See supra text accompanying note 296.
While SSA does not have the authority to bring a declaratory proceeding under the judicial review
provisions of its statute, see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982) ("Any individual, after any final decision of
the Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party. . . may obtain a review of such decision
by a civil action."), the agency may seek recoupment of overpayments except from a "person who is
without fault if such adjustment or recovery would defeat the purpose of [the Act] or would be against
equity and good conscience." 42 U.S.C. § 404(b) (1982). See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.501 et seq. (1988).
There are some difficulties with this approach as well. First, it is unclear whether the "without fault"
limitation on the agency's recoupment authority would permit recovery from claimants who were
presumably entitled to the benefits under the then-prevailing circuit law. Second, the mode of recoup-
ment primarily contemplated appears to be adjustments by the agency to payments subsequently due
the claimant, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.502 (1988). Cf. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979) (due
process challenge to recoupment adjustment procedure). Undoubtedly this method is used because of
the difficulty of obtaining repayment through civil actions. Cf. Thomas v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 730 (9th
Cir. 1986) (unilateral withdrawal of payments erroneously made by electronic funds transfer to claim-
ant's account).
Agencies do have the authority under the APA, "with like effect as in the case of other orders, and
in its sound discretion, [to] issue a declaratory order to terminate a controversy or remove uncer-
tainty." 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (1982). Although seldom litigated, this provision appears to contemplate
some concrete controversy or at least an actual request by a private party for a declaratory determina-
tion. Cf. Climax Molybdenum Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 703 F.2d 447 (10th Cir. 1983) (discussing
factors informing the agency's exercise of discretion to issue declaratory orders).
An agency interested in exploring the declaratory judgment option might go to a federal district
court under the authority of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1982), premising
subject matter jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337 (1982). Aside from Article III problems with
this route, it is unclear whether such "nonstatutory review" may be had in circumvention of the
judicial review provisions of the agency's organic statute, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's
recent rulings curtailing the presumption of reviewability. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,
832-33 (1985).
313. Article III courts are barred from deciding "abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions."
Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. MeAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945); see United States v. Evans,
213 U.S. 297, 300-01 (1909). This problem would be present in the case of regulatory as opposed to
benefits agencies. For the NLRB or the FTC to go to Court for an abstract determination whether a
particular fact pattern states a statutory violation would be no different from the advisory opinions
historically eschewed under Article III. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). For agen-
cies that disburse benefits, however, there would be no Article III barrier to a procedure enabling the
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if these constitutional doubts were overcome, the envisioned procedure
would only address one of the reasons for allowrg interim xonacquies-
cence-the generation of case vehicles for seeking reconsideration of disfa-
vored circuit precedent. The other costs of compelling agencies to revamp
their policies and procedures while the law is in flux would remain.
Fourth, a declaratory judgment procedure would require some alteration
of fundamental premises of our administrative lawmaking system, which
presently assigns to agencies the principal policymaking role and to courts
a reactive, monitoring function. For courts to intervene, and law to be
made, in a manner divorced from the agency's exercise of discretion would
reverse this allocation of responsibility. It is questionable whether concern
over nonacquiescence should drive such a radical change in institutional
arrangements.
Neither are we persuaded by approaches that would authorize intracir-
cuit nonacquiescence only after at least one circuit has ruled in the
agency's favor, or only in a small number of "test" cases.314 Reconsidera-
tion may be appropriate not only when a conflict has arisen, but also
when the court's rule may have undesirable consequences not fully consid-
ered by the first panel which, if brought to the circuit's attention in an-
other case, might lead to a suitable narrowing or, in some cases, abandon-
ment of the rule. Thus, if an agency's enforcement branch does not issue a
complaint under a theory rejected by the court to which an appeal would
lie until another court of appeals has accepted that theory, it will take a
longer time before the issue can be reconsidered. In contrast, if intracircuit
nonacquiescence continued after the adverse decision, relitigation in the
adverse circuit could follow almost immediately. And, as we discuss be-
low,3 15 substantial costs are involved in changing to a new policy in the
circuit in response to the first adverse decision, changing back to the origi-
nal policy after a favorable decision in another circuit, and administering
the statute in a differential manner in the interim.
Nonacquiescence only in "test" cases also presents problems. At the
time that the enforcement branch issues a complaint, it may be clear that
a practice is illegal under the agency's policy but not clear whether it is
also illegal under the standards of the reviewing court. That question
might be resolved only in the course of administrative adjudication. More-
over, the "test" parties against whom the agency issues complaints may
not be inclined to pursue their remedies to the level of a court of appeals.
The vast majority of administrative cases do not get to that
level-principally because it may well be less costly to comply than to
agency to make payments under protest and, in essence, bring a recoupment action, since the party
against whom recoupment is sought would have a concrete stake in the outcome of the case.
314. This appoach has been suggested by Alan Morrison, a prominent Washinton, D.C.,
practitioner.
315. See infra Section IV(O)(3).
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litigate. Thus, the agency would have to pick a relatively large number of
cases to be reasonably certain that an appropriate test case would be gen-
erated for review by the court of appeals. Finally, the disparate treatment
of "test" and "non-test" cases is troublesome because it subjects the
agency to charges of favoritism and unequal treatment of parties otherwise
similarly situated.
2. Uniform Outcomes
We have shown that a bar against intracircuit nonacquiescence, even
where it contemplates limited exceptions, may delay the development of
uniform rules. In addition, it undermines important goals of uniformity
that underlie the administrative law system. The problems of dis-
uniformity can be divided into three major categories: externalities, inter-
state competition, and fairness.
Externalities-in the sense of cross-circuit effects-are present when
economic activity that takes place in one region produces adverse effects in
another region. Air pollution, for example, can travel long distances and
will not respect the geographic boundaries of states or of the regional
courts of appeals. Under the Clean Air Act, EPA regulates air quality by
means of ambient standards, which limit the permissible concentrations of
particular pollutants in the air. In order to achieve these ambient stan-
dards, the agency also regulates the emissions from new sources-sources
constructed after the promulgation of the applicable regulations. The
emission standards are uniform nationwide and are set by reference to
categories of polluters (for example, coal-fired electric plants).316 If one
circuit were to strike down regulations limiting the permissible emissions
of a particular pollutant, the effects would be felt not only in that circuit,
but in downwind circuits as well. 3 7 For the ambient standards to be met
in those circuits, the agency would have to define more stringent circuit-
specific emission standards for those downwind states.31 Thus, the actions
of the court of appeals that struck down the administrative policy will
have important effects even outside the geographic jurisdiction of that cir-
cuit, forcing the agency to take suboptimal measures in the downwind
circuits to counteract the impact of the court's action.3 9
316. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1982).
317. Since this Article is concerned primarily with adjudicatory decisions, see supra note 35, this
regulatory example should be viewed as an illustration of the benefits of uniformity rather than as a
conclusion that the nonacquiescence standards that apply in adjudication would necessarily apply in
rulemaking as well.
318. There will, in turn, be an effect on regional competition for industry.
319. If the agency had thought that this mix of pollution control measures was optimal, it would
probably have adopted them in the first place. Partly to avoid these problems of regional competition,
Congress provided that ambient standards and emissions standards for new sources would be review-
able in a single court of appeals-the D.C. Circuit. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1982). Thus, the situa-
tion described in the hypothetical example in the text would not arise. For examples of interstate
externalities under the Clean Air Act, see, e.g., Air Pollution Central District v. EPA, 739 F.2d 1071
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Another central goal of federal regulation is to prevent regions from
competing for industry by offering a more favorable economic climate at
the expense of other societal goals. For example, federal regulation in the
labor field can be justified, in part, as an attempt to prevent interstate
competition for industry at the expense of worker protection.320 If one
circuit takes a more restrictive view than does the NLRB of what consti-
tutes a mandatory subject for collective bargaining, employers in that cir-
cuit have more enterpreneurial flexibility, and perhaps lower labor costs,
than their counterparts in other circuits, creating incentives for new indus-
try to establish itself in that circuit and for existing industry to move there
from other circuits. As long as the conflict among the circuits persists,
there will be undesirable regional competition.
Finally, uniformity promotes some fairness values. Whether the agency
acts as regulator of private sector activity or administers a benefit pro-
gram, Congress intended, by enacting federal law to promote horizontal
uniformity-equal treatment of regulatees or claimants regardless of
where in this country the dispute or claim arose. To the extent the agency
is required to alter its policy to conform to adverse circuit rulings, the
federal interest in horizontal uniformity is undermined.
3. Differential Administration
If an agency cannot engage in intracircuit nonacquiescence, it will have
to administer its statute differently in various parts of the country, if, after
its policy is rejected in one circuit, it wants to continue pressing that pol-
icy in other circuits. Differential administration can impose significant
costs on an agency. To evaluate these costs properly, it is helpful to ana-
lyze the separate components of an agency's nonacquiescence policy. The
example we use is a multi-member agency that develops policy primarily
through adjudication.
For the commissioners themselves, it might not be particularly burden-
some to apply different rules in different cases. Presumably, whatever
their acquiescence policy, the commissioners will be made aware of deci-
sions by the courts of appeals that affect their agency and will understand
the extent to which the agency's policy is inconsistent with these decisions.
But fashioning an acquiescence policy that applies at all levels within
an agency is far more cumbersome than applying such a policy only at the
level of the commissioners. For example, enforcement staff, often non-
lawyers who are normally responsible for large caseloads, may find it dif-
ficult to become familiar not only with the agency's own policy but also
(6th Cir. 1984); Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1982).
320. See, e.g., Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1297, 1317
(1954); Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations: 1, 59
COLUM. L. REV. 6, 21 (1959).
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with adverse court of appeals decisions. Such personnel are typically in-
formed of their agency's policies by means of instructions manuals pre-
pared by the agency's General Counsel. If such officials are to follow a
policy of acquiescence, they will have to be separately instructed on the
case law of the relevant circuits. And whenever the agency loses a case in
a court of appeals, these documents will have to be updated. 21 More im-
portantly, if officials in different parts of the country must operate under
different legal regimes, it will be difficult for the agency to use a single
training system for all such officials or to evaluate them pursuant to uni-
form standards.322 A portion of the economies of scale that attach to cen-
tralized administration will thereby be lost.323
The costs of differential administration are a cognizable cost of requir-
ing intracircuit acquiescence.324 Just as it is not desirable directly to force
the agency to conform nationwide to the first adverse decision by a court
of appeals, it is similarly not desirable to do so indirectly by imposing
overly burdensome costs upon it. Ultimately, the agency should fashion a
uniform policy, but it should be permitted to litigate its position in several
circuits before making a final decision as to what that policy should be.
Perhaps after losing in one circuit and then winning in two, the agency
will convince the first circuit to reconsider its holding, the Supreme Court
to grant certiorari, or Congress to amend the statute. It would be undesir-
able if the high costs of differential administration prematurely foreclosed
this outcome.
4. Distributional Effects
As we have suggested in Section III, intracircuit nonacquiescence pro-
duces undesirable distributional consequences. A litigant's ability to obtain
the benefit of the case law of the reviewing court of appeals will depend
on whether he has sufficient resources to pursue an appeal to the federal
courts.325 The result is analogous to one in which a litigant before a court
321. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
322. Id.
323. These problems are magnified for agencies which are responsible for administering high-
volume programs. As Ronald E. Robertson, General Counsel of HHS, observed:
Each year some 15,000 State agency adjudicators make some two million disability decisions.
Following these decisions, for claimants who appeal, Social Security Administration adjudica-
tors at the Office of Hearings and Appeals (over 650 Administrative Law Judges) customarily
enter over 200,000 decisions a year. In addition to the disability programs, Social- Security
Administration employees must adjudicate over three million retirement and survivors claims
annually, as well as over 150,000 Supplemental Security Income non-disability claims.
Robertson Letter, supra note 92, at 3-4. For a similar view of the IRS, see supra note 40.
324. An additional cost of differential administration involves the less tangible impact on esprit de
corps and ideological commitment in compelling agency personnel-trained to believe they are respon-
sible for a unitary, internally coherent set of policies-to administer the statute differently in different
parts of the country.
325. See supra text accompanying notes 269-73 (discussing distributional concerns). Other liti-
gants who will not pursue their remedies into the courts are those who are too unsophisticated to
know that this course of action is available and those whose stake in the controversy is insufficient to
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is told that he can purchase the rule of law which will govern the disposi-
tion of his case and that more favorable rules of law are progressively
more expensive. This distributional unfairness is the central cost of in-
tracircuit nonacquiescence.
A by-product of these distributional effects is the lack of uniformity in
the output of the administrative lawmaking system. When lack of re-
sources prevents a litigant's challenge to the agency's nonacquiescence in
court, the result will be vertical disuniformity-disuniformity in outcome
between those who pursue their case into the courts and those who do not.
Like horizontal disuniformity, which is present when different circuits ad-
judicate under different legal standards, vertical disuniformity also under-
mines the goals of uniform administration of federal law.326 Vertical dis-
uniformity is especially troublesome because the negative impact of the
differential policy will probably fall disproportionately on those parties
least able to bear it.
5. Workload of the Federal Courts
Nonacquiescence is likely to increase the volume of cases reaching the
federal courts. Indeed, it is logical to expect that, when the relevant court
of appeals has rejected the policy underlying agency action, a relatively
large number of litigants would seek review.
In the case of intracircuit nonacquiescence, the link is quite direct. Be-
cause a litigant will probably prevail simply through the application of
stare decisis, there will be a strong incentive to seek review, since, in bal-
ancing the costs and benefits of challenging the agency action, the discount
for the risk of not prevailing before the court will be very small. In con-
trast, if the agency had acquiesced, the litigant would have been satisfied
with the agency's decision and the case would never have entered the fed-
eral courts.3 2
The explosion in the workload of the federal courts has been well docu-
mented.32 Strong arguments have also been made about how the problem
cannot be addressed simply by appointing more judges because, at some
point, an increase in the number of judges would lead to a deterioration in
the quality of the courts.3 29 The contribution that nonacquiescence makes
to burgeoning federal caseloads is a cost that must be considered. 330
justify the expense of resorting to the courts. See supra note 36.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 105, 119.
327. Even if the court of appeals to which review lies has not previously addressed the issue, a
decision adverse to the agency in another circuit will signal to the litigant the existence of a reasonably
persuasive position in his favor. Thus, even intercircuit nonacquiescence is likely to generate addi-
tional challenges to agency action.
328. See R. POSNER, supra note 276, at 59-93; Estreicher, Conserving the Federal Judidary for
a Conservative Agenda? (Book Review), 84 MicH. L. REv. 569, 570-77 (1986).
329. See R. PosNEiR, supra note 276, at 96-102.
330. The ensuing friction between agency and reviewing court is a conceivable additional cost.
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6. Assessing the Competing Factors
The presence of weighty factors on both sides of the scale suggests that
either a per se prohibition or an unqualified endorsement of intracircuit
nonacquiescence would be undesirable, and that striking a proper balance
between the competing values will be exceedingly difficult. It is a useful
starting point to consider situations at the extreme where continued in-
tracircuit nonacquiescence should not be tolerated.
One such situation is where all of the circuits have ruled against the
agency and the Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to grant certiorari.
Continued nonacquiescence under such a scenario would raise the specter
of unconstitutionality. In this setting, our reasons for concluding that the
Cooper v. Aaron principle does not carry over to the circuit courts would
lose much of their force: Federal law would not be in flux, and the judi-
cial rejection of the agency's position could not be attributed to the isolated
decision of a single circuit panel.
Neither could nonacquiescence under these circumstances be defended
by a cost-benefit calculus. The relevant comparison is between the effects
of two uniform policies: the agency's original policy as against a new pol-
icy that would be consistent with the rulings of the courts of appeals.
From the perspective of the goal of uniformity, the latter outcome is
clearly preferable since the former produces vertical disuniformity. Simi-
larly, from the perspective of distributional effects, the latter outcome is
also clearly preferable, as the governing rule of law will not depend on
access to litigation resources. Moreover, neither outcome introduces costs
of differential administration, as they both contemplate that the agency
would be implementing a uniform policy.
The only argument that the agency could muster in favor of maintain-
ing its original policy would be based on the cost of the change to a new
policy. But that argument would simply be a restatement of the co-equal
branch analogy: that the agency's responsibility for the interpretation of
federal law is of equal stature in the legal hierarchy as that of the courts.
We thus reject intracircuit nonacquiescence under these circumstances.
A second scenario would have the agency continuing to engage in in-
tracircuit nonacquiescence after all of the courts of appeals have addressed
the validity of the agency's policy and have split on that question, the
circuits have had an opportunity, which they have declined, to reconsider
their original rulings, and neither the Supreme Court nor Congress has
been willing to resolve the conflict. We think it highly unlikely that both
the Supreme Court and Congress would let stand persisting conflict
Much of this friction is due, however, to the uncertain legal status of agency nonacquiescence, and
might recede, at least in part, with clarification of the proper scope of such practices. See supra text
accompanying notes 306-07 (discussing friction under venue choice).
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among the circuits on issues of any real importance.33' The Court's re-
peated refusal to intervene in the face of an intercircuit conflict therefore
might be read as a signal to the agency to fashion a policy that is consis-
tent with the rulings of the circuits. 32
The critical factor here, too, is that the law is no longer in flux: The
circuits have proven unwilling to reconcile their views, and Congress and
the Court, by their inaction, have chosen to tolerate horizontal dis-
uniformity in the administration of the particular statute. In such circum-
stances, intracircuit nonacquiescence is undesirable on policy grounds be-
cause it produces distributional unfairness without the compensating
benefits of prodding intercircuit harmonization or Supreme Court
intervention.' 3
We turn next to a situation in which the law at the circuit court level is
in flux-it is still conceivable that some courts will reconsider their origi-
nal decisions adverse to the agency and that the agency's policy will ulti-
mately be uniformly validated. Assume, for example, that the agency loses
before one circuit and then wins before the next two considering its policy.
Certainly, at that point one would not say that a uniform outcome in the
agency's favor is foreclosed, or even improbable. In such circumstances,
nonacquiescence may lead to a quicker resolution of intercircuit conflicts,
with consequent benefits in terms of the goals of uniform administration.
Moreover, there are cost savings from obviating the need for differential
administration during the period in which the agency has a reasonable
basis to believe that its policy might yet prevail. On the other side of the
equation are the distributional concerns. While sympathetic to such con-
cerns, we believe that they should not be an automatic trump, except
where Congress has spoken on the question in the governing statute.
In light of the preceding discussion, we conclude that intracircuit non-
acquiescence is justified only where it is an adjunct to litigation designed
to yield a uniform rule in favor of the agency's preferred policy. It follows,
as a corollary, that once it becomes unlikely that relitigation will lead to
judicial acceptance of the agency's policy, intracircuit nonacquiescence
loses its justification; the agency must then fashion an approach consistent
with the law of the circuit, even though it remains free to continue to
331. Recent studies suggest that the Court has sufficient decisional capacity to address such con-
flicts and has rarely failed to intervene in Such circumstances. See S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON,
supra note 243, at 6; Note, The Intercircuit Tribunal and Perceived Conflicts: An Analysis of Jus-
tice White's Dissents from Denial of Certiorari During the 1985 Term, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 610, 615
(1987).
332. See Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1227, 1278-91 (1979);
Revesz & Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1067, 1100-04
(1988). The agency might either attempt to fashion a uniform policy, or it might apply different
policies in different circuits.
333. Similarly, in statutory schemes providing for nationally exclusive review in a particular court




press its preferred policy in circuits that have not yet rejected it. In Section
V, we translate this general principle into judicially manageable
standards.
We recognize the tension between the values of percolation, on the one
hand, and uniformity of federal law, on the other. Similarly, there is a
tension between the view of administrative agencies as the primary policy-
makers and the role of the courts as the final arbiters of the legality of
agency policy. In our view, a qualified acceptance of intracircuit nonac-
quiescence better accounts for the competing goals of the administrative
lawmaking system than would a blanket rule either accepting or proscrib-
ing such nonacquiescence.
V. CONSTRAINING INTRACIRCUIT NONACQUIESCENCE
We have shown that intracircuit nonacquiescence is justifiable only
when it is employed as an interim measure that allows the agency to
maintain a uniform administration of its governing statute while it makes
reasonable attempts to persuade the courts to validate its preferred policy.
The question, then, is how to constrain unjustifiable nonacquiescence. We
believe that existing administrative law doctrines provide appropriate tools
for constraining intracircuit nonacquiescence within its proper limits.
A. The Substantive Standard
Consistent with our discussion in Section IV(C), we believe that the
following substantive standard best accounts for the role of the administra-
tive agency in the national lawmaking process, the checking function of
reviewing courts of appeals, and other structural features of the system,
such as the absence of intercircuit stare decisis, the rejection of nonmutual
collateral estoppel against the government, and the Supreme Court's com-
mitment to multicircuit percolation of issues of federal law. Under this
standard, agencies should not engage in intracircuit nonacquiescence un-
less (1) the agency has responsibility for securing a nationally uniform
policy with respect to the question that was the subject of the adverse
judicial decision; (2) there is a justifiable basis for belief that the agency's
position falls within the scope of its delegated discretion; and (3) the
agency is reasonably seeking the vindication of its position both in the
courts of appeals and before the Supreme Court. While a court that had
previously ruled against the agency could continue to set aside agency ac-
tion inconsistent with the previous rule, it could not enjoin the agency
from engaging in intracircuit nonacquiescence in accordance with this
standard (or accomplish the same end by certifying a circuit-wide class
action including future litigants).
Of course, this standard is a prescription for dealing with congressional
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silence about nonacquiescence. 34 Where Congress has provided in an
agency's governing statute that nonacquiescence should be treated in a
particular manner, that determination must control. 3 5
The first prong of the standard requires that the agency have national
policymaking authority over the point in dispute. We recognize that
agency-court disagreements sometimes involve questions over the extent to
which other laws (such as the Freedom of Information Act or Privacy
Act) or constitutional principles limit agency authority under its enabling
statute. In these latter instances, the agency stands in a position not too
different from that of any other litigant complaining of a misapplication of
legal principles that interferes with its freedom to maneuver; the agency
enjoys no special claim to conduct its proceedings independent of circuit
precedent.3 8 The conflict that lies at the heart of this Article, and informs
the legitimacy of intracircuit nonacquiescence, occurs only where the dis-
pute is between an agency's view that it enjoys discretion over the ques-
tion under its organic statute and a judicial ruling that the agency's posi-
tion is barred by the statute. Only in such circumstances can Congress be
said to have endowed the agency with authority to pursue national uni-
formity, for a time, even in the face of adverse circuit precedent.
In a sense, Congress has created a situation of shared responsibility. It
has conferred on the agency a mandate to secure a nationally uniform
administration of its organic statute, and an authority, reflected in the
Supreme Court's doctrine of Chevron deference, to elaborate upon the
bare commands of the statutory text. Yet, at the same time, Congress has
provided that agency decisions will be reviewed for conformity with law
by appellate courts which are free to disagree with each other until the
Supreme Court or Congress forecloses further dialogue. It is only in this
setting that the agency has institutional competence to press its policies
while the law remains in flux.
The second prong requires a "justifiable basis" for belief that the
agency's position falls within its policymaking discretion. Only where such
grounds for agency-court disagreement are present can the agency be said
to be legitimately advancing its responsibility under its enabling statute.
The court must assess the validity of agency action on two levels: review
of the agency's decision on the merits and review of the rationality of the
nonacquiescence policy. An agency does not lack a justifiable basis simply
because its position was previously rejected by the court of appeals; a pre-
vious rejection can be a sufficient condition for setting aside the agency's
action, but it is not a sufficient condition for enjoining nonacquiescence. A
justifiable basis is lacking only where the court concludes that the agency's
334. See supra text accompanying notes 254-56.
335. For example, Congress considered taking such action in 1984 with respect to nonacquies-
cence by the Social Security Administration. See supra Section II(A)(4).
336. See supra notes 214, 235.
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position is so bereft of support in available legal materials that it is un-
likely to be accepted by any other court of appeals.
Although the task of considering the rationality of the agency's position
on these two different levels will be difficult, there is no reason to believe
that a court would equate a losing argument, sufficient to set aside the
agency's action, with an argument devoid of a justifiable basis, which is
the proper predicate for an injunction against nonacquiescence. In the
context of passing on sanctions for legally insubstantial positions under
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the EAJA, the
courts have shown that they are capable of distinguishing claims that are
merely unsuccessful from those that are actually unsupportable.3
The need for these two levels of review is not obviated by heightening
the deference that is accorded to the administrative decision. Even with
the substantial dose of deference to agency views required by the Supreme
Court's Chevron doctrine (or any other level of deference), there will be
an area of bona fide dispute over whether statutory limits on agency dis-
cretion in fact apply. Where this is the case, the agency, as the delegatee
of congressional authority, may continue, for a time, to advance its view
despite some setbacks in the intermediate appellate courts.
The final prong of our standard requires that the agency be reasonably
seeking to vindicate its position in the courts of appeals and before the
Supreme Court.338 Even though we do not propose to describe the opera-
tion of this requirement-which provides the key brake on nonacquies-
cence practices-with mathematical precision, it is possible to provide
some structure for the judicial inquiry.
First, there is a requirement of candor. The agency must openly state
the grounds of its disagreement with circuit precedent because only by
doing so does it make possible intercircuit dialogue, which is a principal
justification for nonacquiescence. Where the agency disguises its disagree-
ment by means of a disingenuous distinction of adverse circuit prece-
dent,339 it effectively precludes that court from reexamining its ruling,
and, therefore, from participating in the intercircuit dialogue. It also sends
misleading signals to other courts of appeals, which may pay closer scru-
tiny to the adverse ruling if the agency openly acknowledges its
disagreement.
Second, a reviewing court should look at how the agency's position has
337. See infra notes 347-48 and accompanying text (discussing EAJA).
338. Another commentator has suggested several reasons why an agency should sometimes refuse
to acquiesce in a single adverse court of appeals ruling. See Note, Administrative Nonacquiescence in
Judicial Decisions, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 147, 163 (1984-85).
339. It is not clear how the courts should treat such an agency. The conventional response to an
erroneous agency ruling which might be sustainable on grounds not articulated by the agency is a
Chenery remand. See Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and Remand of Adminis-
trative Orders, 1969 DUKE L.J. 199. The Chenery doctrine, however, depends on a presumption of
regularity that may be critically undermined where nonacquiescence is surreptitious.
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fared in the various courts of appeals. Other things-principally, the per-
suasiveness of the agency's legal position-being equal, the likelihood that
an agency will obtain a nationwide validation of its policy decreases with
increasing ratios of losses to wins. We are aware that there are cases in
which an agency had lost in almost all of the circuits, then won in one
circuit, thereby creating a conflict, and finally prevailed in the Supreme
Court.3 40 While an agency's ability to press its views in circuits that have
not yet ruled on that policy should not be constrained-we reject any limi-
tations on intercircuit nonacquiescence-we do not think that the agency
can necessarily continue to engage in intracircuit nonacquiescence merely
because one or two circuits have yet to rule. What we are considering is a
balancing of competing factors, and after unsuccessful litigation in a cer-
tain number of circuits, that balance will start pointing against continued
intracircuit nonacquiescence.
Third, an agency genuinely interested in securing intercircuit accept-
ance of its position should actively press its views in the courts of appeals.
For example, in the context of agency action reviewable initially in the
district courts, an agency that persistently declines to seek appellate review
in circuits that have not yet ruled on the legality of its position is not
reasonably seeking to vindicate that position in the courts of appeals.
41
Fourth, a reviewing court should ascertain whether the agency is mak-
ing sufficient efforts to obtain Supreme Court review of its policy. An
agency should, as a general matter, be petitioning for certiorari from ad-
verse decisions of the courts of appeals. Certainly, some flexibility is re-
quired; it might be reasonable for the agency not to seek review in ad-
vance of an intercircuit conflict. But a general failure to seek certiorari
should weigh heavily against the validity of the agency's intracircuit non-
acquiescence. Similarly, the reviewing court should ask whether the
agency is opposing certiorari petitions from circuits in which its policy has
been upheld. If the agency is genuinely interested in the validation of a
uniform policy-rather than in the protection of a favorable judgment-it
should not oppose, and indeed should support, its opponents' certiorari
petitions.
Of course, agencies generally cannot directly petition the Supreme
Court but must obtain the clearance of the Solicitor General, 342 who, in
order to preserve his capital with the Court, may often resist agency de-
340. See supra note 154.
341. We define intracircuit nonacquiescence as disregard of a decision of a court of appeals. That
does not mean, however, that an agency can avoid the nonacquiescence label merely by failing to
appeal adverse district court decisions.
342. See 28 U.S.C. § 518 (1982); 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(a) (1988). But see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341, 2348
(1982) (granting certain agencies more independence from control by Justice Department). For a
general discussion of the relationship between the Solicitor General and administrative agencies, see




mands for review. We do not mean to authorize judicial review of the
delicate negotiations and deliberative processes that inform the Solicitor
General's decision whether or not to petition for certiorari. Nevertheless,
the government cannot defend continued nonacquiescence without seeking
Supreme Court intervention merely because it has chosen to divide peti-
tioning authority in this way.
We have considered the question whether the active pursuit of a legisla-
tive solution should suffice even if Supreme Court review is not sought.
343
There is something to this view, as there is no reason to prefer judicial to
legislative intervention. Nevertheless, because of the practical difficulties
that plague the evaluation of what constitutes an active pursuit of legisla-
tion-flowing from the relative ease with which a bill may be introduced
into the legislative hopper-we do not believe that an agency can justify
prolonged nonacquiescence in this manner.
Fifth, it is relevant whether the statutory scheme or the Supreme
Court's due process and equal protection jurisprudence evinces a particu-
larly strong concern over distributional effects. Of course, if the agency's
governing statute bars nonacquiescence altogether, there is no room for
further discussion. But Congress may have intended that the agency pay
particular attention to distributional effects without stipulating a per se
rule against intracircuit nonacquiescence. If a heightened concern about
such effects is statutorily authorized or constitutionally prescribed, in-
tracircuit nonacquiescence could be truncated more quickly than it would
otherwise be.
344
Without specific congressional direction, however, such distributional
concerns should not be elevated to the point of creating a rule of presump-
tive invalidity.3, It is the central thesis of this Article that nonacquies-
cence, even intracircuit nonacquiescence, is a legitimate feature of the ad-
ministrative landscape; agencies must be permitted the option of pursuing
uniform policies at the administrative level as an adjunct to a reasonable
litigation policy designed to secure nationwide judicial validation of the
point in dispute.346
343. The draft recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States take the
position that "the active pursuit of legislative change" could substitute for a litigation campaign. See
53 Fed. Reg. 12,445 (1988).
344. See Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26, 30 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd in pertinent part, 725
F.2d 1489, 1497-98 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984); Letter from Nancy
Morawetz, Matthew Diller, Burt Neuborne, and David Udell to Mary Candace Fowler, at 3-4
(May 6, 1988) (public comment to ACUS policy) [hereinafter Letter from Stieberger Plaintiffs].
345. Similarly, without a congressional mandate, such concerns do not require interim compliance
with adverse circuit precedent until the agency can demonstrate some overriding justification. See
supra text accompanying note 314-15.
346. We do not believe that for purposes of assessing the legitimacy of nonacquiescence practices,
a distinction should be drawn between agencies that dispense benefits, such as SSA or the Veterans'
Administration (VA) and agencies that exercise regulatory authority, such as the NLRB or EPA. The
argument for such a distinction holds that agencies in the former category, because they.are in a sense
dispensing "their" money, have a tendency to "cheat"-to favor legal rules and factfinding processes
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By applying our proposed standard, a court should be able to determine
when intracircuit nonacquiescence is unjustifiable. This determination is
central to the remedial inquiry. It is only in the cases of unjustifiable
nonacquiescence that a court should enter injunctions mandating that the
agency internalize the case law of the circuit in its administrative proceed-
ings (or should certify class actions that include future members). In the
administrative context, as in other areas of the law, it is simply improper
to turn each case into an injunctive proceeding; an injunction is warranted
only when an agency has exceeded the bounds of a rational nonacquies-
cence policy.
This same standard need not necessarily apply to the award of attor-
ney's fees against the government. For example, distributional concerns
posed by nonacquiescence could be mitigated by requiring the government
to pay the attorney's fees of prevailing parties against whom it had nonac-
quiesced. We doubt, however, that the BAJA, 4 ' as presently drafted, can
be construed in this manner. 48
that limit the number of claimants and the size of their claims, regardless of contrary signals in their
enabling statutes. If so, such agencies should not be entitled to a presumption of regularity, a pre-
sumption that supports the allowance of intracircuit nonacquiescence.
There are a number of difficulties with this argument. First, it depends on an empirical pre-
mise-that such agencies administer programs in which the claims of qualified beneficiaries exceed
the resources that Congress has budgeted and that these resources are unlikely to be supplemented
upon a showing of need. Second, the argument relies on a psychological judgment that officials of such
agencies view the public funds entrusted to their care as personal resources to be expended in accor-
dance with personal predilection, rather than statutory directives. Finally, the argument requires
stripping these agencies not only of the presumption of regularity but also of Chevron deference to
their interpretation of the statute, and of "substantial evidence" deference to their factfinding. In
short, such an argument casts agencies in a radically different role at variance with congressional
design.
347. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1982).
348. The EAJA authorizes attorney's fees against the government whenever its position on the
merits either at the agency level or in the courts is not "substantially justified." 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(1)(A), (d)(2)(D) (1982); see Herron v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 1127, 1128-30 (5th Cir. 1986). The
statute dearly contemplates that the standard for awarding fees is not the same as the standard for
determining whether the agency's position should be sustained on the merits. The Supreme Court
held in Pierce v. Underwood, 108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988), that "substantially justified" means "justified to
a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person," id. at 2550, and added that "a position can be
justified even though it is not correct, and we believe it can be substantially (i.e., for the most part)
justified if a reasonable person could think it correct, that is, if it has a reasonable basis in law and
fact." Id. at 2550 n.2.
The EAJA decisions to date do not provide a clear answer to the question of whether fee awards
may be assessed even in circumstances where an agency's nonacquiescence policy should not be en-
joined. Underwood itself involved a situation where the agency settled the litigation after having suc-
cessfully obtained a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court. Id. at 2545. In sustaining the trial
court's fee award, the Court engaged in deferential, "clearly erroneous" review of the district court's
determination, noting that the grant of certiorari was counterbalanced by the fact that every court to
hear the merits (nine district courts and two courts of appeals) rejected the government's position. Id.
at 2552. Because the Supreme Court did not look at the issue de novo, it provided little guidance on
the proper interpretation of the EAJA.
For pre-Underwood case law, compare Enerhaul, Inc. v. NLRB, 710 F.2d 748, 751 (11th Cir.
1983) (Congress did not intend to approve agency's "reliance on a legal theory that has been clearly
and repeatedly rejected by this Court") with Wyandotte Savings Bank v. NLRB, 682 F.2d 119, 120
(6th Cir. 1982) (although agency's position had been rejected by circuit, it enjoyed support in dissent-
ing opinions and rulings of other circuits). Fees also have been awarded for intercircuit nonacquies-
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B. The Role of the APA
We believe that the APA349 provides courts with the legal authority to
enjoin nonacquiescence that does not comport with the standard described
in the previous section. Under the APA's "arbitrary and capricious" stan-
dard,350 a court must set aside administrative action if
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it
to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to
the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.35'
As Judge Breyer and Professor Stewart have noted, the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard has both a "hard look" or "adequate consideration"
component, which focuses on the process of the agency's decision, and a
"substantive" component, which assesses the rationality of the agency's
action.5 2
We have identified four principal factors relevant to the analysis of in-
tracircuit nonacquiescence: intercircuit dialogue, uniform outcomes, differ-
ential administration, and distributional effects. We believe that an in-
quiry based on these factors is encompassed within the APA's "arbitrary
and capricious" standard.353 Thus, intracircuit nonacquiescence in con-
formity with our proposed standard can be viewed as satisfying the APA's
requirement of "reasoned decisionmaking." '54 Intracircuit nonacquies-
cence inconsistent with this standard cannot survive APA scrutiny.
The typical framework for APA rationality review is provided by the
agency's organic statute; the rationality of an agency's policy is evaluated
in terms of the specific goals and constraints of its implementing stat-
ute.3 55 The factors that govern the validity of intracircuit nonacquiescence,
cence that could not be justified in terms of a plan to create a meaningful conflict among the circuits.
See Keasler v. United States, 766 F.2d 1227, 1234-38 (8th Cir. 1985).
349. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1982).
350. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982) ("The reviewing court shall . . .hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law .... ).
351. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
352. See S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY PoLicY 341-42
(1985).
353. We maintain that such an inquiry is presently authorized by the APA and is consistent with
the strictures against extrastatutory judicial innovation set forth in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). We recognize, however, that there may be reasonable dispute
on this point, and that legislation may be required to assuage concerns over the legitimacy of intracir-
cuit nonacquiescence or over a court's authority under the APA to scrutinize ihe reasonableness of a
nonacquiescence policy.
354. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 104 (1983).
355. See, e.g., id. at 97 ("[a]dministrative decisions should be set aside in this context, as in every
other, only for substantial procedural or substantive reasons as mandated by statute") (quoting Ver-
mont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 558).
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by contrast, derive from the structural underpinning of the administrative
lawmaking system, principally from the position of the administrative
agencies as the primary policymakers under their organic statutes, the
value of uniformity in the administration of federal law, and the lack of
intercircuit stare decisis. There is no reason to believe, however, that the
APA's "arbitrary and capricious" standard is confined to statute-specific
norms, and cannot give effect to general principles of administrative law
and to the background norms against which the relationship between
agency and reviewing court is formed. "Hard look" judicial review,356 for
example, is not so much an elaboration of specific statutory commands as
it is an implementation of a broader conception of the court's checking
function in the administrative process.
We also rely on the well-established canon that, wherever possible,
courts should construe statutes to avoid constitutional problems.3 57 The
factors that make Cooper v. Aaron not wholly apposite to routine in-
stances of intracircuit nonacquiescence lose most of their force when such
nonacquiescence is carried too far and becomes a tool for defiance of judi-
cial review instead of a reasonable quest for the uniform validation of the
agency's preferred policy. Thus, a rule against unjustifiable nonacquies-
cence may be necessary to avoid collision with constitutional principles.3 58
In commenting on our proposed substantive standard and an earlier
draft of this Article, representatives of the Office of the Solicitor General
and the Civil Division of the Justice Department have argued that any
judicial review of an agency's nonacquiescence practice is inappropriate
and invites the courts to embark on "a new category of litigation about the
very conduct of litigation itself." '59 The Justice Department's position is,
at the core, based on a view of the relationship between agency and court
inconsistent with Cooper v. Aaron-that judicial decisions bind only the
parties to the case.360 There are sound reasons for qualifying the Cooper
v. Aaron principle in the context of intermediate, regional appellate
courts.36 ' But it is nevertheless not true that under current legal princi-
356. The term was apparently coined by the late Harold Leventhal of the D.C. Circuit. See, e.g.,
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850-52 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 923 (1971); see generally Estreicher, Pragmatic Justice: The Contributions of Judge Harold
Leventhal to Administrative Law, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 894, 903-07 (1980) (discussing "hard look"
doctrine of judicial review).
357. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979) (citing Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion in Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804)).
358. The Court in Vermont Yankee, while eschewing judicial imposition of procedures not re-
quired by the organic statute or the APA, took care to note the absence of constitutional constraints.
435 U.S. at 542 & n.16.
359. Merrill Letter, supra note 21, at 14; Letter from John R. Bolton to Marshall J. Breger
(May 6, 1988) [hereinafter Bolton Letter] (commenting on earlier draft of this Article and on draft
ACUS policy).
360. See Bolton Letter, supra note 359, at 11-14.
361. See supra text accompanying notes 239-47.
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pies-notably the pervasive requirement of rational agency action under
the APA-that agencies have a completely free hand to disregard the pre-
cedent of courts of appeals that will review their action.
It is also not the case that our proposal will generate a new form of
litigation. That litigation is there-witness the Ninth Circuit's circuit-
wide injunction in the Lopez v. Heckler litigation and the Second Circuit's
comparable Stieberger litigation 3 2-but it is presently conducted on a
plane of warring absolutism, which deflects careful consideration of the
respective roles of agency and reviewing court. Our proposal seeks to
make nonacquiescence regular and legitimate-to encourage agencies to
be more self-conscious about these practices and courts to understand that
their role is not simply one of policing wayward subordinate actors.
C. Procedural Safeguards
In addition to the substantive standard that we have discussed, we be-
lieve that particular procedural safeguards should accompany an intracir-
cuit nonacquiescence policy. Some of these procedures may be judicially
imposed, in our view, pursuant to APA rationality review. Even if the
APA is held not to provide authorization for requiring such procedures,
however, agencies intending to pursue a nonacquiescence policy should be
encouraged to adopt them. First, a decision to nonacquiesce should be ap-
proved by the agency head or some specially designated delegatee such as
an acquiescence review board. Second, the agency should publish in the
Federal Register, or otherwise widely disseminate, a notice of its decision
to nonacquiesce including a brief statement of reasons for that decision.
Third, in the case of agencies that cannot file a petition for certiorari in
the Supreme Court absent approval by the Solicitor General, efforts
should be made to consult with the Solicitor General prior to embarking
on a nonacquiescence policy.
Under our analysis, intracircuit nonacquiescence is justifiable only
where it is an adjunct to nationwide litigation reasonably seeking valida-
tion of the agency's preferred policy. If the agency is not prepared to de-
fend that policy in other circuits, nonacquiescence should simply be im-
permissible. Decisions about intracircuit nonacquiescence, therefore,
should not be made in a decentralized fashion in the agency's regional
offices; they should rest with the agency head or commissioners. 63 Given
the potential for friction between the agency and the federal courts, we
believe that approval by the agency head or specially designated delegatee
362. See supra text accompanying notes 97-126.
363. For those agencies which use adjudication as the exclusive vehicle for policymaking, the
agency's declaration of nonacquiescence or acquiescence may be deferred until an appropriate case is
presented to the agency head or commissioners. We are not requiring interim compliance with the
circuit ruling at these levels for reasons articulated in Section III(C) above.
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will enhance the likelihood that a decision to nonacquiesce reflects a con-
sidered determination by the agency.
The legal basis for the requirement of approval of intracircuit nonac-
quiescence by the agency head rests in the same structural concerns that
underlie the Supreme Court's decision in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong.""
That case involved a challenge to a regulation imposed by the Civil Ser-
vice Commission that barred the employment of aliens in the federal gov-
ernment. The regulation was defended, inter alia, on the grounds that it
gave the President an expendable bargaining chip in negotiating treaties
with foreign countries and that it provided aliens with an incentive to
become naturalized." 5 The Court assumed that the bar could be justified
on the basis of such goals.3 6 It found, however, that these were not goals
of direct concern to the Commission.167 Therefore, the Court was "not
willing to presume" that the Commission "was deliberately fostering an
interest so far removed from [its] normal responsibilities." '368 As a conse-
quence, the Court struck down the regulations. On remand, an official
with direct responsibility over the goals in question-the President him-
self-issued an order disqualifying aliens from the Civil Service,36 9 and
that order was sustained by the courts.
370
In the case of intracircuit nonacquiescence, as in Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, the agency decision is justifiable if undertaken as a means of pro-
moting certain goals-the agency's interest in maintaining a uniform in-
terpretation of its statute while it makes reasonable efforts to obtain a
nationwide validation of this position-but not otherwise.3 71 Therefore,
intracircuit nonacquiescence should be upheld only if it is approved by the
officials who have a direct interest and control over those goals-in this
case, the agency head or commissioners or their delegatees.
A second procedural safeguard we proffer is that the decision to nonac-
quiesce be published and explained. Intracircuit nonacquiescence is never
justifiable when it happens by default; it is only permissible as an adjunct
to a considered policy of nationwide litigation. Thus, it is important that
the agency evaluate the impact of the adverse court of appeals ruling, and
364. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
365. Id. at 104-05.
366. Id. at 105.
367. Id. at 114.
368. Id. at 105.
369. Exec. Order No. 11,935, 41 Fed. Reg. 37,301 (1976).
370. Vergara v. Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1978).
371. Although Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong involved a constitutional challenge, nothing in the
Court's opinion suggests that the structural result would have been different if the applicable limita-
tions on agency action had derived from a statutory source. Thus, if an administrative practice is valid
only if undertaken pursuant to particular statutory goals, the practice cannot stand if approved by an
official for whom fostering those goals is "far removed from his normal responsibilities." Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 105. Moreover, intracircuit nonacquiescence may well raise constitu-




that it explain, albeit briefly, its reasons for pressing its position in the
face of this ruling.
The issues raised in this connection are analogous to those that arise
when an agency chooses to abandon an established policy. The Supreme
Court has made clear that "an agency changing its course . . . is obli-
gated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change." ' 2 As the D.C. Cir-




[A]n administrative agency. . . is not bound to rigid adherence to its
prior rulings. Lodged deep within the bureaucratic heart of adminis-
trative procedure, however, is the equally essential proposition that,
when an agency decides to reverse its course, it must provide an
opinion or analysis indicating that the standard is being changed
and not ignored.
374
So, too, for the reasons that we have discussed, an agency is not always
required to acquiesce in the rulings of the court of appeals that will re-
view its actions. But it cannot simply ignore such rulings. Just as an
agency cannot "silently depart from previous policies, ' 75 it cannot silently
act contrary to a prior ruling of its reviewing court.
376
A third procedural safeguard is consultation with the Solicitor General.
One of the relevant considerations in assessing the rationality of intracir-
cuit nonacquiescence will be whether the agency is actively seeking Su-
preme Court review on the disputed legal question. With limited excep-
tions, agencies cannot petition for certiorari without the approval of the
Solicitor General. Therefore, we would urge agencies, before engaging in
nonacquiescence, to consult with the Solicitor General and seek some pre-
liminary indications as to whether the agency's position will be supported
by the Solicitor General.3 77 We do not believe, however, that it is appro-
372. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983).
373. 454 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
374. Id. at 1026 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Or, as Judge Leventhal stressed, the
agency must indicate "that prior policies and standards are being deliberately changed, not casually
ignored." Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 923 (1971).
In recent years, the D.C. Circuit has set aside administrative actions in many cases in which the
agency had not properly acknowledged or explained its change in policy. See, e.g., Robbins v. Reagan,
780 F.2d 37, 48-49 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam); National Black Media Coalition v. FCC, 775
F.2d 342, 355-56 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
375. Committee for Community Access v. FCC, 737 F.2d 74, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
376. The requirements of notice and explanation also mitigate somewhat the distributional effects
by alerting at least some potential litigants that recourse to the courts may well be successful, thereby
increasing the probability that the agency's action will in fact be challenged.
377. Advance consultation would not impose an unreasonable burden on the Solicitor General.
Pursuant to regulation, the Solicitor General already must approve appeals from the district courts to
the courts of appeals. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(b) (1988). Because it is unlikely that intracircuit nonac-
quiescence would be a routine practice, this responsibility should not overwhelm the Solicitor Gen-
eral's other duties. In any event, the Justice Department will, in general, be involved in the litigation
when the agency's underlying policy and nonacquiescence practice are challenged in the courts. See 28
U.S.C. § 516 (1982).
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priate for courts to police the relationship between an agency and its law-
yer-the Justice Department in general and the Solicitor General in par-
ticular. Thus, while it is desirable that agencies voluntarily adopt a
consultation requirement, judicial enforcement of this requirement is
inappropriate.
VI. ELIMINATING VENUE CHOICE
At present, intracircuit nonacquiescence is relatively rare because most
statutes provide for review of agency decisions in a number of courts of
appeals; the agency, therefore, cannot predict with certainty the identity of
the reviewing circuit." 8 The NLRB, as we have discussed, is often in this
position because the broad venue provisions of its enabling statute lodge
review in the court of appeals where the petitioner resides or "transacts
business," where the unfair labor practice occurred, or in the D.C. Cir-
cuit.3 7 9 Provisions of this type-a common feature of enactments of the
New Deal era-were patterned in part after the Clayton and Federal
Trade Commission Acts,380 but differed from these antecedents in ena-
bling private petitioners to seek alternative venue in the D.C. Circuit. 8 '
As we concluded in Section IV(C), when an agency decision is subject
to review in a number of different courts of appeals, limits on nonacquies-
cence are undesirable for the same reasons as are limits on intercircuit
nonacquiescence. To compel an agency to follow the adverse ruling of a
particular court of appeals would be to give that court undue influence in
the intercircuit dialogue by diminishing the opportunity for other courts of
proper venue to consider, and possibly sustain, the agency's position.
Even though we would not restrict nonacquiescence in the face of venue
choice, we favor predictable venue rules. While our conclusion is moti-
vated primarily by our analysis of the nonacquiescence question, we also
identify independent reasons why venue choice is undesirable. 82
We realize that to the extent that an agency sets its nonacquiescence policy in the context of a
formal adjudication (or of a formal rulemaking), advance consultation with the Solicitor General may
be an inappropriate ex parte communication (a subject on which we do not take a position).
378. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 143-46 (discussing NLRB); supra note 186 (dis-
cussing OSHRC); 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1982) (Federal Trade Commission); 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1 (1982)
(Consumer Futures Trading Commission); 5 U.S.C. § 7123 (1982) (Federal Labor Relations
Authority).
379. See supra text accompanying notes 143-46.
380. See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1982); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §
45(b) (1982). The legislative history of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 449, now
codified as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1982), where § 10(e)-(f) originated, 29 U.S.C. §
160(e)-(f) (1982), states that "[p]rovisions for similar enforcement of orders of administrative bodies
made upon like procedures may be found in the Federal Trade Commission Act ... land] the Clayton
Act." 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 1935, at 1361
(1985).
381. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(0 (1982).
382. Of course, if venue choice is eliminated, more cases will come under the constraints that
apply to intracircuit nonacquiescence, and agencies will be limited in their ability to maintain a uni-
form policy at the administrative level in the face of conflicting circuit court decisions. See supra text
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First, venue choice has negative effects from the perspective of an
agency's relitigation policy. Such choice makes it difficult for an agency to
continue advocating its preferred policy in circuits which have not rejected
it, without having to face challenges to that policy, again and again, in
circuits which have already rejected it. Where venue is fixed, however, an
agency can largely confine the impact of an adverse circuit decision to the
geographic reach of that court. It can choose to engage in intercircuit non-
acquiescence without concern that its opponents will race to a circuit that
previously ruled against it. But where venue is uncertain, petitioners ag-
grieved by the agency action will typically repair to the circuit which pre-
viously ruled against the agency, and that court will view the agency's
behavior to be quite akin to intracircuit nonacquiescence.
Except when all circuits with venue over the agency action have taken
congruent positions opposed to the agency, venue choice will exacerbate
the agency-court tensions caused by the pursuit of national uniformity by
channeling a disproportionate number of cases to circuits that have ruled
against the agency. The corollary, of course, is that such circuits will have
a disproportionate role in determining the agency's decisions. As we have
already explained, this bias is undesirable.3 83
Second, venue choice allows an agency to continue to advocate its pre-
ferred policy nationwide even after such a strategy has ceased to be desira-
ble from the perspective of the administrative lawmaking system. In a
venue-certain regime, an agency could apply its preferred policy at the
administrative level, without restrictions, in circuits that had not yet ruled
on the legality of that policy and in circuits that had sided with the
agency. But in circuits that had rejected that policy, the agency could con-
tinue to apply it only if it met the rationality standard set forth in Section
V(A). Venue choice eliminates the restraining force of rationality review.
It is thus not surprising that some agencies perceive that broad venue pro-
visions increase their power at the expense of the courts of appeals. 8 4
Venue choice also has undesirable effects in areas unrelated to the focus
of this study."8 ' First, and perhaps most importantly, broad venue provi-
sions lead to forum shopping. To the extent that review of administrative
action is available in several courts of appeals, litigants will seek to obtain
review in the court with the case law most favorable to their position. For
accompanying notes 334-48.
383. See supra text accompanying notes 291-95.
384. Collyer Letter, supra note 41, at 13-14. One could argue, of course, that the proper way to
address this problem is by requiring agencies to acquiesce in the adverse ruling of any circuit with
venue over the agency's decision, even if the other available fora had ruled for the agency or were
uncommitted. But, as we have explained, costs of imposing such limits are simply too high because of
the extent to which they would impair an agency's relitigation efforts in circuits that had not rejected
its policy and because of the undue weight accorded to the positions of circuits which ruled against the
agency. Thus, the better course is to remove the venue uncertainty.
385. See Note, Venue for Judicial Review of Administrative Action: A New Approach, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 1735, 1736-44 (1980).
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example, until the advent of recent legislation,"8 6 there had been intense
competition among interested parties to be the first to file a petition for
review. Under then-prevailing law, the court in which the first challenge
was filed became the forum for review of the administrative action; chal-
lenges filed elsewhere were transferred to that court.38 ' The result was
that the applicable circuit court law was determined by who won the
''race to the courthouse."
The unseemliness of this race led Congress to provide, in the recent
amendments, that the reviewing circuit be determined by lottery from
among all of the circuits in which petitions for review are filed within ten
days of the agency's order; the rule of first filing would continue where
petitions are filed after the ten-day period."88 It is not clear, however, why
it is preferable to determine venue by lottery, after actions have been filed
in several circuits, rather than to make it clear ex ante.
For review of NLRB decisions, for example, a predictable venue could
be the circuit in which the unfair labor practice occurred. Admittedly, in
some cases it will be difficult to determine the site of the underlying
events, or those events may have occurred in several circuits. We believe,
however, that such cases will be rare and that predictable rules could be
fashioned. Marginal applications of any venue rule will produce some col-
lateral litigation. But such litigation is present even under the current
venue provisions,38 9 and there is little reason to believe that a predictable
venue regime will exacerbate this difficulty. In any event, the few cases in
which this rule will not be wholly predictable should not drive venue pol-
icy for the vast majority of cases.39 '
Second, venue choice, as it operates in practice, places some administra-
tive agencies at a strategic disadvantage. For example, the NLRB gener-
ally seeks enforcement of its orders in the court of appeals with jurisdic-
tion over the geographic area where the unfair labor practice occurred.391
Thus, it does not take full advantage of the strategic benefits of venue
choice, which would allow it, if it were so inclined, instead to seek en-
forcement in the circuit with the most favorable case law from among
those in which respondents reside or "transact business." In contrast, par-
ties aggrieved by the NLRB's order use venue uncertainty more strategi-
386. See Pub. L. No. 100-236, 101 Stat. 1731 (1988) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (1982));
H.R. REP. No. 72, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
387. In general, courts apply the law of the transferee circuit. See supra note 242.
388. See supra note 386.
389. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 158-60.
390. The fact that the NLRB, by internal policy, already seeks enforcement of its orders in the
circuit in which the unfair labor practice occurred, see supra text accompanying note 142, makes clear
that such a venue rule can be practicably administered. Indeed, the Board, in its comments on an
earlier draft of this Article, did not raise practicability as an argument in support of status quo ar-
rangements. See Collyer Letter, supra note 41.
391. See supra text accompanying note 144.
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cally.3 12 We can think of no desirable reason for handicapping agencies in
this way. Neither can we think of a legitimate justification for equalizing
the scales by encouraging agencies to engage in forum shopping, rather
than by simply eliminating venue choice.3"'
Third, venue choice is undesirable from a distributional standpoint. It
gives multistate actors and wealthy, well-organized parties (or those other-
wise having access to litigation resources) an advantage over less well-
situated parties, who are more likely to seek review in the court of appeals
that is geographically closest, rather than in the one that offers them the
best case law.
It is important to stress that in criticizing the effects of venue uncer-
tainty, we are not advocating the use of exclusive venue provisions. Under
an exclusive venue provision, challenges to particular types of administra-
tive action can be brought only in one circuit. For example, the D.C.
Circuit is the only proper venue in which to challenge regulations
promulgated by EPA establishing emission standards for new sources
under section 111 of the Clean Air Act. 94 In contrast, under a scheme in
which venue is predictable but not exclusive, ultimately all of the circuits
may entertain challenges to agency action, even though for each particular
decision only one circuit will be the proper venue. Thus, whereas exclu-
sive venue provisions hamper intercircuit dialogue,3 95 predictable venue
provisions do not.398
The benefits attributed to broad venue provisions do not outweigh the
problems that we have identified. It is true that venue choice may promote
the convenience of certain parties. Emphasizing this consideration, NLRB
General Counsel Collyer states:
The convenience of citizens aggrieved by government action is also a
factor that is still entitled to respectful consideration. That conve-
nience may involve no more than that a party's Manhattan attorney
may seek review in a New Jersey dispute without going to Philadel-
392. See supra text accompanying notes 155-60.
393. Before 1958, the court in which the NLRB filed the transcript of its proceeding obtained
exclusive jurisdiction over the entire case even where an aggrieved party may have previously peti-
tioned in another circuit. Congress removed the Board's power to choose the forum by adding 28
U.S.C. § 2112. See H.R. REP. No. 842, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1957). It has been suggested that
the purpose of the 1958 amendment was to "punish" the NLRB for its forum-shopping practice, see
McGarity, supra note 160, at 347, but it appears that Congress's purpose was to limit forum-shop-
ping by agencies generally, see Comment, A Proposal to End the Race to the Court House in Appeals
from Federal Administrative Orders, 68 COLM. L. REV. 166, 168-69 (1968). In light of the Board's
policy to seek enforcement only in the circuit where the ULPs occurred, see supra note 144, a return
to pre-1958 arrangements would have the same effect as creating predictable venue in that circuit.
394. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1982).
395. Exclusive venue provisions, however, may have other benefits, which may outweigh the loss
of intercircuit dialogue. Perhaps most importantly, they provide a quick, authoritative resolution of
legal controversies. They also promote expertise on the part of the reviewing court. The wholesale use
of exclusive venue provisions, however, is inconsistent with the rejection of intercircuit stare decisis
and the preeminence of generalist courts. See R. Revesz, supra note 278, at 70-71.
396. See R. Revesz, supra note 278, at 70.
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phia. However, it may also involve the more substantial claim of an
employee who was discharged in Wisconsin but who lives in Nevada
at the time he petitions for review. Or the convenience may be that
of employees whose case technically arose in an Indiana border town
but who live much closer to Cincinnati than Chicago."'
There is reason to be skeptical about the claim that broad venue choice
of the type present in the NLRA is necessary to ensure that litigants are
not relegated to an inconvenient forum. Most importantly, individuals and
small corporations opposed to agency action are likely to be residents of
the circuit in which the allegedly unlawful conduct occurred. In general,
the forum choice afforded by broad venue rules is significant only for a
particular class of litigants-large organizations that would like to peti-
tion for review in circuits where they have their headquarters or "transact
business." But even in such cases, the convenience rationale is not persua-
sive. Appellate review of agency action, such as actions under the NLRA,
involve only briefing and oral argument and review on the basis of the
administrative record; there are no witnesses to be called, and other fact-
gathering activity does not take place. Moreover, in the case of multiple
challenges to the same administrative decision, if different parties prefer to
litigate in different circuits, it is far from clear that venue determined by
the time of filing or by lottery would be more convenient, for most liti-
gants, than a rule fixing venue in the circuit where the underlying events
occurred.
A separate issue is whether the benefits of maintaining an alternative
venue in the D.C. Circuit outweigh the costs engendered by the resulting
unpredictability of venue. The NLRA's provision for alternate venue in
the D.C. Circuit (a common characteristic of New Deal legislation) was
not present in the earlier Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts.398
We suspect that the initial impetus was to permit opponents of agency
action the option of suit in the seat of national government, rather than a
deliberate judgment to allocate reviewing authority to a court which
would, over time, acquire expertise in administrative law. Such an inter-
pretation explains why the statute affords this option to parties aggrieved
by NLRB orders while Senator Wagner eliminated the provision which
would have given the agency the same choice.3 99
Whatever the original design may have been, the D.C. Circuit has de-
veloped a special competence in the administrative area, which undoubt-
397. Collyer Letter, supra note 41, at 12 (footnote omitted).
398. See J. CHAMBERLAIN, N. DOWLING & P. HAYS, THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 170-72 (1942).
399. Compare S. 1958, Original Senate Print, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (Feb. 21, 1935) with S.
1958, as reported, 2d Senate Print, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (May 2, 1935), reprinted in 1




edly has enriched the intercircuit dialogue."" It is unclear, however, to
what extent alternative venue provisions rather than exclusive jurisdic-
tional grants have contributed to this phenomenon. We are willing to con-
cede, for purposes of discussion, that because of its limited geographic
reach, the D.C. Circuit's role in the administrative state would be reduced
under predictable venue rules.
The question is whether the incremental contribution to the D.C. Cir-
cuit's expertise stemming from its role as the alternative venue in adminis-
trative cases outweighs the costs of the attendant venue uncertainty. In
considering this point, one should bear in mind that if the D.C. Circuit
were to become the sole alternative venue in an otherwise venue-certain
regime, its decisions would acquire a national prominence even greater
than it now enjoys, overshadowing the regional courts, skewing the in-
tercircuit dialogue, and creating pressure on the Supreme Court to police
its determinations aggressively. Such an arrangement is problematic for
many of the same reasons that counsel against creation of a national court
of appeals situated between the existing circuit courts and the Supreme
Court.40' On balance, we think that the better approach is pervasive pre-
dictable venue.
Yet another justification for venue choice, extending well beyond con-
siderations of party convenience and of the D.C. Circuit's special role, was
offered by NLRB General Counsel Collyer, commenting for the Board on
an earlier draft of this Article. In the Board's view, existing venue provi-
sions reflect congressional rejection of a district court model of agency
review:
Rather than giving the circuit courts exclusive authority over all
agency activities within their geographic jurisdiction, Congress in-
stead established a system whereby two or more circuits may review
virtually any case-and the jurisdiction to review may turn on no
more substantial ground than the results of a lottery. Such a system
is a deterrent to those courts that would command an agency's re-
sources on a territorial basis.4 2
Moreover, Ms. Collyer noted:
Venue uncertainty removes any incentive for the Board to behave
like a district court .... The knowledge that acquiescence is no safe
harbor but a Board decision that the Board must be prepared to
defend nationwide serves to underscore the responsibility that Con-
400. See Sunstein, Participation, Public Law, and Venue Reform, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 976
(1982); Wald, Making "Informed" Decisions on the District of Columbia Circuit, 50 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 135, 137 (1982).
401. See S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 243, at 111-15.
402. Collyer Letter, supra note 41, at 13 (footnote omitted).
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gress has placed upon the Board to fill in the broad outlines of na-
tional labor policy.4 "
This articulate statement betrays a misconception that pervades judicial
and academic commentary on the subject of agency nonacquiescence-the
tendency to endow venue provisions with structural significance for allo-
cating the roles of administrative agency and reviewing court. Critics of
SSA make the argument that predictable venue invites the district court
analogy: that Congress's choice of predictable venue demonstrates a legis-
lative intent to bar outright intracircuit nonacquiescence. 0 4 For the
NLRB, venue uncertainty conjures up the co-equal branch metaphor:
that, in fashioning a broad venue provision, Congress chose to endow the
agency with power to disregard circuit precedent until the Supreme Court
has spoken. Both projections miss the mark. In our view, in a multi-cir-
cuit system of review, the agency's responsibility for a nationally uniform
administration of its organic statute is simply not a function of the venue
provision. The agency's responsibility, and the attendant checking func-
tion of the courts of appeals, remains the same regardless of the venue
provision.
In summary, it is only the accident of broad venue provisions that en-
ables many agencies to pursue goals of national uniformity without incur-
ring the rebuke that has bedeviled intracircuit nonacquiescence. This state
of affairs has two undesirable effects. First, as a result of the relatively
small number of agencies that operate under venue-certain schemes,
courts have viewed intracircuit nonacquiescence as an aberrational case
meriting sanctions, rather than as a more general by-product of an
agency's legitimate quest for national uniformity. Second, the costs of non-
acquiescence under venue uncertainty have escaped judicial scrutiny. Pre-
dictable venue rules are desirable because they facilitate this checking
function without precluding responsible agency nonacquiescence. 40 5
403. Id. at 14 (footnote omitted).
404. As attorneys for the plaintiffs in the Stieberger litigation contend: "[Wihere Congress has
distributed venue throughout the country to protect the interests of parties appearing before an
agency, Congress had accepted that nonuniform rules may govern the agency and determined that
other interests outweigh the value of uniformity." Letter from Stieberger Plaintiffs, supra note 344, at
11. It is therefore important that, in limiting venue choice, Congress should make clear that it is not
thereby prohibiting agencies from engaging in intracircuit nonacquiescence that satisfies rationality
review.
405. An alternative would be to fashion choice of law rules, which would make it possible to
predict, at the time of the administrative proceedings, which circuit's law would govern the review of
that decision. See Note, Using Choice of Law Rules to Make Intercircuit Conflicts Tolerable, 59
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1078 (1984). But we believe that the prospect of having one circuit apply another




Responding to an earlier draft of this Article, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral John R. Bolton, head of the Justice Department's Civil Division,
stated that "[w~hile agency decisions regarding nonacquiescence should be
rational, subjecting such decisions to judicial review offers few, if any,
advantages over straightforward litigation on the merits of the underlying
issue itself."' '° Thus, a court of appeals would be free to set aside agency
action that was inconsistent with a prior ruling of that court, but would
not be empowered to enjoin nonacquiescence. Each litigant would have to
seek judicial relief in order to benefit from the favorable circuit court rul-
ing. 07 Similarly, Deputy Solicitor General Thomas W. Merrill concluded
that "nonacquiescence decisions, as such, should not be separately made
subject to judicial review."' 0 8
Attorneys representing Social Security claimants occupy the polar ex-
treme. One lawyer wrote that anything short of a blanket bar of intracir-
cuit nonacquiescence "would destroy the very basis of the notion of sepa-
ration of powers by allowing an agency of the Executive Branch to ignore
the judiciary."' 09 Another stated that "[w]hen an agency refuses to follow
the case law of the Circuit, knowing that venue to review will be to the
Court of Appeals of that Circuit, it is engaging in anarchy, pure and sim-
ple."' 10 Attorneys for the Stieberger class argued that "in the public bene-
fits context intracircuit nonacquiescence is illegal.141 1 Along similar lines,
the State of New York urged that "there should be no instances in which
agencies are permitted to disregard rulings of a federal court of appeals in
that circuit.
'41 2
Our Article takes a middle course between the co-equal branch and
district court metaphors that underlie the rhetorical positions assumed by
these litigants. Our approach recognizes a role for the courts in policing
agency practices in this area, but also acknowledges the legitimacy of an
agency's desire to maintain a uniform administration of its governing stat-
ute while it reasonably seeks the national validation of its preferred posi-
tion. The virtue of this approach is not that it travels an intermediate
course. Rather, it flows from a theory of the proper functions of courts
and agencies in the administrative state. It attempts to do justice to the
406. Bolton Letter, supra note 359, at 6.
407. The Justice Department does concede that, at least in some of these cases, EAJA sanctions
would be appropriate.
408. Merrill Letter, supra note 21, at 2.
409. Letter from Brian I. Clymer to Mary Candace Fowler 3 (April 28, 1988) (public comment
on draft ACUS policy).
410. Letter from Gary Palmer to Mary Candace Fowler 1 (May 3, 1988) (public comment on
draft ACUS policy).
411. Letter from Stieberger Plaintiffs, supra note 344, at 17.
412. Letter from Howard L. Zwickel, New York State Department of Law, to Mary Candace
Fowler I (May 6, 1988) (public comment on draft ACUS policy).
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respective responsibilities of, and the delicate interaction between, these
key institutions in our administrative lawmaking system.
